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Preface
Market-oriented planning instruments have recently received considerable at-
tention in many countries. Is it possible to develop innovative, more market-
oriented instruments? In the Netherlands – but also in several other countries 
– the American instrument of Transferable Development Rights has received a 
lot of attention and has been used as an inspiration for the tailor-made trans-
lation of instruments in other planning systems. 
We were inspired to address the topic of transferring development oppor-
tunities between areas in planning practice by a debate between academics, 
lawyers, and planning practitioners at an international planning symposium 
in Annapolis, Maryland (organized by the University of Maryland in the U.S. 
and Habiforum knowledge center in the Netherlands) and the Van Doorne-
Habiforum conference on Transferable Development Rights a year later. We 
quickly decided that the idea of transferring development opportunities be-
tween areas is more than only the transfer of development rights. It relates 
more to compensation: not in money, but in a non-financial perspective. 
The participants’ interest in these types of non-financial compensation 
issues inspired us to probe our own thinking on this compensation issue. A 
comparative study on non-financial compensation was started, funded by 
Habiforum and linked to a number of research projects, such as Menno van 
der Veen’s and Marjolein Spaans’ research funded by the Delft Centre for Sus-
tainable Urban Areas, and Leonie Janssen-Jansen’s research funded by the 
Dutch Scientific Organization NWO-STIP. Marjolein Spaans’ and Leonie Jans-
sen-Jansen’s research also fall under the umbrella of the Habiforum Program 
Innovative Land Use. 
The chapters in this publication are representative of a close cooperation 
between planners, economists and lawyers from both science and planning 
practice. The exchange of knowledge within the framework of this book has 
arisen from divergent paths. Draft chapters were discussed with all the au-
thors during a special track on non-financial compensation within the Inau-
gural Conference of the International Academic Association on Planning, Law 
and Property Rights in Amsterdam, in February 2007. The more theoretical 
chapters were discussed during the international research conference by the 
ENHR (European Network for Housing Research) in Rotterdam, in June, 2007, 
and the Second Conference of the International Academic Association on 
Planning, Law and Property Rights in Warsaw, in February 2008. 
We would like to thank Habiforum and NWO-STIP for making this publica-
tion possible. We are also grateful to the Amsterdam Institute of Metropoli-
tan and International Development Studies at the University of Amsterdam, 
which covered the expenses for our first seminar in 2007. We also thank the 
OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies at the Delft 
University of Technology for covering the costs of the editing and lay-out of 
this book. 
Finally, the contributors to this volume derserve immense thanks for their 
involvement. We hope this book inspires the reader to be curious about the 
instruments of non-financial compensation and to wonder what contribution 
they can make to planning.
Leonie Janssen-Jansen, Marjolein Spaans & Menno van der Veen
Amsterdam & Delft, May 2008
 
Non-financial 1 
compensation in 
international 
comparative research
Leonie Janssen-Jansen, Marjolein Spaans & Menno van der Veen
Introduction1.1 
Market-oriented planning instruments have recently received a lot of atten-
tion worldwide. Although in most developed countries spatial planning still 
reflects a strong awareness of the need for a more balanced and sustainable 
spatial development with provisions for additional space for future devel-
opment, it is increasingly assumed that it is the market, not the state, that 
should resolve planning problems either with or without minimal (financial) 
public intervention. In the search for these market-oriented planning instru-
ments, the U.S. concept of Transferable Developments Rights (TDRs), where 
development rights are transferred between areas, has received considerable 
attention.
The original U.S. TDR concept boils down to the following. Landowner A (in 
a so-called sending area) is not allowed by the government to use his land 
in a particular way which will yield an economic profit. However, the gov-
ernment has to compensate A for this restriction because A will most likely 
suffer a financial loss as a result of it. Instead of providing A with financial 
compensation for the restriction, the government issues a development right. 
This is a right which is valued in terms of money, is transferable and which 
can be bought by a third party owning land in a receiving area, who without 
that right cannot realize the desired land use (at least not to the same extent). 
Landowner A in a sending area sells his right to landowner B in a receiving ar-
ea, who can then use it to develop his land more intensively than before. The 
essential purpose of TDRs is to recapture a portion of the extra value generat-
ed by increased development potential and to use it as compensation for the 
reduction of development potential elsewhere (Pruetz, 2003: 87). The U.S. pro-
grams in Montgomery County, Maryland and in the New Jersey Pinelands are 
known world-wide (Johnston & Madison, 1997; MacHemer et al., 2000; Alexan-
der, 2004; Renard, 2007). Both designate preservation areas where down-zon-
ing has reduced development capacity and ‘taken’ developments rights. TDRs 
strategically transfer those rights, utilizing little to no public funds through a 
voluntary process that provides the landowner in the sending area with just 
compensation for the development rights of the land. It further provides de-
velopers with the opportunity to purchase those development rights as devel-
opment credits which may be used in the designated receiving area to build 
at a higher level, or for more profitable development (Janssen-Jansen, 2008).
Although the American planning concept seems to be simple in its basic 
principles, the TDR concept appears complicated and under debate in all its 
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various applications in both the U.S. and other countries (Renard, 2007). More-
over, the concept has become a reservoir of different planning instruments in 
many countries. Even though there appear to be many pitfalls to the imple-
mentation of the TDR concept and only a few TDR programs have been im-
plemented, they continue to attract considerable interest. In the global trend 
from government to governance, in which the government takes a step back 
in planning and relinquishes increasingly more control to the private sector 
(financing included), there is a demand for such instruments. From this per-
spective, government creates the preconditions and sets the policy objectives. 
Citizens and private parties enjoy greater freedom in this setting, as it does 
not matter to the public authorities how the objectives are attained. In Tokyo, 
for example, conversion and compensation instruments are used to enable a 
more intensive land use on the one hand and to create a safer environment 
with respect to the frequently-occurring earthquakes on the other hand. In 
the Netherlands, planners see it as a potential instrument to redistribute 
wealth between profitable and non-profitable developments.1 Also, in other 
countries, there is an increasing popularity for these pay-as-you-grow prin-
ciples. The elaborate land use reform scheme of Professor Donald Hagman, 
called ‘Windfalls for Wipeouts’, is used to legitimize this recapturing of profits. 
The basic idea is that public agencies whose regulations cause property value 
reductions should compensate landowners for such wipeouts. To be fair, how-
ever, public regulations or other government activities that increase property 
values should be recaptured by the government: the government thus recap-
tures the windfalls that it creates (Hagman & Misczynki, 1978).
In this book we broaden the scope of the basic idea of Transferable Devel-
opment Rights (TDRs) and choose the concept of non-financial compensation. 
Non-financial compensation as a modern planning instrument is thus partly 
rooted in the American TDR concept, but involves more instruments. It in-
cludes all situations where a government has to compensate a landowner for 
his loss of opportunity or his endeavors, but chooses not to do so monetarily, 
but by granting him a new building opportunity which can either be sold or 
used. As a concept, the situation in which a king, emperor or lord finds him-
self in financial need and grants rights and privileges to his well-off citizens 
in exchange for money or services goes back to the Feudal and Roman ag-
es. The term opportunity can be linked to the notion of property rights, i.e. a 
right to use one’s property in a certain way that represents a certain amount 
of money.
1  This is the case in the Netherlands. In general, developing offices, business parks and commercial hous-
ing is profitable for developers; social housing, green areas, roads and other services are non-profitable. 
Redistribution between the gains of an area development and the costs of this development might be used 
as an instrument for more sustainable development.
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Non-financial compensation exists when a government compensates a 
person or company with an interest in land for the loss of one or more of the 
property rights for that land by creating a new property right that he can ei-
ther use or sell. It also exists when a planning authority provides an incentive 
for developers to realize certain planning goals either on their land or on the 
land of others by creating a property right that can be used or sold when the 
goals have been realized, rather than directly subsidizing the realization. The 
latter type of non-financial compensation as incentive structure for spatial 
developments is becoming increasingly popular in international spatial plan-
ning practices. In the final chapter of this book we discuss this variation of 
non-financial compensation more extensively.
It is paradoxical that a non-financial instrument is about money. Howev-
er, we prefer the term non-financial compensation as it emphasizes that the 
government does not compensate landowners by paying them an amount of 
money but by granting them a right that is worth a certain sum. Non-financial 
compensation means that a government does not directly subsidize or com-
pensate a landowner (or developer) for his loss or his endeavors. The concept 
of non-financial compensation is further elaborated in Chapter 2.
Aim and structure of this book1.2 
The aim of this book is to elaborate on the use of non-financial compensation 
instruments in planning by bringing together different international experi-
ences that are of relevance for current spatial planning practice (as ‘best prac-
tice’ or as ‘noticeable practices’), to discuss them in a structured way and to 
look for a more general approach to these instruments from economic, legal 
and spatial perspectives.
As the concept of non-financial compensation has been elaborated in dif-
ferent countries, it is interesting to compare the practices. Although all based 
on the same theoretical roots, the contents as well as the context of the dif-
ferent practices are quite different. Can the different international experienc-
es be helpful with respect to other and new initiatives in non-financial com-
pensation? Can knowledge from one country easily be transferred to other 
planning systems? What are the opportunities and the challenges?
Of course, we realize that planning systems vary considerably between the 
different countries discussed in this book. The comparison (and implementa-
tion) of planning schemes is difficult because they are all embedded in legal, 
institutional and economic realities. Urban and rural planning is by definition 
bounded to the land where it takes place and can therefore never be purely 
international in the way a sales contract between sellers and buyers in differ-
ent countries is. Land does not travel. Still, although this makes the nature of 
our field of research extremely local, it is a fact that people involved in urban 
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and rural planning do learn from each other, do exchange experiences, and 
draw up legislation that is inspired by (or even copied from) foreign systems. 
And although institutional transplantation is shown to be nearly impossible 
(De Jong, 1999), a structured presentation of international best practices and 
experiments will prove to be a source of inspiration among those countries. 
The book thus offers an overview of the opportunities and impossibilities 
of instruments based on non-financial compensation. By showing different 
planning innovations and solutions to comparable problems, we hope to pro-
vide assistance to planners who face similar problems in their own country.
In the following sections we elaborate on this and present the research 
framework we use in this study to compare the different cases of non-finan-
cial compensation as well as reflecting on the use of the instruments. With 
this, we hope to contribute to the social and scientific debate on the increas-
ing use of market-oriented instruments in planning world-wide.
In the first part of this book we introduce the roots of the concept of non-
financial compensation in spatial planning. We position it in the theoretical 
literature of comparative research (Chapter 1) and elaborate the concept of 
non-financial compensation (Chapter 2). In Chapter 1 we also introduce the 
format according to which the chapters in the second part have been writ-
ten. This second part consists of the international examples of non-financial 
compensation in spatial planning. Six chapters examine the three types of 
cases on the basis of solutions in concrete planning examples for six different 
countries. Thus Chapter 3 deals with non-financial compensation in Japan, 
Chapter 4 shows non-financial compensation-experiments in Korea, Chapter 
5 continues with a discussion of non-financial compensation-instruments in 
Spain, Chapter 6 deals with planning innovations in Italy, TDR provisions in 
the U.S. are dealt with in Chapter 7 and finally, in Chapter 8, the non-financial 
compensation experiments in the Netherlands are considered. The conclu-
sion in the last part deals with a different perspective regarding development 
via compensation. The solutions will be held up against the light of legal and 
economic perspectives in Chapters 9 and 10. In Chapter 11 the cases are com-
pared and overall conclusions are drawn.
Comparative analysis of non-financial 1.3 
compensation
An introduction to comparative analysis1.3.1 
A wide range of academic literature exists on the cross-national compari-
son of planning frameworks and planning practices or on trans-national and 
trans-regional initiatives and their impact on planning in European countries 
(Newman & Thornley, 1996; Sanyal, 2005; De Jong & Edelenbos, 2007). These 
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types of comparisons oriented on knowledge distribution can be typified in 
their aims as inspiration and learning. Transplanting planning instruments 
and approaches would be beyond the inspiration and learning categories. Re-
search (De Jong, 1999; 2004; De Jong et al., 2002) shows the many difficulties 
that arise with the transferring of planning instruments from one planning 
system to another. In this section we discuss different types of comparative 
research and levels of transfer of planning in order to define a research frame-
work for international comparative research on non-financial compensation 
in spatial planning in Section 1.4.
As explained earlier, a wide range of academic literature exists on the 
cross-national comparison of planning frameworks and planning practices. 
There are also many examples where cases are compared in different coun-
tries, aiming to create comparative understanding of planning experiences 
and to identify lessons for comparable planning issues (Blazyca, 2003; Evers, 
2004; Booth et al., 2007). In this section we will have a closer look at what com-
parative analysis is and how it can be used. We see international comparative 
research as a specific form of comparative research.
Pickvance (2005) distinguishes comparative analysis from the juxtaposition 
of descriptions of a series of cases. He states that sequential presentations 
of descriptive data are informative about the cases concerned, but compara-
tive in only a weak sense, in that they make the reader aware of differences 
and similarities. The strength of a stronger form of comparative analysis as 
a research design is its ability to introduce additional explanatory variables 
(or to allow variation in variables which have a fixed value in the initial case 
of interest), and to show that relations are stronger or weaker than initially 
thought. Comparative analysis also has weaknesses, however, most notably 
that it requires the commensurability of concepts across cases. Terms like ‘en-
vironmental regulation’ must have consistent meanings to avoid comparing 
apples with oranges. Another weakness of comparative analysis is that like 
all non-experimental research it has to rely on ‘naturally occurring variation’ 
which rules out many possible, but not encountered combinations of values 
that are of interest to the researcher. These specific features of comparative 
research must be taken into account when setting up a research framework 
and drawing conclusions in the analysis.
Schools of comparative research1.3.2 
In international comparative housing research Kemeny and Lowe (1998) iden-
tify three different schools which could also apply to spatial planning. Each is 
associated with a different level of generalization. When a number of coun-
tries are juxtaposed but generalizing conclusions are not made, this is termed 
juxtapositional analysis. At the other extreme are studies that point at un-
derlying similarities and name differences between countries as ‘variations’, 
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‘historical contingencies’ or sometimes ‘exceptions’. These approaches have 
generally assumed that all modern societies are developing in a particular di-
rection, for example towards a more developed welfare state, an unregulated 
market, or higher levels of capital exploitation. Such universalistic and global 
approaches in the comparative literature have been termed convergence per-
spectives. In between these two extremes there are studies which apply what 
might be termed as theories of the middle range (Merton, 1957), that pro-
pose typologies of systems derived from cultural, ideological, political domi-
nance or other theories as the basis for understanding differences between 
groups of societies. Such approaches in the comparative housing literature 
are termed divergence perspectives. Such a middle range theory would use a 
universalistic method within groups of systems that are described as part of 
the same family. Here a problem arises; when it is accepted that cultural dif-
ferences exist and are of importance for a comparison of planning issues, it is 
hard to generalize between countries.
Over the years, other attempts have been made to distinguish between 
types of comparative research, for example in the methodology field. In plan-
ning, comparative case study research is a dominant research method, as 
many studies can be seen as strategic explorations into particular phenom-
ena with the intent to provide an explanation (Masser & Williams, 1986). Pick-
vance (2001) states that the two conventional types of comparative analysis 
– universalizing comparative analysis and differentiating comparative analy-
sis – focus on the explanation of similarities and differences respectively. He 
further elaborates on this distinction by using the categorization of Tilly (1984) 
into four types: individualizing, universalizing, variation-finding and encom-
passing:
an individualizing comparison grasps the peculiarities of a few specific  ■
cases, by contrasting a small number of cases;
a universalizing comparison ‘aims to establish that every instance of a  ■
phenomenon follows essentially the same rule’ (Tilly, 1984: 82, in: Pick-
vance, 2001);
a variation-finding comparison seeks to establish a principle of variation in  ■
the character of a phenomenon, by examining systematic differences be-
tween instances (Thus, it holds that, for example, non-financial compensa-
tion is essentially one phenomenon that may vary in its outcomes in dif-
ferent countries (locations).);
an encompassing comparison defines a system as a whole and then ex- ■
plains the characteristics of specific cases as a function of that system.
In his elaboration of the categorization Pickvance adds the assumptions 
which researchers make about the underlying causal patterns present (see 
Table 1.1).
Dobbin (1994) makes his point when he concludes that the culture of a 
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country and the way people do things is highly related to institutional struc-
ture. Culture itself is hard to measure, but can be captured in rules and prac-
tices. Sanyal (2005: 14-15) makes the picture even more complex when he 
states that: “planning contexts vary not only among different nations in the 
world, but also within nations, particularly those with federal governance 
structures. What is interesting, however, is to question the extent to which 
such contextual specifics can be attributed to indigenous cultural traits of 
planning. (…) The concept of cultural essentialism, in which culture is por-
trayed as static, home-grown, pure, and immutable, is inaccurate. Rather the 
presented planning cultures seem to have evolved with social, political, and 
economic influences, both internal and external; creating hybrid cultures 
whose complexity can only be understood through deep historical analyses”.
Van Dijk (2002: 914), finally, assumes that (1) the comparative analysis of 
planning systems can be done at a number of levels of increasing complexity, 
and (2) advising other countries is the most complex aim, therefore the high-
est level. He distinguishes four levels of comparative cross-national study:
collecting information about planning systems in other countries (‘exhibit- ■
ing’); or presenting a range of strategies in a clear way;
valuing each planning system with a relative value (‘valuing’); or: giving  ■
relative scores to various planning systems;
revealing the variables that determine the outline of the planning instru- ■
ment (‘explaining’); or: why things are the way they are;
advising countries that not have a certain type of planning system yet (‘ad- ■
vising’); or: countries can benefit from other countries.
This brings us to our key-point: the various aims that underlie comparative 
research.
Aims of comparative research1.3.3 
Planning research is not only about increasing knowledge. Comparisons are 
often made with the concrete goal of improving one’s own planning system. 
Oxley (1991) formulates ten objectives of conducting comparative research on 
housing. His objectives include increasing knowledge and developing ideas 
for new policies for research. His presumption is that when systems are better 
understood in their broader context, it is also possible to find ways to make 
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Table 1.1 Types of comparative analysis according to whether the starting point is 
similarities or differences
End point: explanation in terms of
Principle of variation Principle of universality
Starting point Observed or constructed 
differences
A. Differentiating 
comparative analysis
B. Universalizing 
comparative analysis with 
plural causation
Observed or constructed 
similarities
C. Differentiating 
comparative analysis with 
plural causation
D. Universalizing 
comparative analysis
Source: Pickvance, 2001, p. 23
them work better. When collecting comparative material, arguments that are 
based on narrow perceptions can be rejected or sets of pre-held judgments 
can be supported. Further, Oxley also sees comparative research as helpful in 
determining the relationships between the housing, or other, system and oth-
er variables. This might result in obtaining new knowledge and ideas in order 
to formulate new hypotheses or further comparative research to test well-de-
fined hypotheses concerning the functioning of housing, or other, systems.
Planners and other practitioners look at approaches in other countries 
hoping that the problems they encounter in their own systems can be solved 
by using a successful foreign approach. This aim is also part of comparative 
academic research: if the ultimate goal of comparison is not to learn from and 
adopt the best practices of the countries researched, then what is? Although 
academics tend to be skeptical of the chances of institutional transplantation, 
it is often the ultimate goal of comparative planning research.
In this chapter we distinguish three levels of increasing intensity in the 
transfer of planning instruments and practice when comparing practices 
across countries: (1) inspiration, (2) learning, and (3) transplantation:
Inspiration ■  is about collecting and valuating data and information on inno-
vative experiences and practices. Would, for example, the American prac-
tice of TDRs be of interest for our research? And what about TDR-like and 
non-financial experiments in other countries?
Learning ■  implies adaptation of the information collected and evaluated in 
the inspiration phase, including retrieving underlying ideas, obstacles and 
changes. This practice is of interest to one country but – as systems are 
quite different – how can we implement such an idea without its weak-
nesses? Working together with planners from different countries and ‘ex-
changing’ knowledge is essential at this level of learning.
Transplantation ■ : the knowledge transfer is complete and an innovative prac-
tice has been adopted by the ‘learning’ country, often adapted to local cir-
cumstances. Of course, we can also find ‘transplants’ of instruments with-
out any adaptation. Here the ‘learning’ step seems to be skipped.
De Jong (2004: 1055-1056) writes that planners wanting to adopt transplants 
from countries varying greatly in terms of administrative culture and struc-
ture should reckon on considerable institutional complications. Although the 
adoption process is not impossible because of this, attention should be paid 
to transforming them in such a way that they meet domestic circumstanc-
es, needs and wishes. However, it is generally assumed that transplanting 
planning institutions from countries with similar political, legal and cultural 
characteristics is easier. Political, legal, administrative and planning systems 
in Europe are regularly divided into groups, such as the Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, 
Napoleonic, other Continental and former Communist systems. In addition, 
anthropologists have shown that cultural values embraced in different coun-
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tries have a strong impact on administrative and organizational processes 
and that the role planning plays in different societies is linked to aspects of 
time conception, to uncertainty avoidance and to the extent in which the en-
vironment is considered controllable and able to be influenced. This should 
all be taken into account when setting up an international comparative re-
search framework and interpreting the results. In the next section we define a 
research framework for international comparative research on non-financial 
compensation in spatial planning.
What framework fits the aim of our 1.4 
comparative research?
As mentioned in Section 1.1, several countries are experimenting with forms 
of non-financial compensation in spatial planning. A method was sought to 
discuss these different planning instruments without getting lost in facts 
or becoming only a compilation of material in the form of a juxtapositional 
analysis. For this reason, a set of three concrete but abstract cases and their 
possible solutions are taken as the basis, after which planning experts from 
a variety of countries indicate how within their country (or the country of 
which they have extensive knowledge) these cases are being handled. These 
solutions might again offer inspiration for other countries.
We distinguished three ways in which a comparison between cases in dif-
ferent countries (or regions) can take place: inspiration, learning and trans-
plantation. The ways differ in their ultimate aims and thus require different 
research methods. Generally, when the aim of the comparison is more ambi-
tious, a more in-depth analysis of various factors is required. For this book 
our primary goal was to offer inspiration for developing non-financial com-
pensation instruments by bringing together different international expe-
riences that are of relevance for current spatial planning practice. However, 
discussing them in a structured way will allow us to look for a more general 
approach to these instruments from economic, legal and spatial perspectives 
and distinguish some learning points which might ease the ‘transference’ of 
non-financial instruments between countries.
To provide a more structured way to improve the comparativeness between 
the cases we formulated three types of cases that have been abstracted from 
the real world in such a way that they:
depart from a problem situation within planning practice ■
cover many similar cases, and ■
can be related to concrete cases in other countries. ■
These abstract cases were subsequently used by reporters from different 
countries to indicate how within their country (or the country of which they 
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have extensive knowledge) these cases are being handled with the use of one 
or more non-financial compensation issues. We distinguished between cases 
of conservation, conversion and re-allocation.
Case 1 (Conservation) – One or more local governments would like to  ■
preserve an open area that is now being used for extensive farming. A 
residential neighborhood will be created nearby. The preservation and 
maintenance of the green zone is too expensive for the farmer. The lo-
cal governments do not have any funding available to maintain the green 
zone. They would therefore like the developers of the residential neighbor-
hood to contribute to the green zone that could even be upgraded into a 
green recreational and wildlife area. Do the local governments use an in-
strument to force the developers to do that? In this conservation category, 
protection – and even upgrading – of the existing land use is important and 
whether the existing land use is ‘open space’ or contains monuments.
Case 2 (Conversion) – A local government would like to demolish exist- ■
ing high-rise buildings in a certain area and replace them with one and 
two-story (low-rise) buildings. There are no financial resources available to 
compensate the real-estate owners for the reduced proceeds that they will 
receive as a result of the conversion. Is there an instrument available that 
the local government could use to fulfill its goals? In this conversion cat-
egory the improvement of the current land use is important. Examples of 
this type of non-financial compensation include the conversion from agri-
cultural into nature reserve land use and from dilapidated into newly-built 
housing and the financial instruments that are used to realize these con-
versions. The Dutch Space for Space instrument, through which additional 
dwellings are realized to finance the demolition of stables in open areas, is 
an example of such a conversion which pays for itself (and is not depen-
dant upon government subsidies).
Case 3 (Re-allocation) – A new commercial business area will be created and  ■
as a result the landowners will enjoy a considerable increase in the value of 
their land. Within the area, however, some of the plots have been zoned as 
green areas. As a result, the owners of these parcels will suffer a decrease in 
the value of their land, and they therefore do not want to cooperate. Expro-
priation of these owners is not an option since the local government does 
not have the financial resources to compensate the owners. Is there an-
other way to compensate the owners of the green areas and thus convince 
them to include their land in the project? In this re-allocation category, the 
compensation for non-development is important. Examples of this kind of 
non-financial compensation can be found in redevelopment areas (for ex-
ample the ‘Valencia model’ in Spain), but also in greenfield developments 
(confer planning obligations). The compensation may be realized within the 
plan between property owners, but also between local governments if they 
decide to forego development in favor of their neighbors.
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All country chapters have been written in accordance with a particular for-
mat in order to ease comparison and learning. Formulating abstract cases and 
having experts in different countries who translate them into concrete cases 
in these countries, makes it easier to learn from each other’s best practices 
and to compare the different experiences. In this book, we explore to what 
extent the different practices and instruments address the problem. Although 
the planning context and the institutions are different from country to coun-
try, the object of research might be quite similar. In this way, studying various 
institutions can be interesting for institutional designers abroad.
Comparing non-financial compensation 1.5 
practice in six countries
In the winter of 2006 we approached reporters of different countries in which 
experiments of non-financial compensation instruments seems to be present 
based on an extensive literature research. We asked the reporters whether or 
not the use of non-financial compensation in their countries would be appli-
cable in one of the three abstract cases. In some countries, like Germany, the 
idea of instruments of non-financial compensation seems to be only theoreti-
cal (Einig, 2005).
The book analyzes experiments and practices of non-financial compensa-
tion in Japan, Korea, Spain, Italy, the U.S. and the Netherlands according to the 
format of the three abstract cases described in Section 1.4. Table 1.2 gives an 
overview of the cases presented in the book. For the research, countries from 
different continents were selected, all experimenting with instruments and 
cases of non-financial compensation in spatial planning. For each country we 
asked the reporter to sketch the planning context in which the selected case 
studies take place, describing the cases in accordance with our format and 
concluding with a summarizing table of the cases along the following themes:
Period in which case was introduced ■
General objective of proposed instrument ■
Characteristic factors ■
Particular economic and social circumstances that have determined the in- ■
strument
Fit within planning and legal system: what relation to spatial plans ■
Whether specific laws and regulations were drawn up ■
Spatial level at which case is tackled ■
Relevant public actor(s) and role ■
Balance between private and public exchange ■
Parties which financed the case ■
Possibility for public participation. ■
[ 11 ]
The country chapters can be seen as sequential presentations of descriptive 
data, but in accordance with a common framework to ease the comparison 
between the different cases. This study does not aim to explain causal rela-
tions; it aims to mirror different approaches to an abstract problem in order 
to inspire, learn or even transplant planning practice experiences. With our 
research framework for a comparative study of cases addressing non-finan-
cial compensation we have addressed the conditions set out in the literature.
Our book concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences 
in the approaches of the authors of the country chapters by comparing the 
definitions used. Furthermore, we compare the problem-solving capacity of 
the (proposed) solutions in each country for the abstract problems mentioned 
above. To what extent are problems solved and with which instrument? As 
each chapter concludes with a summarizing table, we also present a struc-
tured evaluation of the different cases throughout the book. In the concluding 
chapter we reflect on the three levels of increasing intensity in the transfer of 
planning instruments and practice (inspiration, learning and transplantation) 
for the six countries examined in the book.
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Table 1.2 Overview of the cases discussed in this book
Conservation Conversion Re-allocation
Japan Marunouchi district (Tokyo) Safer and more efficient land 
use (Tokyo)
Tokyo station
Korea Sinseol-dong (Seoul)
Spain Natural areas preservation
Preservation of listed 
buildings (City of Almería)
Francia Avenue (City of 
Valencia)
Orriols (City of 
Valencia)
Italy Cappuccini area (Schio) Cremona General Town Planning 
Scheme of Rome
U.S. City of Malibu (California) Hudson Yards (New York City) Portland (Oregon)
Netherlands Limburg experiment Space for Space (Province of 
Noord-Brabant)
GEM in VINEX,
Sports in the South Axis 
(City of Amsterdam)
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The concept of non-2 
financial compensation 
in spatial planning
Marjolein Spaans, Menno van der Veen and Leonie Janssen-Jansen
Introduction2.1 
In this chapter we will further elaborate the concept of non-financial com-
pensation. We will discuss why governments (i.e. planning authorities) use 
non-financial compensation as a planning tool, why governments have to 
compensate for the loss of a property right and – the other way around – why 
governments have the right to recapture increased market value.
The term non-financial compensation has its roots in agency theory, 
which accepts that in a principal-agent relation, non-financial compensation 
schemes will sometimes result in a greater commitment by the agent than 
financial incentives. Examples of non-financial compensation schemes are 
developmental opportunities for employees, on-the-job training programs or 
alternative work schedules. Non-financial compensation may thus provide an 
extra incentive for an agent to stay at or join a company or to work harder in 
a scheme that is ultimately profitable for him. In other words, non-financial 
compensation exists in cases where agents are also financially compensated 
for their efforts.
The perspective we take in the cases in this book differs from agency 
theory, most notably because in these cases the value of the non-financial 
compensation can be unclear, although it is always regarded as sufficient to 
compensate a property owner for his loss. The main difference between a fi-
nancial and a non-financial compensation scheme is that in the latter situa-
tion the government does not financially compensate a landowner for his loss 
of rights, but instead gives him a right that represents a financial value.
This could be the case in the examples that are used in agency theory. On-
the-job training programs and developmental opportunities provide employ-
ees with skills that allow them to make more money in the future. But some-
times other examples such as ‘the right to dress casual’ are mentioned and 
these examples are not incorporated in our research project. That does not 
mean that truly non-financial compensation schemes cannot exist in the con-
text of spatial planning. On the contrary, one example could be when land-
owners have to contribute some of their land for public use and do not re-
ceive anything in return but a park or an esplanade that may or may not lead 
to an increase in the value of their properties. From the developers’ perspec-
tive these often voluntary agreements generally have a strategic element, as 
they hope to be asked again in the future to be involved in new developments. 
In the examples we use in this book, however, non-financial compensation 
always means that a financial payment by the government is replaced by the 
granting of a right that represents financial value in order to give landowners 
an additional incentive to join the development.
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Why governments use non-financial 2.2 
compensation schemes
Non-financial compensation in spatial planning means that a government 
does not directly subsidize or compensate a landowner or developer for his 
loss or his endeavors. Non-financial compensation exists when a government 
compensates a person or company with an interest in a piece of land for the 
loss of one or more of his property rights for that land by creating a new prop-
erty right that he can either use or sell. An example is when a plot of land 
that could be developed in many ways becomes subject to rules that confine 
its development to low-rise buildings. In some countries the landowner has 
to be compensated for this loss of opportunity. When the planning authority 
(usually local government) that took away the right does not have the finan-
cial resources, instead of compensating him directly (financially) or engaging 
in ‘partial taking’ (Bruce, 1998) it may give the private landowner a new right 
that he can either sell on the market or gives him the right to develop prop-
erty elsewhere. Non-financial compensation also exists when a planning au-
thority provides an incentive for developers to realize certain planning goals 
either on their land or on the land of others and the government does not 
directly subsidize that realization but creates a property right that they can 
use or sell when they have realized the goals. These types of incentives are 
non-financial incentives.
Taking the point of view of government in this chapter and not the point 
of view of the private parties, we use the term non-financial compensation 
for both situations. In both cases government creates a new property right to 
compensate the developers and private parties to compensate them for their 
losses or their endeavors. It would be interesting to take the position of the 
private parties into account and focus on situations where they choose to or 
are forced to compensate for externalities of their market strategies in kind 
instead of paying for them. That is however not the focus of this chapter. The 
example of the European legislation on nature compensation through the 
Birds (1979/409) and Habitat (1992/43) Directives (European Commission, 1979; 
1992) thus does not fit into the framework set out in this chapter2.
2  The European Union issued the Birds Directive (1979/409) and the Habitat Directive (1992/43), setting 
stringent criteria for the protection of designated natural habitats and species. Article 6 of the Habitat Di-
rective, for example, imposes all sorts of obligations on the member states. Each plan or project which is 
not directly connected with site management must be meticulously screened for its potential spatial effects. 
The plan or project in question may be approved only “after having ascertained that it will not adversely af-
fect the integrity of the site” (6.3). The compensation principle set out in Article 6 sub 4 comes into effect if 
it turns out that a project or plan will indeed have an adverse effect on a site and therefore be in breach of 
the regulations.
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Two types of non-financial compensation2.2.1 
We distinguish between single-purpose and multi-purpose types of non-fi-
nancial compensation. A single-purpose type of non-financial compensation 
exists when the non-financial compensation scheme is not a planning tool in 
itself but only exists as a way to compensate the landowner for his loss. It re-
lates to the compensation of a loss of right and could be considered as a pas-
sive instrument as it is only used as compensation. A multi-purpose type of 
non-financial compensation exists when the scheme not only compensates 
the landowners, but is also used as a tool to reach a certain spatial planning 
development goal. This type of scheme relates to an opportunity to develop 
something additional and implies an actively deployed scheme.
An example3 of a single-purpose type of non-financial compensation is 
the well known Penn Central case in New York where the owner of the sta-
tion was also granted the right to use his unused development rights off-site, 
but here the motive was only to compensate him for his loss of development 
rights, not to promote the construction of a new high density neighborhood.
The case of Tokyo Station is an example of a multi-purpose scheme. To-
kyo Station is a historic building next to the Central Business District of 
Marunouchi in Tokyo. The owner of Tokyo Station had the right to build at 
a Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of 9 where the station was built at only FAR 2. His 
plan to build two towers next to the station was fought since the buildings 
would ‘overshadow’ the historic building of the railway station. He was then 
granted the right to sell the development rights he had left to other sites in 
the Central Business District of Marunouchi, which was rezoned because the 
City of Tokyo wanted to encourage development in the highest possible den-
sities. The two motives therefore were the conservation of the Tokyo station 
and promotion of the construction of high-density buildings in the areas that 
could receive the TDR (Chorus, 2007). The Highline project in New York City 
is also an example of a multi-purpose non-financial compensation scheme. 
Here, when it was decided that an elevated rail track would not be demol-
ished but converted into a public park, TDRs were used not only to compen-
sate landowners for their loss of development rights but the scheme was also 
used to promote the construction of high-rise buildings in a special zone in 
the borough of Chelsea.
Another example is the Space for Space program in the Netherlands 
(Ruimte voor Ruimte). In this program, developers agreed that they would only 
receive the right to develop expensive housing projects after compensating 
those farmers financially, who (on a voluntary basis) decided to stop their in-
3  The examples of Penn Central (New York) and Tokyo Station are discussed more extensively in the coun-
try chapters.
[ 19 ]
tensive livestock industries and have their lands converted into natural park-
land or agricultural land. The right to develop one’s land is a property right 
that the developers have to buy from the farmer who quits his intensive live-
stock farming activities. Since  there may be a problem of phasing, the right is 
not directly purchased from the farmers; instead the money is paid to a farm-
ers’ compensation fund. In the Dutch legal system some legal barriers arise 
with a system that forces the developers to purchase the rights directly from 
the farmers. The program is regarded as an example of non-financial com-
pensation because the government does not pay the farmers to stop farming 
in the area but gives them a property right (the right to develop housing proj-
ects). For the developers the program is an example of non-financial compen-
sation, because they receive the right to develop profitable housing projects 
when they pay for the conversion of agricultural land into nature land.
The examples show that a planning authority may use a non-financial 
compensation scheme to compensate landowners for their loss of economic 
value or to provide an incentive for them to realize a certain planning goal. 
Such planning goals include social housing, environmental goals, conserva-
tion of historic sites, conversion of sites, or the prevention of urban sprawl 
(Pruetz, 2003). These goals could add up to an infinite list but we take a more 
abstract point of view and focus on the motives behind planning authorities 
using non-financial compensation schemes. We discern four general motives:
compensation for lost opportunities ■
lack of public resources ■
increasing ineffectiveness in the management of urban plans ■
improvement of the overall quality of urban and regional space. ■
The first two motives are generally examples of single-purpose non-financial 
compensation schemes, since they are only meant to compensate. The latter 
two can result in multi-purpose non-financial compensation schemes. The 
four motives do not exclude each other; they can all apply to the same case 
at the same time. This would be the case when an existing land use plan does 
not result in reaching the results for which it was drawn up. It does not suc-
ceed, for example, in its aim to protect the green zones from the expanding 
city. A new plan is now drawn up at a regional scale in which the surrounding 
green zones of the city are protected while at the same time higher-rise build-
ings will be allowed in an area where the planning authority wants to create 
a high quality mixed neighborhood including both office and residential use. 
As a result some property owners, who have already made some investments 
in the legitimate expectation that they could build residential low-rise build-
ings in the green zone, are now left with land that is worth virtually noth-
ing. The city does not possess any financial resources to compensate these 
landowners; it therefore decides to compensate the landowners with devel-
opment rights that they can either use or sell in the neighborhood where the 
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city wants to promote the construction of high-rise buildings. In such a case, 
the reasons to use the non-financial compensation scheme would be: com-
pensation of lost opportunities of the landowner in the green zone, the lack 
of financial resources as the local government does not have the money to 
compensate and cannot accomplish the goals itself, ineffectiveness of the for-
mer urban plan as this did not succeed in protecting the green zone and the 
improved quality of space through concentration of urban growth within the 
boundaries of the existing city and the safeguarding of the green zones.
Negotiated developments2.2.2 
The popularity of non-financial compensation schemes falls within a trend 
that at least exists in the western world and western-based systems (e.g. the 
Asian tigers), whereby the traditional borders between state and market are 
being eroded. Nowadays, a complex web of relationships between govern-
ments and the market exist. Related keywords are public private partnerships, 
negotiated development and (to some extent) neo-liberalism (Osborne, 2000; 
Fischer & Ury, 1983; Shmueli et al., 2008; Jessop, 2002). Sometimes the plan-
ning authorities themselves are mixed entities that have characteristics that 
are traditionally associated with the market (making profit) and with the state 
(promoting public, not private benefits).
Davy (1998: 1) speaks of the trend in negotiated developments or planning 
by agreements: “Negotiated developments are land uses for which a plan-
ning authority grants specific zoning or planning permissions as the result 
of a negotiated agreement between the municipal government, the developer, 
and other stakeholders”. This strikes us as a good definition of the trend al-
though we should note that the American planning systems are traditionally 
more oriented towards a strict demarcation between the planning authorities 
and the developers. TDR systems are often as-of-right (Booth, 2003). Due to 
the trend in negotiated developments, the use of non-financial compensation 
schemes may increase, but an non-financial compensation scheme is not nec-
essarily an example of a negotiated development. We hereby take the position 
of the government as our point of view, since an non-financial compensation 
scheme that involves a transferable and sometimes even tradable right will 
generally involve a price-negotiation between market parties.
Davy (1998) raises the question of whether negotiated developments, 
whether formalized or informal, improve or corrode spatial planning and 
land use control. A first group of arguments against negotiated development 
is directed against zoning and spatial planning and questions the legitimacy 
of negotiable restrictions on land uses. A second group of arguments criticize 
negotiated developments for more political reasons. Since development ne-
gotiations consume substantial resources, the uncertain result of the nego-
tiation process puts into question whether resources are employed wisely. A 
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final group of arguments against negotiated developments draws upon the 
traditional outlook of the planning profession. Although ‘planning’ means dif-
ferent things to different people, the vast majority of professional planners 
consider themselves defenders of the public good. Planning by agreement is 
more flexible than planning in the classical way (by detailed legislation); it 
allows governments to define the goals and purposes of development where-
as the market will achieve an optimal distribution of development rights. It 
thus combines the best of both worlds; it overcomes the social injustices of 
the market as well as the inefficient rules of the government. This could al-
so provide an explanation for the popularity of non-financial compensation 
schemes, as they aim to have the best of ‘more than one world’. That means 
that, when planning involves compensation, non-financial compensation 
schemes are more efficient, more effective and cheaper than traditional plan-
ning tools.
Having defined the concept of non-financial compensation we will now 
have a closer look at the reasons why governments have to compensate (Sec-
tion 2.3), and sometimes want to compensate (Section 2.4) and why they can 
recapture values that have increased because of the act of a planning author-
ity (Section 2.5 and 2.6). Conclusions will clarify why the non-financial com-
pensation concept helps to compare non-financial compensation schemes in 
different planning systems and legal systems. Non-financial compensation is 
a new term that is not used in any country-specific planning or legal system, 
and can therefore be used by academics and planning practitioners through-
out the world as a neutral concept without a country-specific burden.
Why governments have to compensate2.3 
In this section we elaborate on why governments have to compensate per-
sons who lose one or more rights to property4. Sometimes they cannot be 
compensated in money (because of lack of funds), and therefore have to be 
compensated in the form of a right. Property rights play a very important role 
in urban and rural land development. Spatial changes will always have effects 
on property. Article 1 Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights guarantees:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and 
4  We do not use the term landowners because the persons that need to be compensated may lease the land 
or have any other right to it that is taken away from them and therefore requires compensation.
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by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
The use of land development tools and planning tools therefore will 
necessarily find a boundary in the protection of the fundamental right 
to property” (Groetelaers & Ploeger, 2007).
The already mentioned Highline project in New York City ended a battle over 
an elevated railway that had become obsolete. In the manufacturing district, 
shop owners underneath the redundant highline had sought ways to have the 
railway demolished so that they could use the airspace to build new, higher, 
buildings in one of the last underused areas in Manhattan. They had already 
reached an agreement with former mayor Giuliani that the railway would be 
demolished, but things turned out different when mayor Bloomberg promised 
during his election campaign that he would not tear the railway down. The 
shop owners under the railway claimed that if the railway stayed, they would 
lose the opportunity to develop their properties. They demanded compensa-
tion, which they received in the form of air rights that they could sell in the 
district (see www.thehighline.org). This case is interesting for more than one 
reason, but here we mention it to illustrate the concept of a ‘partial or regula-
tory taking’ that was developed in the U.S. where the property is protected in 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
The concept of a regulatory taking is related to the concept of a property 
right. In his work Contracting for property rights Gary Libecap (1989: 1-4) defines 
property rights as: “(…) the social institutions that define or delimit the range 
of privileges granted to individuals to specific assets, such as parcels of land 
or water. Private ownership of these assets may involve a variety of rights, in-
cluding the right to exclude non-owners from access, the right to appropriate 
the streams of rents from use of and investments in the resource, and the 
right to sell or otherwise transfer the resource to others”.
He continues by stating where these rights stem from: “Property rights in-
stitutions range from formal arrangements, including constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, and judicial rulings, to informal conventions and customs re-
garding the allocations and use of property. Such institutions critically affect 
decision-making regarding use and, hence, affect economic behavior and per-
formance. By allocating decision-making authority, they also determine who 
are the economic actors in a system and define the distribution of wealth in a 
society. (...) Because certain property rights arrangements can reduce transac-
tion costs in exchange and production and encourage investment in order to 
promote overall economic growth, they have public goods aspects”.
The definition points the finger at an important aspect of property rights, 
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namely that they do not necessarily refer to the term ownership. Property 
rights involve much more than the rights of the legal owner; they involve the 
rights of tenants and other users as well and to a further extent than in civil 
law countries. Secondly, the final quotation points the finger at another im-
portant aspect of property rights: they have a public goods aspect. We believe 
this to be a very important aspect for two reasons. In the first place, it refers 
to the public meaning of property rights: they function within a society that 
(depending on the country and the specific rights) protects them to a greater 
or lesser extent and even defines property rights that do not as such exist in 
other countries.
As the importance and the amounts of property rights grow, the loss of 
such rights provides grounds for compensation. It makes sense that govern-
ments look for ways that prevent them from having to compensate at a ‘fair 
market value’ but rather create new property rights to compensate the own-
ers.
The concept of a partial or regulatory taking has gained importance in Eu-
ropean countries. The European Court of Justice seems to use a concept of 
taking that is analogous to the American concept (Groetelaers & Ploeger, 2007). 
In the James-case (James and others v the United Kingdom (21 February 1986) the 
European Court of Justice mentioned the term ‘property right’, when it stated 
that: (…) “the fairness of a system of law governing the contractual or prop-
erty rights of private parties is a matter of public concern and therefore legis-
lative measures intended to bring about such fairness are capable of being in 
the ‘public interest’, even if they involve the compulsory transfer of property 
from one individual to another.” The line between the concept of indirect ex-
propriation and non-compensable regulatory governmental measures has not 
yet been systematically articulated. However, a close examination of the rel-
evant jurisprudence reveals that, in broad terms, there are some criteria that 
tribunals have to use to distinguish these concepts: (1) the degree of interfer-
ence with the property right, (2) the character of governmental measures, i.e. 
the purpose and the context of the governmental measure, and (3) the inter-
ference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed expectations 
(OECD, 2004).
When a landowner loses an opportunity to use his property profitably, 
this is considered a partial taking. The theoretical background is that owner-
ship in common law countries is not thought of as one undividable right, but 
rather as a bundle of sticks. Those sticks represent rights and interests in the 
property. Some of the sticks (the right to make binding rules, the right to take 
land for public use) are reserved for the legislator/sovereign whereas others 
are for the private parties. If the government takes away a stick – in the High-
line case the opportunity to develop the space above the shops – it leaves the 
owner with fewer rights to the land than it previously had. The government 
must then compensate the owner for this loss.
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Governments however do not always have financial resources to compen-
sate the landowners for their loss. Therefore they sometimes compensate 
the landowners by giving them the right to sell a development right on the 
market to a different landowner for a location where there is no such restric-
tion. This is what happened in the Highline case. In that case compensation 
was even more complicated because the land was rezoned so that the devel-
opment rights could be sold but could also be used on site. In that case the 
building had to be constructed over the highline (see Figure 2.1).
A regulatory taking is a taking that does not expropriate the landowner but 
takes away a property right of an individual right that is of economic value. 
Here the difference between the police power and eminent domain are of im-
portance since the first does not require any compensation, whereas the lat-
ter demands full compensation for damages that occurred as a result of the 
regulatory actions by the governmental agency with regard to plots nearby.
The following factors are determinative of a (regulatory) taking: “the char-
acter of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations” (edit. Bruce, 1998: 336).5 
With regard to the taking itself it is not clear whether the whole property is 
taken into account, or only the stick. But TDRs are said to be in line with the 
constitution, albeit that the Supreme Court has not yet dealt with them di-
rectly. TDRs provide a way to compensate an owner for the loss of one of his 
sticks by giving him a development right to use on one of his other parcels or 
to sell.
Three other cases serve to illustrate what American law considers a tak-
ing situation and how it deals with it. The first deals with the constitutional 
5  The quotation here has been used in a number of cases.
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requirement of a state that owners of shopping centers allow individuals to 
exercise their free speech and petition rights. The retail owners said that this 
policy involved a taking. The court ruled that the right to property includes 
the right to exclude others, but the right to exclude others was said to have 
no economic importance in a shopping mall. Therefore the policy did not in-
volve a taking. When a governmental agency once used the trade secrets of 
a company, this was considered as a taking. Trade secrets give a company an 
advantage in the markets and using it was therefore depriving the company 
of a stick that had economic value. Finally, in New York, the physical invasion 
resulting from a cable installed on an apartment owner’s roof (authorized by 
New York law) constituted a taking of the apartment’s owner property with-
out just compensation. Here the governmental action was said to involve a 
taking ‘per se’.6
Why governments want to compensate2.4 
Sometimes governments want to compensate developers by providing them 
with a property right for their endeavors or sufferings. The reason may in-
clude political reasons (property rights movements), but here we focus mostly 
on situations where the market solves inefficiencies that are due to the na-
ture of planning. In other words, governments want to compensate develop-
ers for their endeavors because the market can sometimes solve inefficiencies 
or reach results that are out of the reach of planning authorities. A compen-
sation scheme in this respect will have the character of an incentive scheme. 
Governments may add value to rights that had not been worth anything. This 
however is not enough for a non-financial compensation scheme, which also 
needs a compensation element. A market where rights are sold is not in itself 
an example of non-financial compensation. Suppose that the government, to 
protect the environment, limits the quantity of energy that may be used per 
square meter of office building. Suppose that it allows owners who stay be-
low that limit to sell whatever they have left of it to those who need more. 
The government wants to compensate those who use less energy for their en-
deavors (and probably investments in energy-saving building materials and 
installations) by granting them a right that they can sell. It may have been 
hard for the government to reach this result (promoting sustainable develop-
ment without losing economic vitality) by regulation.
Micelli (2002) puts it this way: “The weak efficiency of urban planning can 
6  Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company, 104 S. 
Ct. 2862 (1984), Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). All cited in edit. Bruce 
(1998): 332-334.
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be attributed – at least in part – to the authoritative nature of the tools for im-
plementing and managing plans. As a result, there is great interest in creating 
innovative planning tools – in particular through real estate taxation and the 
creation of new markets – that do not replace the market (as command-and-
control tools do), but are limited to intervening to correct its failures” (Lanotte 
& Rossi, 1995; Stellin & Stanghellini, 1997, both in Micelli, 2002).
Coase (1960) states that the establishment of a property rights market can 
replace direct forms of public intervention in order to solve the economic in-
efficiencies due to market failures. This may thus help to solve the increasing 
ineffectiveness in the management of urban plans. Many trends and devel-
opments have intensified the need for effective and expedient spatial plan-
ning instruments and schemes, linked to adequate financial constructions. 
Creative financial constructions in particular are needed for the realization 
of green and blue zones in urbanized areas, which usually have economical-
ly weak functions (De Jong & Spaans, 2006). This type of non-financial com-
pensation scheme further elaborates the utilization of betterment or plan-
ning gain in land value accrued from a change in land use to an economically 
more profitable one (European Communities, 1997).
Before dealing in more detail with this planning gain issue, it is important 
to note that there is such a thing as ‘government failure’ or ‘public failure’ 
(Coase, 1960; Downs, 1957; Tiebout, 1956; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Govern-
ment failure is the public sector analogy to market failure and occurs when 
a government does not efficiently allocate goods and/or resources to persons. 
A government failure is not a failure of the government to bring about a par-
ticular solution, but is rather a systemic problem that prevents an efficient 
government solution to a problem. Some economists believe that even with 
good intentions governments seldom get their policy application correct. They 
can tax, control and regulate but the eventual outcome will be a deepening of 
the market failure or, even worse, creation of a new failure. Public value fail-
ure occurs when: mechanisms for values articulation and aggregation have 
broken down; ‘imperfect monopolies’ occur; benefit hoarding occurs (i.e. pub-
lic domain benefits and public goods have been captured by groups, limiting 
distribution to the population); there is a scarcity of providers of public val-
ue; a short time horizon threatens public value; there is a focus on the sub-
stitutability of assets that threatens conservation of public resources; social 
and market transactions threaten fundamental human subsistence (Boze-
man, 2002). In planning practice, for example, a very common phenomenon 
is the constantly adjusted zoning regulations to accommodate ‘market forces’. 
Municipalities compete with their neighbors for the settlement of new busi-
nesses. In this respect, Coase (1960) shows that not only public intervention 
is needed for securing collective action, but that also voluntary market agree-
ments are possible. Although individuals may, in principle, be willing to pay a 
certain amount to secure a certain quality of public open space, semi-public 
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open space, regulative control over building quality or over bad-neighbor uses, 
or of future land use information, none is likely to be able to afford any quan-
tity of such goods on their own and collective action strategies are required 
to elicit the goods (Webster, 1998: 62-63). An non-financial compensation-like 
instrument could be used as an incentive to strengthen the collective action 
initiatives.
Regulative development control planning is traditionally concerned with 
the production of policy goods that in the end are designed to reduce the level 
of present and future externalities in a city (Webster, 1998: 55). The regulatory 
system is also increasingly being employed to lever the private production 
of tangible (as opposed to policy) public goods. With impact fees, planning 
charges, linkage exactions, planning consent application and cost-raising 
conditions on planning approvals an attempt has been made to reduce the 
consumption of certain built environmental goods (Webster, 1998: 55). The 
sustainability rationale is one of urban planning’s most important rationales. 
It rests on externality and public goods arguments. Planning engages in nego-
tiation with developers to exact privately financed public goods, rationalized 
either as a compensation payment for negative externalities or as a repay-
ment of unearned7 betterment value (Webster, 1998: 55). Both forms should 
result in maximizing total gain (ibid. 62).
Higher quality of space
Another reason why government is keen to use non-financial compensation 
schemes in spatial planning is that it enables a higher quality of space8 with-
7  Land rent is often referred to as ‘unearned’ income, in the sense that it is not the result of an individual 
action of forbearance. It is useful to keep in mind that there is no logical connection between ‘unearned’ 
and ‘undeserved’ (Fischel, 1985: 12-13). Other words for this are betterment (U.K.), unearned increment, 
plus value, windfalls (U.S.). Partly related concepts are planning obligations, planning gain, developer obli-
gations, plus value capture.
8  Quality of space is a broad and often contested concept. The Roman architect Vitruvius was one of the 
first to write about the issue. In his handbook on architecture he started from basic physical and esthetical 
values, writing that quality of space should be ‘realistic, beautiful and solid’. Nowadays the concept of qual-
ity of space is approached in a much broader sense. Place, time, scale level, social conditions and cultural 
scope determine how quality of space is perceived. The task of spatial interventions is to avoid spatial con-
flicts, and to encourage the mutual reinforcement of forms and uses by combining these in space and time. 
The surplus value in doing this is often identified as quality of space. Quality of space may, for example, be 
described as smart growth, preventing uncontrolled urbanisation, but also as the architectural quality of the 
public space in a neighbourhood. In this article we use quality of space in its broader meaning, considering 
it from a regional perspective and including both public and private space. At the same time we realise that 
quality of space in this broader meaning becomes vague and less operational. Whereas quality of space 
is considered to depend on a number of factors, these principles may vary between countries. Large sub-
urbanisation land-use patterns may be considered undesirable in one country, whereas in another country 
they may be approached positively (De Jong & Spaans, 2009).
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out necessarily using public funds for its realization. For several years the am-
bition to improve the quality of space has run into the problem of diminish-
ing state funding and inadequate regional resources. This situation created a 
need for new methods that would guarantee a better quality of space and the 
means to fund it. An important source of inspiration came from the American 
concept of the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR). In the U.S. TDR was re-
lated to the Smart Growth Theory, which focuses on a long-term development 
perspective that accepts economic growth, but advocates that steps be taken 
to ascertain how – with the revenues originating from this growth – the nega-
tive consequences of growth can be absorbed rather than ignored or passed 
on to the next region (Janssen-Jansen, 2004). However, Smart Growth is largely 
associated with the fight against urban sprawl, whereas many non-financial 
compensation schemes have a broader scope and are designed first and fore-
most to improve the quality of space in urban, rural and mixed-use areas. The 
prevention or containment of urbanization is simply one of the purposes that 
co-exists with the realization of improvements to natural or landscape val-
ues. These schemes also utilize the planning gain that may accrue from the 
acceptance of a certain urbanization in designated areas (De Jong & Spaans, 
2009). Be that as it may, the theory and practice of Smart Growth can teach 
us useful lessons in how to develop these methods for spatial interventions 
at the regional level further and, more importantly, how to flesh out the non-
financial compensation scheme (Geoghegan, 2002).
The idea of using planning gain for related or wider development goals is 
not accepted everywhere. It is contested as much from an economic point of 
view as from a legal perspective. From an economic perspective it is argued 
that the obligations are essentially a specific, indirect taxation of betterment. 
It might be more effective, efficient and fair to developers and other stake-
holders to tax the betterment directly and earmark the revenues for special 
purposes (Crook & Whitehead, 2002). Several countries have such a taxation 
scheme, be it on the local or state level. The problem is that such taxation 
schemes seldom result in a program with direct revenues (subsidies and 
grant) for local governments confronted with the external costs of develop-
ment and accepted community needs. From a legal perspective there is the 
requirement of a necessary statutory basis of planning obligations and agree-
ments, the procedural equity between developers and the required relation 
between the planning or development purpose and the agreed obligations. Do 
planning obligations have to reasonably and fairly relate to the planning pur-
pose or is a wider relation acceptable? Some argue that with acceptance of 
the latter the system allows developers to buy permission for profitable de-
velopments (Healey et al., 1995). In the Dutch planning system utilization of 
planning gain in most cases requires a formal legal basis and apart from that 
a reasonable relation between planning goal and obligation (Tweede Kamer, 
2001; 2005) (De Jong & Spaans, 2009).
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Why governments can recapture  2.5 
added value
When is it legitimate for government to intervene in private real estate mar-
kets? Cho (2007) proposes that the traditional argument regarding land use 
and urban development justifies regulatory planning intervention based on 
the concept of market failure – a concept where the pursuit of private interest 
does not lead to an efficient use of society’s resources on the one hand and 
equity on the other. The market failure view posits that the sources of market 
failure – public goods, externalities, natural monopolies and information sym-
metries – impede the allocative efficiency of the market system and that pub-
lic intervention in land use and urban development is therefore required. On 
the other hand, the equity argument contends that markets achieve a high 
degree of efficiency at the expense of equity and that consequently regula-
tions are necessary to achieve an appropriate degree of redistribution (Rich-
ardson & Gordon, 1993).
Under the influence of the market failure view, urban development is in 
large part driven by a variety of government regulations, which comprise not 
only traditional land use controls such as zoning and subdivision regulations, 
but also growth management techniques such as concurrency requirements, 
growth phasing programs, urban growth boundaries, rate-of-growth pro-
grams and restricted development zones. Despite the extensive use of such 
regulatory tools, however, the evidence suggests that regulation efforts of-
ten fail to bring about efficient and fair outcomes in development decisions. 
For example, restrictive urban containment policies have produced various 
negative consequences, such as the outward expansion of urban areas, the 
rising prices of housing, a highly dispersed leapfrogging pattern of develop-
ment, longer commuting distances and the decline of central cities. Thus, the 
idea of restrictive regulation watching out for the correction of market fail-
ure and also distributional justice is, in many cases, not creditable. Given the 
persistence of adverse consequences of regulatory intervention, the view that 
only through the enhanced government regulation public purposes can be at-
tained is open to question.
Furthermore, the argument of market failure in support of regulatory inter-
vention into private real estate markets, as grounded in the correction of inef-
ficiency and the unsatisfactory distribution of land resources, must be viewed 
as only a partial explanation of the appropriate government role. The suffi-
cient forms of public intervention should not cause consequences that would 
inflict greater social costs than social benefits. Accordingly, identification of 
the costs of government intervention needs an understanding of the ways 
collective action can fail, which can be facilitated by the perspective that in-
cludes government failure as well as market failure (Weimer & Vining, 1992).
Theoretical underpinnings of government failure are primarily drawn from 
[ 30 ]
public choice theory, which presents an attempt to apply economic models of 
reasoning to the analysis of collective choice and democratic decision-mak-
ing. Public choice theory examines the role of economic incentives within the 
political market of planning intervention and, by exploring the institutional 
structures of liberal democracy, challenges the merits of government regu-
lation (Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1977; Buchanan, 1986). Challenging the market 
failure rationale for government planning, it argues that the identification of 
market failures is not enough to justify government intervention. More spe-
cifically, if the economic case for planning is to be made, then planners can 
obtain the necessary information to correct market failures and furthermore, 
they have sufficient personal incentives to act on the basis of that informa-
tion (Buchanan, 1986; Anderson & Leal, 1991). If these conditions cannot be 
met, it is misplaced to suggest that the alternative to imperfect markets is 
government intervention immune from similar, if not more serious, institu-
tional failings (Demsetz, 1969; Pennington, 2000). This perspective emphasizes 
the inadequacy of government as a mechanism for allocating resources, con-
tending that markets may not be perfect as an institution of resource alloca-
tion but that they still offer important advantages over governments. Then, 
the argument of government failure obviously leans toward anti-planning, 
pro-market sentiment in support of market approaches to urban develop-
ment.
In recognition of the inadequacy of public regulation for urban develop-
ment, the pro-market argument posits that market forces can be harnessed 
to encourage more efficient and equitable development patterns that ensure 
the maximum satisfaction of the preferences and desires of individuals. Thus, 
market-oriented thinking espouses the premise that the public interest is 
best served by market institutions that can process and meet the needs and 
preferences of all individuals within the community rather than prescribing 
outcomes that represent the vision or desires of regulators and narrow spe-
cial interests (Staley & Scarlett, 1997; Pennington, 2000).9
Recapturing added value of land2.6 
This leaves the question of why a government has the right to recapture the 
added value of land. Added value of land can be caused by the rules of the 
market, by private improvements, by government intervention or public im-
provements. The extent to which the government may tax or otherwise re-
capture the added value differs per country. We now take a closer look at the 
situation where the added value is the result of a ‘planning decision’.
9  For the first part of this section we greatly appreciate the input of Cheol-Joo Cho (2007). 
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Added value of land (or lost value) is described by terms such as ‘wind-
fall’ and ‘wipeouts’ or ‘worsenments’. “Windfalls and wipeouts – called better-
ments and worsenments by the British – are often attributed to governmental 
projects and regulations. But windfalls and wipeouts can exist independent 
of government. Activities of neighbors can cause a windfall or a wipeout. Con-
sequently, windfalls and wipeouts are increases or decreases in the value of 
land or real estate that also are community caused – i.e., caused by someone 
other than the landowner, whether that someone be government or a private 
party in the community” (Hagman & Misczynski, 1978: xxix).
The question if and to what extent a government can recapture the added 
value of land for public use is often debated. In the U.S. the discussion is re-
lated to the property rights-movement. “Some may regard windfall recapture 
as un-American. Many Americans consider it right that increases in value 
publicly conferred (through rezoning or from nearby public projects) belong 
to the private property owners” (Hagman & Misczynski, 1978: executive sum-
mary, xxxi). Most governments, however, claim to have the right to recapture 
added value. In England the legal explanation of the right to recapture value 
is found in the Town and Planning Act of 1947 that nationalized all develop-
ment rights. A landowner only owns the existing uses of his land, if he wants 
to develop it differently, he has to acquire that right from the government 
who owns the right to develop the land. A complex process of negotiation 
then starts whereby the planning authority demands the creation of public 
goods and payments for its right (Booth, 2003; Cullingworth & Nadin, 2006). 
The discretionary power, based on the ownership of the development rights, 
is vested in the local government who can agree the so-called planning ob-
ligations with developers by formulating a development plan (Healey et al., 
1995). These obligations mostly enable the provision of infrastructure and ser-
vices directly related to the development. More recently contributions to the 
wider community needs like the provision of affordable housing (on or off-
site), the creation of mixed communities and the redevelopment of brown-
fields can also be seen as the results of planning obligations (Crook & White-
head, 2002).
In many countries the idea of recouping this surplus value of planning de-
cisions is growing in importance, the theory being that more value that re-
sults from a planning decision (such as the change of a land use plan) should 
be recaptured by society. The underlying concept in many countries is that 
no individual property owner or resident has a legal right to a particular zon-
ing ordinance. Thus, zoning is not a personal property right; it is a commu-
nity property right (Fischel, 1985: 36). Recapturing would result in more dis-
tributive justice (as the gain is unearned), reduce the temptation to misuse 
planning decisions to enrich individuals, might reduce land speculation by 
reducing its gains; might increase trust in governmental planning decisions, 
might reduce growing public objections to new development. Micelli (2002: 
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141) argues that in the debate of urban economists and planners about the 
possibility of using innovative methods and tools in managing urban plans 
in order to increase their effectiveness, “a major step would lie in shifting 
from the use of authoritative tools towards those that employ market levers 
to implement public policies and, as economists say, to restore conditions of 
efficient resource allocation”. This kind of levy is preferable above alternative 
fiscal sources. There is money to compensate, because the market will only 
develop if this is profitable (Alterman, 2005). Linked to the recapturing value 
discussion in the Netherlands is the question of to what extent a community 
can require new developments to finance municipal services. Only directly 
apportioned costs can be attributed to new developments according to exist-
ing Dutch law. New laws seem to have broadened the grounds for cost recov-
ery. Non-financial compensation schemes might be a manner to recoup extra 
value. An important presumption is the belief that transaction costs can be 
changed into transaction changes (Van der Heijden & Slob, 2006).
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In Figure 2.2, Whatmore (1994) sketches a simplified political economy of 
the flows of economic value between different parties in the land develop-
ment process. Within this framework, planning gain can be understood as 
one of the several possible mechanisms for regulating the burden of develop-
ment costs and benefits between individual and communal interests.
Hagman & Misczynski (1978) indicate that they know of no other country 
which used the U.S. legal explanation to recapture added value. Although it 
is based on the common law view of ownership as a bundle of sticks, the U.S. 
have never stated that they would own development rights to land, the right 
to recapture a windfall is based on general explanations of fairness and not 
all states agree that such a right exists. An example in a European country 
is Spain where 10% of the land on a development site is designated for af-
fordable housing purposes – apart from the public spaces and infrastructure. 
Many countries require the land to be conveyed to the local government for 
public spaces and facilities. Since the seventies the comparable construction 
of the development impact fee has emerged in the U.S.. Many local govern-
ments, confronted with rapid growth in their community, have adopted it as 
an alternative to an increase in property taxes (Evans-Cowley & Lawhon, 2003; 
Jeong, 2006; Nicholas & Conrad, 2003). In all these constructions the trade-offs 
basically refer to the specific development plan, or local level, and the obli-
gations are more or less closely related to the development goals (proximity 
principle) (De Jong & Spaans, 2009).
Conclusions2.7 
In this chapter we have introduced the concept of non-financial compensa-
tion as a concept that allows us to compare different planning schemes in 
which government does not financially subsidize or compensate landowners 
and/or developers for their losses or endeavors. We introduced the distinc-
tion between single-purpose and multi-purpose non-financial compensation 
schemes. Whereas the single-purpose non-financial compensation scheme 
only aims to compensate for loss of economic value, the multi-purpose non-
financial compensation scheme serves more goals and provides not only a 
way to compensate but also to promote planning goals (such as a more ef-
ficient allocation of development rights or prevention of urban sprawl). The 
division between single and multi-purpose non-financial compensation 
schemes relates to the reasons why governments have to compensate and 
why they want to. We saw that the concept of a taking of interference with 
a property right gains in importance leaving governments with more cases 
in which they are obliged to compensate for their actions while, at the same 
time, governments have less financial resources.
Non-financial compensation offers a way to have the market pay for the 
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losses of property owners. The government can compensate those owners 
by granting them a new property right instead of paying them. The reasons 
why governments want to compensate (using non-financial compensation 
schemes) are related to modern insights into the relationship between the 
private and the public sectors. Sometimes, when governments set the con-
ditions, the market will solve inefficiencies that cannot be solved by public 
action. We also paid some attention to the question of why governments are 
allowed to let the market compensate for the losses of property owners. In 
the end an non-financial compensation scheme is about recapturing (or re-
distributing) added value. We saw that although (to our knowledge) every gov-
ernment recaptures value, there is no clear principle as to why they are al-
lowed to do so. It is better to say that different countries use different, if any, 
legitimations. It seems, however, to be generally accepted that windfalls that 
are caused by government (public) action should at least partly be recaptured 
for the benefit of society.
We conclude that the non-financial compensation concept is a useful con-
tribution to academic discussion because it is not used as such in any legal 
system. It is therefore neutral and can be developed, whereas a term such 
as TDR will evoke many connotations by academics (and planners) used to 
working with that concept. The non-financial compensation concept allows 
us to discuss practices on a more abstract level, to move one step away from 
the terms of our own systems, and look at them from a different perspective. 
The non-financial compensation concept also urges us to rethink the grounds 
of justification for governments that interfere with property rights and helps 
us compare the differences between planning systems and in the end, as is 
our belief, to improve them.
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Japan: using developing 3 
rights as driver for 
development
Paul Chorus
Introduction3.1 
People that are used to neatly planned cities might be shocked when going to 
Japan. Virtually everything seems to be possible in Japanese cities resulting in 
a, for the outsider, rather chaotic and contrastive landscape. For example, it 
is quite common to find skyscrapers next to low-rise wooden houses or rem-
nants of farmland in the middle of the Central Business District (see Figure 
3.1). This makes one wonder if there actually is such a thing as a planning 
system in Japan. To be reassuring, yes there is, but it is a very loosely regu-
lated one. Furthermore, landownership in Japan is highly fragmented. When 
a development is taken on it is quite common to see hundreds of different 
landowners get involved. This calls, particularly in metropolitan areas, for 
long negotiations since each landowner has to be convinced separately in or-
der to acquire the land necessary for a development. Although the govern-
ment is authorized to use eminent domain10, it rarely applies this right, mak-
ing planning in Japan a rather time-consuming task.
City planning3.2 
Planning in Japan is carried out at three levels; the national, regional and lo-
cal level. At the national level Comprehensive National Development Plans 
are prepared. Since 1962 five such plans have been established. The current 
plan, however, approved in 1998 with 2010-2015 as its target year, is likely to 
be the last one of its kind as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Trans-
port is currently revising its national as well as the regional planning system. 
On the national level the Comprehensive National Development Plan is going 
to be replaced by the New National Land Sustainability Plan. This plan has to 
meet “the needs of the new era”, referring to the challenges Japan is facing 
such as a declining population and an expected decrease in its share in the 
world economy. The new plan is expected to come into effect by the middle of 
2007 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2006b). Besides national 
plans, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is also responsible 
for formulating the regional plans. In contrast to many other countries Japan 
does not have a separate layer of regional government. Tokyo belongs, with 
seven surrounding prefectures, to the National Capital Region for which the 
10  Due to bad experiences in the past such as the development of Narita International Airport in Tokyo, 
there is virtually a ban on using eminent domain.
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National Capital Regional Basic Plan has been formulated. The changes pro-
posed on the regional level mainly involve a simplification of the plan figures. 
On the local level planning is carried out at two levels; by the prefectures and 
by the municipalities within each prefecture. Prefectures serve the wider ar-
eas while the municipalities provide the local services. The prefecture of 
Tokyo occupies a special position as its central and most populated part is 
divided into 23 self-governing municipalities, referred to as the 23 wards. Re-
garding city planning the Wards are responsible for ‘local affairs’ such as the 
construction of local roads, the maintenance of local parks and small-scale 
urban developments. The prefectural governments are responsible for the 
large-scale projects and for the planning of urban facilities such as roads, air-
ports, parks and sewerage facilities. City plans such as district plans, urban 
development projects (land readjustment and urban redevelopment projects), 
land use zoning plans and plans for urban facilities are made on the local 
level. Either the prefecture, in the case of Tokyo the Tokyo Metropolitan Gov-
ernment, or the wards carry out such plans, which basically depends on the 
size and importance of a project.
The foundations for city planning were laid in 1968 when, after being en-
tirely revised, the new City Planning Law was promulgated. The City Planning 
Law defines the basic provisions for the planned development of urban ar-
eas in Japan. These include (1) the types and standards of city planning, (2) 
planning procedure, (3) planning control and (4) urban development projects. 
Details of regulations are specified in separate legislation such as the Build-
ing Standards Law, which regulates building activities in accordance with the 
zoning plan (Isocarp, 1997: 14).
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Figure 3.1 Contrastive land uses: remnants of farmland in the middle of Tokyo’s CBD 
City planning in Japan begins by defining the City Planning Area. This is the 
area where the City Planning Law is applied and land use is under the control 
of the government. The City Planning Area demarcates two areas: the Urban-
ization Promotion Area (UPA) and the Urbanization Control Area (UCA). In an 
UCA the urbanization is to be restricted. However, in some exceptional cas-
es large-scale developments are allowed to take place. The UPA includes the 
built-up areas and areas which will be developed in the coming ten years. In 
an UPA land use is controlled by twelve land use districts while in an UCA land 
use is controlled by plans from the agricultural side. Besides the 12 land use 
districts additional zonings exist that make either tighter or looser regulation 
of the land possible. Such zonings partly cover existing land use districts and 
are designated by municipal ordinance in specified areas (Ministry of Land, In-
frastructure and Transport, 1996b). The most detailed control of land use takes 
place on the district level and is laid down in so-called district plans.
Loose planning regulations3.3 
The flexibility of the Japanese planning system is perfectly illustrated by the 
land use zoning districts. In Japan there are 12 standard land use categories, 
which can be roughly divided into three groups: residential districts, com-
mercial districts and industrial districts (see Table 3.1). No less than seven 
zones belong to the residential districts. Although the name supposes differ-
ently none of these zones is exclusively reserved for residential use. Even in 
the most strictly zoned residential district, the Category 1 Exclusive low-rise 
residential district, non-residential use such as a small shop or office is al-
lowed. Also Industrial districts are not the exclusive territory of factories. For 
example in an ‘Industrial’ and ‘Quasi industrial district’ houses and shops can 
be built. The most loosely zoned districts are the ‘Commercial districts’. Here 
virtually every kind of function combination is possible and directions related 
to the usage of buildings and lands are minimal. Usually the areas zoned as 
‘Commercial districts’ can be found along the major roads, around stations 
and in the traditional shopping and business districts.
In addition, the areas that are most loosely zoned are also the areas where 
the controls on building activities are the weakest. ‘Commercial districts’ do 
not only facilitate the largest variety in land uses, they also allow for the high-
est densities and tallest buildings to be realized. This is most clearly demon-
strated by the volume controls such as the Building Coverage Ratio (BCR) and 
the Floor Area Ratio (FAR). The BCR determines to what extent a site can be 
built upon, while the FAR regulates the scale of a building with respect to its 
surroundings. The height of both volume controls varies depending on the 
land use district. The highest values are to be found in the Commercial dis-
tricts since these are the areas where land prices are the highest and inten-
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sive land use is most often requested. By placing fewer restrictions on volume 
controls, resulting in high FAR and BCR ratios, such a demand can be met. In 
a Commercial district the BCR is 80% while the FAR can go up to as much as 
1,300% (see Table 3.2). This means that 80% of a building lot can be used for 
the construction of a building that is allowed to have a floor space equalling 
thirteen times the size of the lot. Therefore, traditionally the highest densi-
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Table 3.1 Standard land use districts in Japan
Examples 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Residences, residences in combination with 
small-scale functions (store, office etc.) 
Kindergarden, schools 
Shrine, temple, church, clinic
Hospital, university
Store/restaurant, max. 150 m² on the 1st or 
2nd floor
Store/restaurant, max. 500 m² on the 1st or 
2nd floor
Store/restaurant
Office, store
Hotel
Karaoke box
Independent garage
Warehouse
Theater, cinema
Auto repair shop
Factory with some possibility of danger or 
environmental degradation 
Factory with strong possibility of danger or 
environmental degradation
Legend
1 Category 1 - Exclusively low-rise residential districts
2 Category 2 - Exclusively low-rise residential districts
3 Category 1 - Exclusively mid-rise residential districts
4 Category 2 - Exclusively mid-rise residential districts
5 Category 1 - Residential districts
6 Category 2 - Residential districts
 7 Quasi residential districts
 8 Neighborhood commercial districts
 9 Commercial districts
 10 Quasi-industrial districts
 11 Industrial districts
 12 Exclusively industrial districts
 Can be built  Usually cannot be built  Can be built under some conditions
Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2001
ties and the most high-rise buildings are to be found in the Commercial dis-
tricts. Most strictly regulated are the Exclusive residential zones, resulting in 
low values regarding the FAR and the BCR. For example, in some areas zoned 
as Exclusive low-rise residential districts only a BCR of 30% and a FAR of 50% 
is permitted. In these areas aspects such as sunlight, ventilation and lighting 
play an important role in the quality of the living environment. Therefore, it 
is not preferable to have a high density here, which is why FAR values are 
among the lowest in these zones. The FAR Controls were introduced in 1970 
to replace the former Building Height Controls. Previously, the total floor area 
of buildings was regulated by controls such as the building height. In Resi-
dential districts the height of a building was not allowed to exceed 20 meters 
while in other districts the maximum height was set at 31 meters. With the 
adoption of the FAR controls these height controls have been abolished ex-
cept for the Category 1 and 2 Exclusive low-rise residential districts where a 
height control of 10 to 12 meters still exists.
Although specified by law the designated FARs are not fixed. Several sys-
tems exist that allow for a relaxation of existing FAR values. In general, ex-
emptions to existing floor areas are given when a developer includes the pres-
ervation of historical sites, the creation of public facilities or the guarantee of 
a certain percentage of open space in a development. Depending upon the 
proportion a developer contributes the so-called FAR bonus is given, which 
is an additional FAR. For example, in the Central Business District of Tokyo 
such relaxing measures have resulted in FAR values of 1,700% while officially 
only 1,300% was allowed. This is typical for the planning style conducted in 
Japan nowadays11. Although the law regulates many things, nothing seems to 
11  After the collapse of the Bubble at the beginning of the 1990s the government introduced many relaxing 
measures in order to increase private sector development as it was believed that this would increase eco-
nomic growth. 
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Table 3.2 Allowable total Floor Area Ratios and Building Coverage Ratios
Land use district FAR Values (in %) BCR Values (in %)
Category 1 and 2 Exclusive low-rise 
residential districts
50, 60, 80, 100, 150, 200 30, 40, 50, 60
Category 1 and 2 Exclusive mid-rise 
residential districts
100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500 30, 40, 50, 60
Category 1 and 2 Residential districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500 50, 60, 80
Quasi residential districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500 50, 60, 80
Neighborhood commercial districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500 60, 80
Commercial districts 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900,  
1000, 1100, 1200, 1300
80
Industrial districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400 50, 60
Quasi industrial districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500 50, 60, 80
Exclusive industrial districts 100, 150, 200, 300, 400 30, 40, 50, 60
Source: The Building Center of Japan, 2004
be fixed and everything is negotiable, basically paving the way for all develop-
ments to happen. That this does not always lead to good results is clear from 
the evident contrasting land uses.
Fragmented landownership3.4 
Whereas one would expect a flexible planning system to be accompanied by 
efficient planning procedures allowing for prompt developments, this is not 
the case in Japan. Due to the highly fragmented ownership of land, it is often 
more than ten years before a development is actually carried out, making ur-
ban planning in Japan a rather time-consuming process. Most of the land is 
owned by the private sector and of this privately-owned land individuals hold 
the largest share. However, the amount of land that each individual owns 
is rather small. In Tokyo, for example the average plot size is around 209m2 
(Chorus, 2002). It is quite common therefore that a large number of landown-
ers get involved in any development. Each of them needs to be dealt with sep-
arately in order to acquire the land necessary for the development. Since the 
voluntary movement of the landowner is usually relied upon, one can imag-
ine that this can lead to long negotiations.
An individual landowner enjoys an almost untouchable position in Japan. 
Landownership is highly respected since strong emotional values are attached 
to it. A piece of land is often the only remaining connection to one’s ancestors 
and individuals are therefore often very reluctant to sell it. This ‘never sell’ 
mentality was reinforced by the soaring land prices. For a long time land was 
believed to be a reliable asset to invest in as its value could only increase and, 
even though land prices did start to decrease at the beginning of the 1990s, 
values are still high. For example, residential land in an area outside the Cen-
tral Business District of Tokyo still sells for €4,000/m2. Due to negative expe-
riences in the past the government rarely uses the instrument of eminent 
domain anymore, so the chances that a landowner will be forced to relocate 
are very small. The voluntary cooperation of the landowner is rather relied 
on, which is understandable since eminent domain contradicts with Japan’s 
consensus-oriented society. It is against this background one should consider 
the case studies provided in the next section.
Case on conservation and redevelopment 3.5 
in the Marunouchi District
Right in the heart of Tokyo, situated in between the Imperial Palace and Tokyo 
Station, the most important area of Japan is to be found: the Marunouchi Dis-
trict (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Over 4,000 companies, among them many na-
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tional and international head offices, are located in this area, contributing to 
approximately 20% of Japan’s Gross Domestic Product. Besides having a work-
force of over 240,000 people, the area attracts more than 700,000 visitors per 
day. Including the buildings under construction, 105 major office buildings are 
located in an area of 120 hectares with a total floor space of approximately 6.4 
million m2 (Okada, 2006). To underline the economic importance of the Mar-
unouchi area the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has designated this district 
with the highest allowable FARs to be found in the country, namely 1,300%. In 
this way private developers like Mitsubishi, the most important landowner in 
the area, are encouraged to use their land in the most efficient way.
Development history3.5.1 
The foundations of the Marunouchi district were laid in the Meiji period 
(1868-1912). It was in 1890 that Mitsubishi purchased the Marunouchi site, 
a 36-hectare site formerly owned by the headquarters of the Imperial army. 
Four years later, in 1894, they completed their first office building: the Mitsub-
ishi No. 1 Building. This building was the first office building and marked the 
development of Marunouchi as Japan’s first Central Business District. Strik-
ing for the Marunouchi Area was that, unlike other Central Business Districts 
in the world, its first appearance was that of a low-rise area due to the strict 
height regulations that existed in Japan at that time. The Building Standards 
Law did not allow buildings to be taller than 31 meters in Japan, which is also 
referred to as the 100-feet setback rule. By the time this rule was abolished 
and replaced by the FAR system most of the Central Business District had 
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already been developed. Since many of the buildings are now more than 40 
years old, the need to upgrade them is becoming an issue. The FAR system 
provides the developer with a tool to do this in a much more efficient way. 
For this reason all the projects in the current redevelopment phase share the 
same approach: the conversion of low-rise buildings into high-rise complexes.
Planning the redevelopment of Marunouchi3.5.2 
In 1988, 69 landowners and leaseholders in the Marunouchi district formed 
the Redevelopment Project Council headed by Mitsubishi Estate. With the es-
tablishment of this Council the planning of the renewal of Marunouchi offi-
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cially started. Their task was to coordinate and promote plans for a compre-
hensive redevelopment of the area. In 1996 the Advisory Committee on Area 
Development was established as a public private partnership consisting of 
representatives of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Chiyoda ward (the 
ward Marunouchi District is situated in), East Japan Railways Company and 
the Redevelopment Project Council. It was their role to create a future vision 
for the area and to set up a basic framework of rules for its implementation. 
This resulted in the establishment in 2000 of the city planning guidelines 
for the Marunouchi District. In this planning document it was agreed that 
the traditional business center would be transformed into a city center with 
multiple functions, also referred to as an ‘Amenities Business Core’. For this 
functions that were at that time underrepresented, such as cultural facilities, 
hotels, meeting places, shops and restaurants, had to be drawn into the ar-
ea. Furthermore the idea of creating an inclined skyline towards the Imperial 
Palace was launched (see Figure 3.4). For this the Marunouchi district had to 
be roughly divided into three building height zones. In the area bordering the 
Imperial Palace a height of 100 meters was allowed respecting the view from 
the Palace, while in the center of the Marunouchi district buildings up to 150 
meters could be built, with the possibility of 200 meters in the area around 
Tokyo Station.
It was also decided to retain the 100-feet setback rule as a general design 
principle for the area. In this way, something of the unique landscape caused 
by the 31-meter height restriction could be preserved for the future.
The first results3.5.3 
The first redevelopment phase (1998-2007), in which six buildings have been 
renovated, has just come to an end. All the buildings have been redeveloped 
according to the same principle – by converting a former low-rise building in-
[ 49 ]
to a high-rise structure. However, the instruments used to achieve this differ, 
as will be illustrated by the three cases below.
The Marunouchi Building
The original Marunouchi Building was completed in 1923 and was one of the 
first high-rise office buildings in the Marunouchi District. Due to the earth-
quake in Kobe in 1995 serious questions were raised about the earthquake 
resistance of old buildings in Tokyo. Therefore in 1998 Mitsubishi, as owner of 
the building, decided to demolish it and replace it with a 37-story high-rise 
building, which opened its doors by 2002. This seems like a sad story, but in 
fact the opposite is true. Although the old building was demolished, it was 
then rebuilt to resemble the original style. However, this did not mean that an 
old low-rise building was simply replaced by a new one. That would have been 
a missed opportunity, since the floor area regulations allowed Mitsubishi to 
use their land much more intensively. By building an additional high-rise on 
top of the low-rise building they were able to fully utilize their unused floor 
area rights. This development model allowed Mitsubishi to adopt the 100-foot 
setback rule as was required by the city planning guidelines by using the low-
rise structure as a podium for the high-rise building.
What is typical of many developments in Tokyo is that the FAR actually 
used turns out to be much higher then the officially designated one. This ap-
plies to the Marunouchi building, which was allowed to utilize a FAR of 1,000% 
(after 2002 this was increased to 1,300%), but instead used a building volume 
of approximately 1,437%, resulting in a height of 180 meters.
As mentioned before, if a private developer includes the preservation of 
historical sites or public facilities in his development, or secures open space, 
he receives the FAR bonus, a proportionate additional FAR. In the case of the 
Marunouchi Building a bonus of 300% was received for adding cultural facili-
ties to its building, providing open space and constructing a passageway. A 
further 137% was received from an adjacent building’s unused development 
rights, resulting in a total additional FAR of 437%.
The Industry Club of Japan Building
Another historical building that has been recently redeveloped is the Industry 
Club of Japan Building. The building itself was completed in 1920, but for the 
same reasons as the Marunouchi Building, it had to be renewed. However, un-
like the Marunouchi Building, the original building was not demolished as it 
was registered as a Tangible Cultural Property. The developer was therefore 
required to preserve the outer façade of the building and was only allowed to 
carry out minor changes to the inside interior. However, in return for this, the 
developer received tax exemptions and financial support from the national 
government. The low-rise building also served in this case as a podium for 
the construction of a high-rise building totalling 143 meters. However, such 
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an increase in building volume was only allowed as the adjacent building, the 
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Building, was included in the redevelop-
ment. Therefore, Mitsubishi, as developer of the site, could use the develop-
ment rights of that adjacent property to construct the high-rise building. In-
stead of receiving an additional floor area due to some kind of investment, as 
was the case for Marunouchi, an increase was simply made possible here by 
utilizing unused development rights.
Tokyo Building
In 2005 the redevelopment of the Tokyo Building was completed, adding 
a building of 33 stories with a height of 164 meters to the Marunouchi Dis-
trict. Unlike the other redeveloped buildings in the area, the Tokyo Building is 
much more an office building. Although on the ground level and in the base-
ment there are commercial functions, their contribution is rather small com-
pared to other redeveloped buildings in the area. It is interesting that such 
a development was possible, despite city planning guidelines established in 
2005 to stop such primarily office-led developments. It is interesting that the 
same instrument that was introduced for realizing multifunctionality also 
made this rather monofunctional land use possible. Once again, this proves 
how flexible the Japanese planning system is.
The city planning guidelines established an instrument called ‘Use substi-
tution’ in order to introduce non-office functions in Marunouchi. This instru-
ment prescribes that when constructing a building with a FAR of more than 
1,150%, the additional capacity needs to be devoted to non-office uses. Since 
in the Marunouchi district a FAR of 1,300% is allowed (see Figure 3.5), this 
means that 150% has to be devoted to other usages to fully utilize this floor 
area allowance. However, this non-office part does not need to be realized in 
the same building, as Use substitution instrument allows for an exchange of 
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usages between different buildings in the district. This means that non-office 
functions can be traded against office functions, thus enabling a developer to 
devote more than 1,150% to office use.
This is what happened in the case of the Tokyo Building. The total FAR for 
the Tokyo Building was approximately 1,720% which meant that, according to 
Use substitution instrument, 570% needed to be devoted to non-office uses. 
Instead of realizing this non-office part in the Tokyo Building, this 570% was 
transferred to two other buildings within the district – the Hibiya Peninsula 
Hotel (another redevelopment project in the Marunouchi Area) and the Tokyo-
Mitsubishi Bank Building. In return, the Tokyo Building received a similar vol-
ume of office space from these two buildings12. This allowed the Tokyo Build-
ing to remain mainly an office building and the Peninsula Building to become 
an exclusive hotel (see Figure 3.6).
The Tokyo Building was ultimately able to increase its allowable FAR to 
1.720% as it received air rights from Tokyo Station and used the unused air 
rights of the adjacent Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank Building.
A look into the future3.5.4 
The second phase of the Marunouchi redevelopment starts in 2008 and an-
other 7 or 8 buildings will be renewed. It is most likely that the guidelines for 
the area will be further deregulated. One of the clear signals for this is that 
the Marunouchi Area has been designated as a Priority Development Area for 
Urban Renaissance, based upon the Urban Renaissance Law. Such a designa-
tion allows for financial support and tax exemptions and a shortening of city 
planning procedures. The most drastic measure is, however, that within such 
an area special zones for urban renaissance can be established in which all 
the existing land use regulations are lifted and a new set of rules is imposed 
which takes the private sectors opinions into account. This means that a pri-
vate developer will be able to draft a plan without the interference of local 
government, giving a developer even more freedom in using their site in the 
most efficient way.
Case on conversion in Tokyo: towards 3.6 
safer and more efficient land use
In many Japanese cities there are still plenty of them; the so-called low-rise 
high-density areas. Typical of these areas is that many of the houses consist 
of wood and are built so close to each other that they hardly leave room for 
12  As Mitsubishi Estate owns both buildings the exchange of usages was fairly easy.
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infrastructure or greenery. Most of them were built at a time when there were 
hardly any detailed city planning regulations. After the enactment of the City 
Planning Law in 1968 this changed, but planning controls remained weak. For 
example, in most cases in Tokyo a landowner does not need planning permis-
sion for a building lot development when the size of the plot does not exceed 
500m2. Since most of the land owned by individuals is smaller, on average 
209m2, no control on their land use exists (Chorus, 2002). This means that ba-
sically any land use is allowed and explains why in many areas the land is 
utilized in a rather inefficient way. The many low-rise houses that are present 
in the Commercial districts as well as the remnants of farmland one can find 
in the Central Business District make this perfectly clear.
Besides inefficient land use, many sites are also characterized by a rather 
inefficient spatial layout. Especially in the low-rise high-density areas this is 
a pressing problem. Infrastructure is often so poorly developed that it is not 
even possible for cars to enter the area. Furthermore, because the areas are 
so densely built up, there is hardly any space left for greenery. This makes 
these areas extremely vulnerable to damage from fire or earthquakes which 
are, due to its location on a fault line, a very common phenomenon in Japan. 
These crammed areas need to be replanned to make them safer. Additional 
greenery is required to serve as a refugee base whilst a wider infrastructure 
is essential to make the areas accessible to the emergency services. In 1995 a 
heavy earthquake struck Kobe and most of the damage occurred in the areas 
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with densely packed wooden houses. In the light of this lesson and due to the 
fact that a big earthquake directly under Tokyo is expected in the near future, 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government recognises the urgency of redeveloping 
these areas.
Two methods for rearranging the land3.6.1 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has a wide range of instruments avail-
able for rearranging the land. Many of these instruments aim to utilize the 
individual sites efficiently. However, this case study focuses upon the rear-
rangement of larger areas, for which two methods are employed: Land Re-
adjustment and Urban Redevelopment. Both of them fall under the so-called 
Urban Development Projects that make, together with the land use plans and 
the urban facility plans, the basic framework of city planning in Japan. Urban 
Development Projects implement land use and urban facility plans and the 
combination of all three makes the planning system in Japan comprehensive 
(see Figure 3.7). Other private land development activities are regulated by 
the land development permission, which is legalized in the City Planning Law 
(Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 1996c).
Land readjustment
Land readjustment was originally used as a measure for consolidating agri-
cultural land. Before World War II it was broadly applied to areas that were 
struck by disasters. Since World War II land readjustment has been used as 
a measure to provide housing lots for a rapidly urbanizing Japan. The legal 
basis for carrying out a land readjustment project is provided by the Land Re-
adjustment Law (1954).
Land readjustment is a measure based upon the exchange of rights from 
one land to another. This is also referred to as replotting. Both landowners 
and leaseholders contribute an equal portion of their land in a land readjust-
ment project. Part of this land is used for the development of public facilities 
while another part is used for financing the project costs. The land used to 
defray a part of the project costs, is referred to as ‘reserve land’. After the land 
readjustment the landowners and leaseholders receive their replots (the rear-
ranged lands after land readjustment) back, albeit smaller in size. By using 
this system public facilities can be improved and lands can be reorganized in-
tegrally. Land readjustment projects are broadly applied to areas such as ex-
isting built-up areas, areas where urban sprawl is in progress and new towns. 
Projects vary in size from 10 to 1,000 hectares. By 2002 more than 385,000 
hectares had been developed using the Land readjustment method. Land re-
adjustment projects are carried out by both the public sector and the private 
sector. In the public sector most land readjustment projects are carried out 
by the prefectural and municipal governments, followed by the Urban Renais-
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sance Agency, whereas in the private sector most projects are carried out by 
land readjustment cooperatives consisting of at least seven or more landown-
ers or leaseholders. It is also possible to carry out a land readjustment project 
as an individual.
Urban redevelopment
Urban redevelopment projects are executed under the Urban Redevelopment 
Law (1969). This law was the result of a merger of two other laws; the Fire Pre-
vention Building Districts Expansion Law (1961) which aimed to turn wooden 
structures into fire resistant ones, and the Urban Reformation Law making it 
possible to transfer rights from land to a building for the purpose of providing 
public facilities.
Urban redevelopment is based upon the exchange of rights from land to a 
building floor. This is also referred to as right conversion. Land and building 
owners who are willing to participate in an urban redevelopment project give 
up their lands and buildings. Under the urban redevelopment system new 
buildings are constructed and previous land titles are transferred to the build-
ing site and the floor space in the new buildings. That is, landowners and also 
lease owners obtain a certain portion of floor space in the newly constructed 
building. Excess floors are reserved in order to defray part of the project costs. 
This system enables a comprehensive renewal of public facilities and build-
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ings and is mainly applied to existing central urban areas. The project size 
is generally around 1 to 3 hectares with a maximum of 10 hectares. By 2002 
more than 860 hectares had been developed through urban redevelopment 
projects. Executors of urban redevelopment projects are public bodies such 
as local governments and the Urban Renaissance Agency as well as private 
bodies such as a redevelopment corporation consisting of several landowners 
and or leaseholders.
In the following section two cases will be described that show in practice 
how land readjustment and urban redevelopment work. Although there are 
many examples available within Tokyo itself we have consciously chosen proj-
ects located more on the urban fringe to illustrate that developments are also 
taking place outside Tokyo. The first project is the Tsukuba Express, which is 
a commuter line that connects Tsukuba, a suburb to the northeast of Tokyo, 
with the center of Tokyo. The second involves several urban redevelopment 
projects in Saitama.
Land readjustment applied along the Tsukuba line3.6.2 
The Tsukuba line started its services in August 2005, twenty years after the 
first plan was launched. The 58.3 km railway line consists of 20 stations and 
links Tokyo with Saitama, Chiba and Ibaraki prefecture (see Figure 3.8). The 
Tsukuba Express, also referred to as TX, is most likely the last new commuter 
line that has been built in the Tokyo metropolis. The new line aims to pro-
mote development in areas where there had been no railway services. A spe-
cial act was enacted in 1989 to enable this, the ‘Special law on the housing-
land and railroad system development’. This law enabled the TX project to 
simultaneously promote the acquisition of land for the railroad services and 
land readjustment. Along the line 20 projects are planned totaling 3,300 hect-
ares with a planned population of 100,000 people. Here the Katsuragi project, 
conducted by the Urban Renaissance Agency, is described.
The Katsuragi project
The Katsuragi project is located around Kenkyugakuen Station, which is one 
station before Tsukuba, the final destination of the Tsukuba Express. Its total 
area comprises 485 hectares and it has a planned population of 25,000 people. 
The first plans for the area were made in 1991 by designating Katsuragi as 
a top priority development area under the earlier mentioned ‘Special law on 
the housing-land and railroad system development’. In 1994 the three parties 
involved (representatives of landowners, the governor of Ibaraki prefecture 
and the Tsukuba city mayor) agreed the basic frame of the project. In 1999 the 
boundary of the project area and the location of the main roads and railways 
were fixed by the city planning. People started moving into the area in 2005. 
The project is expected to be completed in 2019.
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Land readjustment in progress
In the case of the Katsuragi project 846 different landowners were involved. 
Prior to the start of the replotting of the land a majority of them needed to 
approve the plan. One can imagine that this must have been rather time-con-
suming, particularly as it is common to rely on the voluntary contribution of 
land in Japan. However, only after the consent of the landowners can the land 
be rearranged. Regarding the Katsuragi Project the average rate of land contri-
bution was 40% which was used for the construction of roads and parks and 
partly sold as reserve land to private developers to defray part of the project 
costs.
The Katsuragi project is different from other ordinary land readjustment 
projects as it uses two special types of land readjustment;. the ‘Specifically 
designated land readjustment project method’ as well as the ‘Integrated land 
readjustment project method’. The first method is used for designating both 
consolidated farmland and common housing areas. Landowners that want to 
be located in either the consolidated farmland area or the common housing 
area can swap their lands. As for the Katsuragi project, landowners could swap 
their lands into a common housing area, but no farmland area was set up.
The integrated land readjustment project is based upon the Special Law for 
Housing and the housing-land and railroad system development. It is imple-
mented in areas where new railroad facilities are planned. Under this system 
land is acquired in advance for the construction of railways and related rail-
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road facilities such as roads and a station plaza (see Figure 3.9). In the case of 
the Katsuragi project, Ibaraki prefecture bought 36% of the land readjustment 
area in advance. This land was swapped for land along the railway line. How-
ever, only part of it was actually used for developing railway-related facilities. 
The remaining land, the usage of which was decided upon before the land 
swap, was sold as commercial land to private developers. Ibaraki prefecture 
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bought a large amount of land in advance so that the land exchange would go 
more smoothly. The conductor of the Katsuragi project is however the Urban 
Renaissance Agency, a large semi-public housing corporation, who, as project 
executor, had to develop the public facilities. Part of the land contributed by 
the landowners to the project was used for this. The remaining land, the re-
serve land, was sold to private developers. The revenues generated from this 
were used by the Urban Renaissance Agency to cover the project costs.
The disposition of reserve land is the major source of revenue in a land 
readjustment project. Furthermore, if a major arterial road is included in the 
project, as is the case for Katsuragi, a subsidy for the construction or improve-
ment of roads is received from the national government. This can amount to 
as much as half of the construction costs. The major expenses involved are 
usually the relocation of buildings and the construction of public facilities.
Urban redevelopment projects applied 3.6.3 
in Saitama City
Saitama City is part of Saitama prefecture and is located 30 kilometers from 
Tokyo (see Figure 3.10). It has experienced vigorous growth in its population 
due to the influx of families, the majority of whom work in Tokyo but who 
prefer to live in Saitama. Due to this increase in the population the construc-
tion of condominiums prospers, illustrated by the many high-rise buildings 
that have been built in recent years. It is interesting to note that most of 
these high-rises are built along railway lines. An explanation for this is that 
the areas along railways are usually the oldest parts of the city. Here the typi-
cal low-rise high-density wooden areas are to be found which are inefficiently 
used and at the same time vulnerable to damage from earthquakes. The high-
rises are the result of the numerous urban redevelopment projects that have 
been carried out in these areas aimed at making them more efficient in terms 
of land use and layout. The workings of urban redevelopment will be illus-
trated by the Asahi Machi area around Yono Station.
Redevelopment of the Asahi Machi area
On the westside of Yono station several areas have been redeveloped. All of 
them concern former low-rise high-density areas consisting of numerous 
landowners, leaseholders and building owners. One of them is called Asahi 
Machi, an area of 0.6 hectares consisting of 110 different owners (see Figure 
3.11). For the redevelopment of the area an association has been established 
representing the affected owners. In contrast to land readjustment owners 
had to give up more than just their land for the urban redevelopment as both 
buildings and lots were to be comprehensively rearranged. However, they 
were compensated for this by receiving a certain portion of building floors in 
the renewed building, and, dependent on their previous tenure, shared own-
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ership of the land. In case of the Asahi Machi area the application of urban 
redevelopment resulted in two high-rise buildings of 70 and 72 meters re-
spectively (see Figures 3.12 and 3.13). The land, which was divided into many 
small pieces before the project implementation, has been integrated into one 
lot and is shared by the owners. At the same time the landowner owns, to-
gether with the leaseholders and the building owners, a certain portion of the 
high-rise building. Excess floors have been sold to outsiders by the redevel-
opment association. In this way part of the project costs could be covered. A 
common outcome of an urban redevelopment project is that low-rise houses 
are replaced by mid-or high-rise buildings as such buildings enable a far more 
efficient utilization of the land while at the same time space is created for fa-
cilities such as roads and parks. This is perfectly illustrated by the changes in 
land use after the redevelopment of the Asahi Machi project.
The major source of revenue comes from the disposal of the reserved 
floors. The national government also provided a subsidy for the dismantling 
of buildings and the provision of public facilities equal to one-third of the 
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total costs of the development. The major expenses are the removal of old 
buildings and the construction of the new buildings, roads and parks.
Although both systems, land readjustment and urban redevelopment, en-
able efficient and safe land use, the time required before the first results are 
visible is rather long. There are years of negotiations, in the case of the Tsu-
kuba Express line 13 years, before all the land is acquired for a development. 
One may wonder if Japan has that time considering the continuous threat of 
a big earthquake hitting a major city. If Japan truly wants to become a safer 
city this has to change.
Case on reallocation: compensation for 3.7 
the non-development of Tokyo Station
Located in the middle of the Central Business District one of the few build-
ings that possesses a high historical value can be found – the Tokyo Station 
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building. Many regard it as the ‘entrance to Japan’, especially as it fronts onto 
the ‘most important road’ of Japan, the Miyuki Dori, which is the road that 
leads to the Emperor’s Palace. Its symbolical value is still reflected by the 
fact that every new ambassador is transported by coach along the Miyuki 
Dori to receive official approval for his or her appointment from the Emper-
or. Renowned office buildings such as the Marunouchi Building and the Shin 
Marunouchi Building are also located along this road, underlining further its 
importance. The station building itself was built in 1914 during the Meiji Era 
(1868-1912), which was when Japan started its modernization, greatly influ-
enced by the ‘civilized countries of the West’. The adaptation of ideas and 
techniques from the West was regarded as the ultimate means of turning Ja-
pan into a modern country. Many buildings that were designed during this pe-
riod reflect this strong orientation to the West. This is most clearly illustrated 
by the Tokyo Station building itself which clearly resembles the Amsterdam 
Central Station building. The station building itself has undergone a rather 
rough history as it was severely damaged by the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 
1923 and barely repaired before it was hit again, this time by the air raids dur-
ing World War II. The station complex is currently being redeveloped. On the 
Marunouchi side, which is the westside of the station, the surrounding area is 
being converted into a big plaza extending into a walkway in the direction of 
the Imperial Palace. Furthermore the roof of the station will be restored to its 
original state. This part of the redevelopment is scheduled for completion in 
2010. On the Yaesu side, the eastside of the station, a large pedestrian prom-
enade is planned with a high-rise building at each end (see Figure 3.14). It was 
completed in 2007 and is the first result of an instrument introduced by the 
national government in 2001 – the so-called ‘Special FAR applied district’.
Transferring unused development rights
In 2002 the Tokyo Metropolitan Government designated the Marunouchi Area 
the first area to become a ‘Special FAR applied district’. Such a designation 
made it possible to utilize unused floor areas by transferring them to multiple 
sites within a district (see Figure 3.15).
For this the consent of the rightful owners concerned is needed. Prior to 
this a transfer of the unutilized floor area was already possible, but the trans-
fer was limited to the adjacent plot. The new instrument enabled Japan Rail-
ways East (JR East), the owner of the station building, to fully utilize its devel-
opment rights.
The Tokyo Station building is located in an area zoned as a ‘Commercial 
district’ and is allowed a maximum FAR of 900% while the height for the sur-
rounding area is set at 1300%. In the current situation approximately 200% 
is used for the station complex, which means that 700% remains untouched. 
Therefore JR East is entitled to use the remaining part. At first a plan was 
launched to construct two high-rise towers on the Marunouchi side, because 
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JR East did not own enough land to develop them on the other side. This plan 
was met with strong criticism since this would overshadow the historical 
station building. However, in the light of the ongoing redevelopment in the 
neighboring Marunouchi area it was a rather logical response of JR East that 
they wanted to use their land as intensively as possible. Eventually, JR East 
managed to find the necessary space for its high-rise development by work-
ing together with the landowners on the Yaesu side of the station.
Until 2007 the FAR has been distributed to four different plots. For each 
transfer the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s permission was required. 
In 2003 99.9% was sold to Mitsubishi and used for the development of the 
Shin Marunouchi Building. In 2004 98% was transferred to the Tokyo Build-
ing, which was a joint development by Mitsubishi and JR East. In the same 
year JR East was allowed to transfer 360% to the Yaesu towers, a development 
carried out together with Mitsui Fudosan, another real estate developer. After 
these three transfers 340.5% remained for the station building. Another part 
has been recently sold to Mitsubishi for their so-called Marunouchi SF project, 
which involves the redevelopment of three buildings. The revenues earned 
by the sale of unused floor areas are used by JR East to cover the redevelop-
ment expenses of the station. The building volume of the renewed station is 
expected to increase slightly as an additional story will be added to the build-
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ing. The Tokyo Station used to be a 3-story building but after the earthquake 
became a two-story one.
On the Yaesu side two towers have been built which are 170 meters and 205 
meters in height respectively. Their height is largely the result of the transfer 
of the unused floor area of the station. The sending area is rather large, as the 
square in front of the station building is also included. The absolute number 
of square meters that can be transferred to other areas is considerable. This 
results in high FARs when looking at the sites individually. For example the 
Yaesu tower of 205 meters has a FAR of approximately 1,650%. This is much 
higher then the 900% allowed by the land use zoning. However, looking at the 
whole area, the designated FAR of 900% is not exceeded. Investing in a pedes-
trian deck also led to the bonus of an additional floor area.
The example of Tokyo Station shows that being a historically valuable build-
ing, located in the middle of the most important business area of Japan, does 
not necessarily have to imply that development opportunities are limited. Still 
JR East, as owner of the station building, can fully exploit its location by trans-
ferring its unused development rights elsewhere. However, without such an 
institution it would have been much more difficult for the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government to convince JR East not to demolish its station complex. It was 
only in 2001 that JR East decided to preserve the station building, the same 
year the national government introduced the ‘Special FAR applied district’.
Evaluating Japan’s planning style3.8 
The term ‘negotiation-led planning’ would probably characterize the planning 
style of Japan best. Developments are the result of deals closed between pri-
vate and public parties, and not so much of regulations set up by the govern-
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ment in advance. Regulations provide the basic framework for a development, 
although one can never guess their final outcome. This is most clearly illus-
trated by the allowable floor area volumes. The Building Standard Law stipu-
lates that in Commercial districts a maximum FAR of 1,300% is allowed, but 
as illustrated by the cases of Tokyo Station and the Marunouchi District these 
values are often much higher. For example, the Tokyo Building has a FAR of 
approximately 1,720%, which is 420% more then the law officially prescribes, 
while the Marunouchi Building has a FAR of 1,437%, which was at the time 
of its completion 437% more then the law allowed. The additional volumes 
are the result of the incentive systems the government uses for encouraging 
efficient utilization of the land. Basically, if a private developer meets certain 
conditions such as investing in public infrastructure and open space he is re-
warded for it by receiving additional building volume, also referred to as the 
‘FAR bonus’. The amount of the bonus depends on the proportion a developer 
invests. What is interesting about these systems is that in the end both par-
ties gain from it. The government receives public infrastructure it does not 
have to pay for, whilst a private developer receives in return additional floor 
area, which enables him to make a greater profit.
In the case of urban redevelopment projects such as the Yono Station proj-
ect in Saitama these incentive systems work in a similar way, albeit the gov-
ernment’s objective is different. The main aim here is not only to encourage 
efficient land use, but also safe land use by stressing to the developer the im-
portance of buildings that are 100% fireproof and have enough open space to 
serve as a place to shelter. Regarding land readjustment the incentive is not 
so much the FAR bonus, but the increase in the value of the land that is ex-
pected due to the improved infrastructure. This should convince a landowner 
to relinquish a piece of their land.
Having said this, the question arises of whether such a planning style 
would be of any interest to other countries. For countries that are looking 
for a more market-oriented style of planning the answer would definitely be 
yes. Planning in Japan is strongly led by the economy. Planning measures are 
mainly established from an economical point of view; they are supposed to 
contribute to the growth of the national economy. From this perspective it is 
logical that in Japan a rather flexible planning system is used, as too detailed 
rules would frustrate the development of the economy. Even the latest instru-
ment introduced, the so-called ‘Special zone for urban renaissance’ is strong-
ly focused upon giving the economy a new boost after a decade of economic 
stagnation. What is new however is that within these special zones all exist-
ing land use regulations are lifted and a new set of rules imposed, based upon 
the proposals received from the private sector (Japan External Trade Organi-
zation, 2002). By setting up such a special zone regulations can be established 
that truly fit the specific local circumstances rather then being applied uni-
formly to the entire country. By using this instrument the private developer is 
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gradually taking over the role of the government, which may one day lead to 
planning being carried out without the involvement of the government.
However, the other side of the coin is that this strong focus on the econo-
my has distracted attention away from the quality of the developments. The 
fact that high-rises can appear next to low-rise buildings and that there are 
still many crammed areas of wooden low-rise houses in the cities makes this 
quite clear. During the long period of economic growth the quality of the de-
sign of the buildings did not play a really important role, resulting in many 
functionally designed square blocks. This is also noticeable when looking at 
the areas that have been rearranged due to land readjustment and urban re-
development. Their new development pattern is of course more efficient then 
before, but on the other hand the land use is rather dull, characterized by 
dead straight streets and plots.
From this perspective, a lesson for Japan would be to look for ways of in-
corporating the qualitative aspect into their flexible planning system. By pav-
ing the way for any likely development to occur without basically having to 
offer anything in return, as is the case for the ‘Special zone for urban renais-
sance, it is questionable if the desired quality will ever be met. Therefore, if 
Tokyo truly wants to become a more attractive city, the government should 
perhaps remain involved.
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Table 3.3 Summarizing the Japanese cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Conservation and 
redevelopment in the 
Marunouchi District
Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use:
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
Compensation for the non-
development of Tokyo Station
Period in which the 
case was introduced
Bubble economy period 
(1986-1991)
a) Bubble economy period 
(1986-1991)
b) 1998 (three years after the big 
earthquake in Kobe)
Bubble economy period (1986-
1991)
General objective 
of the proposed 
instrument
 FAR bonus instruments:
ensure balance between  -
public infrastructure and 
buildings
achieve a pleasant urban  -
environment
a) Integrated land readjustment:
coordinated development  -
of railways and their 
surrounding areas
b) Urban redevelopment:
disaster prevention -
provision of public facilities -
efficient utilisation of land -
Special FAR applied district: 
efficient utilization of lands in  -
commercial districts
Characteristic factors Introduction of non-office 
usages such as retail, 
conference, restaurants to 
an office-dominated Central 
Business District (CBD)
a) After land readjustment
Public land: 26%
Private land: 74%
(of which 35% is commercial 
land and 34% residential 
land)
b) After urban redevelopment:
On 60% of the 0.64 ha 
project area two high-
rise buildings have been 
constructed. The remaining 
land is public.
Preservation and restoration of 
the old station building.
Area in front of station is  -
converted into a plaza (west 
side)
A large promenade deck  -
is planned with a high-rise 
building at each end (east 
side)
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined the 
instrument
Rapid growth of the economy 
resulted in high development 
pressures on the CBD
a+b) Growth of the economy 
led to a large influx of people 
into the urban areas (1950s 
onward)
b) Great fires in urban areas 
(1960s)
A decade of low growth of 
the economy (1991-2001) 
resulted in several deregulation 
measures that were supposed 
to help the economy to recover
Fit within planning 
and legal systems: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Projects are carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established 
for the Marunouchi District
a+b) District plan The project is carried out 
in accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Conservation and 
redevelopment in the 
Marunouchi District
Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use:
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
Compensation for the non-
development of Tokyo Station
Were specific laws 
or regulations drawn 
up?
Tokyo Building:
Made use of the Special FAR  -
applied district regulation 
(2001)
Marunouchi Building and  -
Industry Club of Japan 
Building made use of exist-
ing FAR regulations (1961)
a) Special law on the Housing 
Land and Railroad System 
Development (1989)
b) Urban Redevelopment Law 
(1969)
Amendment of the City 
Planning Law and Building 
Standards Law in 2001
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
incentives
Chiyoda Ward: involved in  -
the planning of the minor 
public facilities (local road, 
local parks)
a+b) National government and 
local government; provider of 
subsidization
National government:  -
provider of subsidization 
for the renovation of Tokyo 
Station
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
applied district
Public-private sector 
exchange
The several redevelopment 
projects are the outcomes of 
negotiations between private 
and public parties, and not so 
much a result of regulations 
set up by the government in 
advance
a) The plan was developed 
by the government after 
consulting the landowners 
involved
b) The plan was developed 
by the private landowners 
themselves with the help 
of an outsider (private 
developer)
The redevelopment project is 
an outcome of negotiations 
between private and public 
parties, and not so much a 
result of regulations set up by 
the government in advance
Parties which 
financed the case
Mitsubishi Corporation a) Urban Renaissance Agency 
and Ibaraki prefecture
b) Urban renewal association 
and Sumitomo Fudosan 
(private developer)
National government, JR East 
and some other private parties
Possibility of public 
participation
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by 
the parties involved 
a+b) Yes, both cases have to 
undergo the city planning 
procedure
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by the 
parties involved 
Table 3.3 continued
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Table 3.3 Summarizing the Japanese cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Conservation and 
redevelopment in the 
Marunouchi District
Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use:
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
Compensation for the non-
development of Tokyo Station
Period in which the 
case was introduced
Bubble economy period 
(1986-1991)
a) Bubble economy period 
(1986-1991)
b) 1998 (three years after the big 
earthquake in Kobe)
Bubble economy period (1986-
1991)
General objective 
of the proposed 
instrument
 FAR bonus instruments:
ensure balance between  -
public infrastructure and 
buildings
achieve a pleasant urban  -
environment
a) Integrated land readjustment:
coordinated development  -
of railways and their 
surrounding areas
b) Urban redevelopment:
disaster prevention -
provision of public facilities -
efficient utilisation of land -
Special FAR applied district: 
efficient utilization of lands in  -
commercial districts
Characteristic factors Introduction of non-office 
usages such as retail, 
conference, restaurants to 
an office-dominated Central 
Business District (CBD)
a) After land readjustment
Public land: 26%
Private land: 74%
(of which 35% is commercial 
land and 34% residential 
land)
b) After urban redevelopment:
On 60% of the 0.64 ha 
project area two high-
rise buildings have been 
constructed. The remaining 
land is public.
Preservation and restoration of 
the old station building.
Area in front of station is  -
converted into a plaza (west 
side)
A large promenade deck  -
is planned with a high-rise 
building at each end (east 
side)
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined the 
instrument
Rapid growth of the economy 
resulted in high development 
pressures on the CBD
a+b) Growth of the economy 
led to a large influx of people 
into the urban areas (1950s 
onward)
b) Great fires in urban areas 
(1960s)
A decade of low growth of 
the economy (1991-2001) 
resulted in several deregulation 
measures that were supposed 
to help the economy to recover
Fit within planning 
and legal systems: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Projects are carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established 
for the Marunouchi District
a+b) District plan The project is carried out 
in accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Conservation and 
redevelopment in the 
Marunouchi District
Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use:
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
Compensation for the non-
development of Tokyo Station
Were specific laws 
or regulations drawn 
up?
Tokyo Building:
Made use of the Special FAR  -
applied district regulation 
(2001)
Marunouchi Building and  -
Industry Club of Japan 
Building made use of exist-
ing FAR regulations (1961)
a) Special law on the Housing 
Land and Railroad System 
Development (1989)
b) Urban Redevelopment Law 
(1969)
Amendment of the City 
Planning Law and Building 
Standards Law in 2001
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
incentives
Chiyoda Ward: involved in  -
the planning of the minor 
public facilities (local road, 
local parks)
a+b) National government and 
local government; provider of 
subsidization
National government:  -
provider of subsidization 
for the renovation of Tokyo 
Station
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
applied district
Public-private sector 
exchange
The several redevelopment 
projects are the outcomes of 
negotiations between private 
and public parties, and not so 
much a result of regulations 
set up by the government in 
advance
a) The plan was developed 
by the government after 
consulting the landowners 
involved
b) The plan was developed 
by the private landowners 
themselves with the help 
of an outsider (private 
developer)
The redevelopment project is 
an outcome of negotiations 
between private and public 
parties, and not so much a 
result of regulations set up by 
the government in advance
Parties which 
financed the case
Mitsubishi Corporation a) Urban Renaissance Agency 
and Ibaraki prefecture
b) Urban renewal association 
and Sumitomo Fudosan 
(private developer)
National government, JR East 
and some other private parties
Possibility of public 
participation
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by 
the parties involved 
a+b) Yes, both cases have to 
undergo the city planning 
procedure
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by the 
parties involved 
Table 3.3 continued
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Korea: the case of non-4 
financial compensation in 
the District Unit Planning 
process in Seoul
Cheol-Joo Cho
Introduction4.1 
One of the most recent developments in the Korean public sector is a shift 
from the use of restrictive regulation tools towards those that employ mar-
ket levers to implement public policies. In tandem with the emerging trend in 
pro-market regimes, the application of market-oriented devices has rigorous-
ly expanded in the area of land use and development control. Motivated by 
the argument that markets are advantageous for mitigating the various forms 
of transaction costs that would be high if command-and-control regulation 
applies, the pro-market position suggests a variety of market-based tools 
with which practical problems associated with growth – urban sprawl, traffic 
congestion, loss of open space and farmland, higher infrastructure costs, and 
environmental degradation – would be effectively addressed.
Of diverse market-oriented mechanisms, the idea of a development rights 
market has received significant attention from the planning profession. The 
Korean planning system has not yet established a typical non-financial com-
pensation instrument, even though it has long been argued that the non-fi-
nancial compensation program is necessary to promote public interests. Two 
non-coercive programs that would be considered non-financial compensation 
in their concept have, however, been recently initiated. One is an incentive 
zoning scheme that has been introduced into two planning-related laws, the 
Planning and Use of National Territory Act (PUNTA) and the Special Act for Ur-
ban Readjustment Promotion (SAURP). The other is a non-financial compensa-
tion program in-kind that has recently been incorporated into the SAURP.
Extra bonuses in development density are given under PUNTA as a right 
to developers who fulfill the prescribed requirements for public purposes set 
out in the planning ordinances. The legal requirement under this program is 
strict – development rights should not be transferred across different devel-
opment tracts and thus the development rights severed from a development 
site cannot be used in a separate tract. On the other hand, SAURP is closer 
to the typical non-financial compensation program in the sense that the two 
separate zones, i.e. sending and receiving districts, can be established to facil-
itate the transfer of unused development rights between them. Only effective 
as of October 2006, however, there have as yet been no development cases 
carried out under this program.
This chapter aims to examine the Korean experience of non-financial 
compensation with respect to the use of incentive zoning in urban develop-
ment, presenting the details of its structure and operation. In the next sec-
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tion an overview of the Korean planning system is presented. This system can 
be seen as the envelope of the density transfer program. Then, three devel-
opment cases are examined, all of which have been implemented with this 
density transfer program. Next, the pros and cons of the Korean instrument 
and its potential with regard to planning purposes are discussed. Finally, this 
chapter ends with some concluding remarks.
Planning and development system4.2 
Korea’s planning framework has a top-down structure to establish a vertical 
consistency between central, provincial and local plans. It provides the nec-
essary order of intergovernmental coordination to address a wide variety of 
planning issues encompassing national, regional or local interests. Under the 
stringent top-down planning order, central government has an umbrella au-
thority to guide planning at lower levels of government, with the legal author-
ity to enact enabling legislations that cover the whole country. As the steer-
ing function in planning is primarily controlled by the national government, 
it can be said that most of the scope and characters of planning are centrally 
determined. This means that the role of local government in planning is lim-
ited and the ways by which planning operates are therefore not much differ-
ent between localities.
On top of Korea’s planning hierarchy is the national comprehensive plan, a 
10-year nationwide plan, which dictates the spatial allocation of population, 
employment, public facilities and the like on the national level. It provides 
a blueprint with strong spatial components, such as urban development, in-
dustrial location, resource conservation, environmental protection and infra-
structure investments. The legal status of the national comprehensive plan is 
authorized by the Planning Framework of National Territory Act (PFNTA), the 
planning law that regulates the scope of various levels of planning and the 
relationships between them. The law states that no public bodies can enact 
any by-law or undertake any planning that does not conform to the approved 
national comprehensive plan.
The next tier of Korea’s planning comprises provincial plans which are le-
gally bound to enumerate the planning guidelines spelled out in the national 
comprehensive plan. Provincial governments in Korea are hierarchically re-
lated to central government. Accordingly, much of the provincial policy efforts 
are devoted to implementing the policies and programs which are delegat-
ed from central government. Lacking a higher degree of autonomous steer-
ing power, provincial governments merely develop policies in their own right 
within the framework outlined by national legislations and plans.
Provincial and metropolitan city governments constitute the upper-tier of 
Korea’s two-tier local government system, while localities, i.e. the municipal 
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and county governments for the provincial government and district govern-
ments for the metropolitan city government, form the lower-tier. Although 
the provincial government forms the parental authority for local jurisdictions, 
the master-servant relationship is not so strong between them. Unlike the 
state government in the American federal system, provincial governments in 
Korea have no power to legislate enabling acts through which local govern-
ments can enact their own ordinances. To the extent that the scope of local 
codes is defined by national government’s legislation, provinces are not con-
sidered the architect of local government.
Although the political and administrative controls that provincial govern-
ments exercise are limited in scope, the provinces have a relatively strong 
stake as far as local government planning is concerned. The provincial plan 
is a stand-alone planning guide in the sense that it customizes the objectives 
and policies of the national plan into appropriate provincial policies. However, 
the legal mandate that local plans should conform to the outlines defined by 
the provincial plans calls for provincial governments to supervise over local 
planning. The provincial plan, positioned in between the national and the lo-
cal plan, plays the role of a middleman bridging the plans at both ends, defin-
ing the policy framework within which the objectives and policy prescriptions 
of local government plans should be compatible.
Local government planning in Korea is largely regulated by the 2002 PUNTA, 
the result of merging two formerly separated planning laws – the City Plan-
ning Law and the Use and Management of National Territory Act. The PUN-
TA spells out detailed regulations for local plans and development processes, 
including the types of zoning districts, regulations of land uses, lot coverage 
and density, infrastructure provisions, urban design, development permits, 
planning processes, and so on. As long as the legal provisions confined by the 
PUNTA are fulfilled and consistency with the provincial plan is maintained, 
local governments can formulate their own plans. With the limited amount 
of discretion that the legal framework delegates to local governments, local 
planning in Korea is hardly a local matter. It is largely handled by central gov-
ernment control and, in consequence, there is no great variety in the ways 
that local planning is carried out throughout the country.
PUNTA enables joint cross-government planning efforts to be organized to 
deal with extra-local issues such as, for example, the spatial allocation of in-
frastructure and public facilities. An area-wide plan covers multiple local ju-
risdictions if it is formulated within a province, or ranges over a metropolitan 
city government and adjacent localities if it transcends the political bound-
aries of the metropolitan city. The current institutional framework does not 
allow separate regional bodies to be created that are responsible for handling 
area-wide planning. Accordingly, provincial governments are authorized to 
govern the extra-local plan that covers multiple localities, whereas provinces 
and metropolitan city governments are jointly responsible for preparing and 
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implementing the area-wide plan that transcends the boundaries of metro-
politan cities and provinces.
In addition to the various levels of plans examined above, the PFNTA defines 
another level, i.e., regional plans, which are also established within the frame-
work of the national comprehensive plan. Regional planning is conducted by 
central government for the parts of the national territory where special policy 
prescriptions are needed. In general, regions that are economically distressed 
or lagging far behind the rest of the national territory are targeted for special 
investments and customized promotional treatments. Initiated by national gov-
ernment, regional plans generally transcend the political boundaries of a locali-
ty, covering multiple provinces and/or local jurisdictions as their planning areas.
The capital region surrounding Seoul, however, is treated by a separate le-
gal framework beyond the reach of the PFNTA. Specifically, all the planning 
and development issues at the macro level of the capital region are addressed 
by the Capital Region Readjustment Planning Act (CRRPA), a centrally enact-
ed law. For the capital region, the CRRPA occupies the top statutory status to 
which other legislations are subordinate.
As industrial and population growth has become excessively concentrated 
in the capital region, planning for this region has largely been about reducing 
the unbridled development pressures and simultaneously relocating the in-
dustrial and public facilities to the outside regions. Accordingly, the key plan-
ning issues for the region, most of which are addressed by the CRRPA, include 
the Capital Region Readjustment Plan, macro regional zoning by which the 
region is split into multiple use districts,13 development constraints imposed 
on the amount of annual industrial growth, and various development exac-
tions designed to discourage excess growth in the capital region. Planning 
and development in the capital region are therefore determined centrally, in 
the sense that the capital region’s guiding principles are regulated by area-
specific statutes enacted by central government.
The central role of the national government in enacting planning-related 
legislation, coupled with direct intervention in the planning and development 
at lower levels of government, has served to portray Korea’s planning as typi-
cal of a top-down system. Under the extremely centralized planning system 
new innovation in planning is barely feasible unless the national government 
initiates a law by which the innovative devices can be utilized.
Within the legal framework of Korea’s planning and development, various 
policy instruments have been established to address the adverse consequenc-
es associated with urban development, such as urban sprawl, environmental 
degradation, infrastructure shortage, traffic congestion, and financial stress. 
13  The capital region is divided into three macro zones with varying degrees of development regulation: 
congestion relief zone, natural conservation zone, and growth management zone.
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Examples of prominent planning tools include the development-restricted 
zone (more frequently referred to as the greenbelt), a development impact fee, 
incentive zoning, the development permit process, congestion charges and an 
aggregate development ceiling system.
Of the various planning instruments in Korea’s planning system, incentive 
zoning is the most recent, and is considered a non-coercive, market-oriented 
device close to the non-financial compensation mechanism in its concept. De-
signed primarily to encourage urban design purposes and/or adequate public fa-
cilities, Korea’s incentive zoning scheme is operated with the District Unit Plan-
ning (DUP) process, which is initiated under the legal authority of the PUNTA.
DUP is classified into two types: Type I DUP and Type II DUP. The former is 
established in urban areas to achieve public purposes, whereas the latter pro-
vides adequate infrastructure in non-urban areas. Under Type I DUP bonuses 
in development density are provided to developers who meet the require-
ments for public amenity set out in the DUP plan. The developers within the 
Type I DUP area donate part of their site for public purposes in exchange for a 
density bonus that can be used in the rest of the site. The development rights 
severed from one section of the site are transferred to the building which is 
thereby able to increase its development density, so the developer obtains 
compensation for the donation of land for public amenities.
On the other hand, Type II DUP is introduced to redress the problem of ur-
ban expansion with sprawled development. As urban areas rapidly expand 
outwards, fragmented patchwork development with infrastructure shortages, 
free-riding on the existing public facilities, has become a common landscape 
in newly-developed areas. These circumstances pushed the government to 
encourage plan-guided development with adequate infrastructure, needed to 
serve new developments in non-urban areas. Once an area is defined as Type 
II DUP, developers within the area are authorized to take advantage of the ex-
tra premium in density and lot coverage. Instead, they have to submit the de-
velopment plan that demonstrates the adequacy of various planning features, 
including public infrastructure.
Of the two types of DUP, Type I DUP could be regarded as a TDR type non-
financial compensation technique, where the development rights are trans-
ferred within a single site rather than across the separate zones as in the 
typical non-financial compensation scheme.14 Ideally under the Type I DUP 
14  Under the typical TDR, owners of property in development-restricted areas called sending districts are 
granted the ability to sever the development rights from their property and to sell those rights to property 
owners in specified receiving districts. Property owners who purchase development rights are then able 
to increase the development density that can be built on the receiving site above the as-of-right limits on 
development (Nelson & Duncan, 1995). The non-financial compensation technique can be used to save 
historic structures from demolition, prevent conversion of farmland to urban uses, and preserve unique 
environmental areas and vistas.
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process, both developer and local government end up ahead. The developer 
ends up enhancing the value of the development project by more than the 
cost of the donated property. On the other hand, the local government se-
cures the permanent provision of public space that has high amenity, public 
or open space value at no direct cost. Thus, Type I DUP offers a way for com-
munities to achieve their urban development goals without having to collect 
public money for acquisition. Type I DUP therefore is a Case 3 (re-allocation) 
non-financial compensation tool.
Admittedly, on the other hand, Type II DUP must constitute a kind of non-
financial compensation mechanism with a something-for-nothing appeal. But 
it does not fall into the category of a non-financial compensation technique, 
because the extra development rights granted to the developer are not offered 
in return for the provision of public space. Rather, the density bonuses that 
permit additional development are presented in exchange for the developer’s 
compliance with the planned layout scheme. Accordingly, given the lack of at-
tributes of the technique of space exchange, Type II DUP is hereafter excluded 
from further consideration.
So far, an overview of Korea’s planning system has been outlined, locating 
the position and attributes of the DUP process within it. Next the structure 
and operation of Type I DUP are examined for three cases of application, all of 
which have been implemented in Seoul.
Re-allocation: three cases of density 4.3 
transfer in Seoul
Legal foundations4.3.1 
As mentioned earlier, Type I DUP is a new emerging land use control tech-
nique designed primarily to overcome the shortcomings of zoning at no ex-
pense to general taxpayers. Zoning regulations are applied to individual zon-
ing lots, each of which constitutes the basic unit of development control. For 
individual zoning lots, zoning controls the use of the lot and imposes bulk, 
height, lot coverage and setback limits on the structures erected on the par-
cel of land. Bulk and height requirements, among others, are combined to de-
termine the intensity of land use, generating a flexible formula, i.e. the Floor 
Area Ratio (FAR), which constrains a building’s total floor area as a certain 
multiple of the lot size, without necessarily specifying coverage.
Under the zoning system, development approval is granted as long as the 
development proposal complies with the zoning requirements specified in 
the planning-related statutes, such as the PUNTA, the Building Regulation Act, 
and local government’s building codes. Executed on a lot-by-lot basis, zon-
ing’s fit-and-go permit procedure is therefore not effective in promoting qual-
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ity environments in highly complex urban areas. For a tract of development 
in urban areas, the public interest can be much better achieved if public fa-
cilities, roads, open space, dwellings, commercial buildings and land use are 
planned as a unit. Zoning’s lot-by-lot regulations lack the authority to encour-
age cooperative efforts between different developers, however, which means 
that it fails to produce desirable public features, such as the interconnection 
of buildings, pedestrian pathways protected from vehicles, open-air concours-
es, urban plazas, the mixture of complementary land uses, and so on.
Most local governments are facing increased demands for public spaces, 
however, along with fiscal constraints on their revenue capacity to afford the 
necessary public facilities. The revenue limit provides localities with lasting 
incentives to find novel ways to raise more financial resources. Cost recovery 
devices are rigorously looked at on the part of local governments to prevent 
the imposition of new development costs on the existing tax base.
To overcome the limits of the conventional zoning system in an era of fis-
cal shortage, central government has extended the Type I DUP process into 
the PUNTA. Article 51 of the PUNTA defines candidate areas where Type I DUP 
districts are designated, stating that “(…) part or whole of the following areas 
can be designated as a Type I DUP(…) including zoning districts, infrastruc-
ture-fee payment districts, urban development districts, housing rehabilita-
tion districts, residential development districts, industrial estate development, 
tourism development districts, districts released from development restric-
tion, etc.”. As such, Type I DUP is a technique that can be used in new areas 
where development can be started with a clean slate and an undisturbed 
landscape, or already developed areas. When the Type I DUP process is ap-
plied to existing built-up areas in particular, anticipating the timing of devel-
opment for individual zoning lots is almost impossible. Since property own-
ers tend to make development decisions on an individual basis, development 
occurs over a long period of time. Property owners choose the date of conver-
sion of a specific site such that the present value of net income is maximized 
under the market forces and economic circumstances at that time.
On the other hand, Article 52 of the same statute specifies the planning 
components that should be specified in the Type I DUP plan as follows: “(…)
among others, the Type I DUP plan shall address the switch of zoning use 
districts, the allotment of public facilities, block-unit development planning, 
lower- and upper-limits on building heights, lot coverage and FAR, building’s 
usage, the layouts, shapes and colors of buildings, environmental and land-
scape planning, transportation circulation planning, etc.”. In addition to these 
planning components, the same article contains the provision by which the 
zoning restrictions imposed on building heights, lot coverage and FAR could 
be mitigated if some planning and design requirements are fulfilled.
On the other hand, the specific conditions for the development restric-
tions to be eased are spelled out in Article 46 of the Enforcement Decree of 
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the PUNTA, another key planning law accompanying the PUNTA. In addition, 
the same article articulates the quantitative formula with which the amounts 
of relief that would be granted to the developer are calculated. Then, it is just 
by these statutory provisions that the developer can take advantage of den-
sity incentives or bonuses offered in exchange for the developer’s donation of 
public spaces.
Within the guidelines outlined by the relevant articles of the DUP enabling 
acts, local governments are authorized to enact their own ordinances to regu-
late density incentives, in which the list of planning requirements and the 
magnitude of density bonuses offered in exchange for fulfilling each require-
ment are specified. In general, most local ordinances specify various plan-
ning features as prerequisites for awarding density bonuses, such as plazas, 
pedestrian-circulation improvements, open-air concourses, arcades, and the 
widening of sidewalks. By increasing pedestrian space, creating streamlined 
linkages, and improving the level of amenities, these planning features en-
hance the quality of the urban environment. As mentioned earlier, the preset 
planning features are not attainable if the development process depends ex-
clusively on conventional zoning regulations. Furthermore, constraints on the 
financial capacity do not allow local governments to purchase all the spaces 
required to provide public amenities.
Under the Type I DUP procedure, the local government is required to make 
a blueprint DUP plan for the whole district based on the assumption that the 
individual property owners would entertain the maximum extent of legally 
provided incentives, instead suiting all the preset design and amenity re-
quirements defined by the DUP relevant laws and local ordinances. But the ef-
fective bonuses that individual property owners obtain are determined by the 
number of prescribed requirements with which the property owners choose 
to comply, and for each requirement fulfilled, the magnitudes of density bo-
nuses to be granted are a priori specified in accordance with the legal restric-
tions. Accordingly, the verbal prescriptions and pictorial images contained in 
the DUP plan do not represent the end product realized when the develop-
ment of all the properties is complete. In this sense, the DUP plan, once ap-
proved, becomes a regulation envelope within which individual property own-
ers are allowed to make development decisions based on negotiations with 
the city’s government.
Operations of Type I DUP4.3.2 
Korea’s DUP seems similar to the Planned Unit Development (PUD) used in 
the U.S., in the sense that both devices apply to a site larger than a zoning 
lot. However, they are quite different in terms of the geographical scopes of 
the transfer of density. In PUD, transfers of density are permissible across dif-
ferent lots within the PUD track such that the overall density is not changed 
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(Barnet, 1982; Cook, 1980). Unlike the U.S. PUD, however, cross-lot transfer of 
density is not allowed in Type I DUP, where unused or foregone development 
rights within a lot are transferable to the remainder of the area within the 
same lot in the form of density incentives.
Four kinds of density as expressed in FAR are distinguished in the opera-
tion of Type I DUP: standard density, permitted density, upper-limit density, 
and the legal density ceiling. Under the Korean zoning system, an allowable 
upper bound of density below which local governments can choose the ap-
propriate levels of density that are applied in their jurisdictions is specified 
by the key zoning legislations.15 The maximum density defined by the key leg-
islations constitutes the legal ceiling on density. When managing zoning and 
development, therefore, none of the local governments issue a density permit 
up to the legal ceiling, but rather, in most cases, set the permissible densities 
below the legal density ceiling.
In the operation of Type I DUP, the standard density forms a base-line FAR 
to which the density bonuses that a developer receives in return for providing 
public facilities are added to determine the permitted density. The permitted 
density is then determined by summing up the preset standard density and 
the density bonuses that the developer receives as a reward for building-pre-
scribed public amenities. In general, the determination of permitted density 
depends on the negotiation between the developer and the city. Once the per-
mitted density is determined, the developer is entitled to develop his property 
exceeding the prevailing standard density.
On the other hand, if the developer decides to dedicate part of his property 
to the city without just compensation, extra densities are awarded.16 If the de-
veloper makes a property donation to the city, but refuses to comply entirely 
with the preset list of design features, the developer can only take advantage 
of the extra density bonuses. In this case, the allowable FAR at which the de-
veloper can develop his property equals the standard density plus the extra 
density bonuses. On the other hand, if the developer agrees to build some-
thing for public use and simultaneously to donate a segment of his property, 
he will be offered an extra density bonus above the permitted density. Then, 
the total density granted to the developer is equal to the sum of the permit-
ted density and the extra bonus. In both circumstances, the allowable density, 
15  Article 78 of the PUNTA stipulates that in urban areas, the legal maximum floors in FAR are set at 500% 
for the district zoned for residential uses, 1,500% for the commercial district, 400% for the industrial dis-
trict, and 100% for the green district, respectively.
16  When the property owner donates part of his property to the city, the ownership of the donated area of 
the site is transferred to the city. In contrast, zoning incentives obtained in exchange for providing desirable 
features that meet the qualifications spelled out in the ordinances do not accompany the transformation of 
the title of the site on which public uses are constructed. Consequently, the responsibility for building and 
maintaining the public facilities remains in the hands of the property owner.
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which is determined with the extra bonus awarded in return for property do-
nation to the city, is tantamount to the upper-limit density. Figure 4.1 illus-
trates the concepts of the four different kinds of density associated with the 
Type I DUP process.
Local governments have exclusive authority for preparing the Type I DUP 
plan for the entire areas designated as Type I DUP districts, and managing the 
DUP process. The Type I DUP plan contains verbal prescriptions and graphic 
sketches that detail land uses, the layouts of streets, the provision of public 
facilities, and architectural plans for individual structures. The development 
features suggested in the plan represent the end state if all the property own-
ers in the DUP district decided to meet all the preset requirements.
To get a development permit issued, the property owner has to submit a 
development application to the city government, which evaluates the com-
patibility of the application with the predetermined DUP plan. To facilitate the 
complicated DUP process, the city usually prepares bonus-award guides in ac-
cordance with the relevant legal restrictions. The incentive guides contain the 
detailed features required of the prescribed public uses in order to qualify for 
a density bonus and the corresponding amounts of incentive to be granted. 
Table 4.1 shows an example of incentive-award standards currently adopted 
by the City of Seoul.
Referring to the bonus-award manual as shown in Table 4.1, the proper-
ty owner embarks on rounds of negotiation with the city, through which he 
chooses, among the prescribed requirements, the specific planning features 
that he is willing and able to fulfill. Thus, as for the DUP process, the final 
development plan that will be used as a development guide is generated 
through the negotiation-based bargaining process. It is contended, therefore, 
that the specific forms and profiles of a Type I DUP development are not de-
termined until the city-developer bargaining process is completed.
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To reflect changing environments and circumstances surrounding the DUP 
district over time, the DUP plan is periodically updated every 5 or 10 years. 
The properties that have remained undeveloped during the previous planning 
period, if any, are subject to the updated regulations spelled out in the revised 
plan.
Cases of Type I DUP application4.3.3 
The Jeonong-dong case
In 1997, the City of Seoul decided to make a sector of the Jeonong-dong area 
a Type I DUP district.17 According to Seoul’s zoning map, Jeonong-dong’s DUP 
district is a zoned neighborhood commercial district, superimposed by an 
aesthetic district. The case analyzed here is a development application from 
early 2006. The development tract in question is split into 20 separated lots, 
each with different ownership, with a total acreage of 2,970m2.
Applying for development approval, the property owners agreed to con-
struct a mixed-use building accommodating offices and residential apart-
ments in the upper floors and convenient commercial activities in the lower 
stories. The architectural plan for the property’s development proposed a sec-
tion of the tract (269.15m2) be dedicated for public uses, which would include 
green space (66.67m2), public open space (43.97m2) and pedestrian roads 
(158.61m2). The net acreage of the building site on which the proposed struc-
ture would be constructed, would then be 2,700.85m2.
According to the Type I DUP regulation, the ownership of the dedicated sec-
tion was conveyed to the city government. In return for the voluntary dedi-
cation of land, the property owners obtained an extra density bonus, which 
amounted to 62.184% as measured in FAR. The DUP plan for this Type I DUP 
district allocates a standard FAR density of 300% to the development site.
Besides the voluntary dedication of their space, the property owners de-
cided to fulfill the pre-established requirements for which additional density 
incentives are offered. Without releasing further space for public use, they 
consented to accept several non-spatial design features: constructing the 
building jointly across 20 separate lots; accommodating the recommended 
use in the lower floors; and conforming to the recommended building setback 
requirement. In return for the non-space compliance with the requirements, 
an additional 180% of density incentive was awarded.
The negotiation process between the property owners and the city govern-
17  The dong constitutes a lower level of administrative unit in the hierarchy of government. In the Korean 
government system, a municipal government is divided into several dongs, to which no authority of local 
autonomy is delegated. The City of Seoul is composed of 25 district governments, which are equivalent to 
the status of local government. In turn, the 25 local governments of Seoul are further split into 522 dongs.
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ment therefore yielded a 480% permitted density, composed of the standard 
density, 300%, and the bonus award for non-space compliance, 180%. The 
upper-limit density as applied to this development site amounts therefore to 
542.184%, calculated by adding the bonus incentive awarded in return for the 
space dedication, 62.184%, to the permitted density, 480%.
Unlike the classical TDR program, the Jeonong-dong case represents a 
transfer of development rights within a single site. By allowing the shift of 
unused development rights to the remainder part of the development tract, 
the local government secures 269.15 m2 of public space without spending the 
city’s financial revenue. No compensation to the property owners is made for 
safeguarding the public space.
In this example the non-financial compensation technique was used for 
re-allocation purposes, where part of the developer’s property dedicated for 
public purposes is converted into extra development rights that can be used 
to increase the floor areas of the development project. Even though the public 
space is not parcels of land that are separate from the development site, this 
case may fit the re-allocation category (Case 3) in the sense that government 
finance is not used to achieve the prime purpose of guarding the public zone.
Finally, it is noted that, in this case, the role of the transfer of density is 
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Table 4.1 Standards for density bonus award, the City of Seoul
Requirement for bonus award Mitigation standard
Lot development plan Joint development within a 
single unit
SD x 0.1 ~ 0.4
Cross-lots joint development SD x 0.05 ~ 0.15
Trade of lots SD x 0.2
Building plan Cross-lots joint construction of 
buildings
SD x 0.5 x A 2 lots: A=0.1
3~4 lots: A=0.15
Above 5 lots: A=0.2 
Shared wall SD x 0.1 ~ 0.15
Recommended use of 
building
Compliance for entire floors SD x (recommended area – total 
floor area except parking area) 
x 0.2
Compliance area should 
exceed 20% of total floor 
area
Partial compliance SD x (recommended area – area 
of the relevant floor) x 0.1
Compliance area should 
exceed 30-50% of area of the 
relevant floor
Open space within 
development site
Compliance with recommended 
location
SD x 0.1
Compliance with recommended 
form and size
SD x [(donated area – mandatory 
requirement)/lot size] x B
Piloti form: B=0.5
Open form: B=1.0~1.2 
Plaza within 
development site
Compliance with recommended 
location
SD x 0.1
Compliance with form and size SD x (donated area/lot size) x C Piloti form: C=0.5
Bed form: C=0.8~1.0
Open: C=1.0~1.2
Open space in front of 
building line
Entire area from curb to building 
line
SD x (donated area/lot size) x D Piloti form: D=0.5
Open form: D=1.0~1.2
Requirement for bonus award Mitigation standard
Pedestrian path within 
development site
Walkway on surface SD x (donated area/lot size) x E Piloti form: E=0.5
Open form: E=1.0
Underground walkway 
connected with subway 
station, underground plaza 
and underground pathway
Underground or elevated 
walkway
SD x (donated area/lot size) x E
Mixed-use for pedestrian and 
vehicle path
SD x (donated area/lot size) x E
Form and appearance 
of building
Joint installment of outdoor 
signboard
SD x 0.05
Connection with subway station SD x 0.1 ~ 0.15 Connection point within 
building or lot
Environment-friendly 
construction
Conservation of ground soil SD x (conserved area/lot size) x 
0.1 ~ 0.2
Planting on building’s rooftop SD x (planting area/lot size) x 0.3
Recirculation of wastewater or 
use of rainwater
SD x 0.05 ~ 0.1
Parking lots with pervious 
surface
SD x 0.05
Vehicle circulation Cross-lots joint entry and exit 
lane or ramp to parking lot 
SD x 0.1 ~ 0.2
Cross-lots joint parking space SD x 0.1 ~ 0.2
Opening part of indoor space to the public SD x 0.2 ~ 0.3
Note: SD = standard density.
Source: City of Seoul, 2004
Table 4.1 continued
not overstated, as its contribution to the property’s development is not higher 
compared to that of the non-space compliance. The lower role of transferable 
density is demonstrated by the fact that a majority of the total extra density 
obtained above the standard density, say, 242.284%, comes from the develop-
er’s compliance with the non-spatial requirements rather than the voluntary 
dedication of space to the city government.
The Sinseol-dong case
Seoul’s zoning map shows that the Sinseol-dong DUP district is located with-
in a semi-residential district, overlaid with an aesthetic district, where office 
buildings can be developed. The development site selected for analysis was a 
vacant property filed for development approval in early 2006. The development 
tract with a total acreage of 1,501.6 m2 comprised three separate building lots 
owned by Daihan Life Insurance. The insurance company applied for a devel-
opment permit to construct the company’s branch office on that site.
In order to receive development approval, the developer proposed meeting 
two pre-determined planning features, for which density bonuses are provid-
ed: the establishment of a small-sized rectangular plaza in the corner of the 
site and setting the building back by an additional 3 m. The size of the plaza 
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Table 4.1 Standards for density bonus award, the City of Seoul
Requirement for bonus award Mitigation standard
Lot development plan Joint development within a 
single unit
SD x 0.1 ~ 0.4
Cross-lots joint development SD x 0.05 ~ 0.15
Trade of lots SD x 0.2
Building plan Cross-lots joint construction of 
buildings
SD x 0.5 x A 2 lots: A=0.1
3~4 lots: A=0.15
Above 5 lots: A=0.2 
Shared wall SD x 0.1 ~ 0.15
Recommended use of 
building
Compliance for entire floors SD x (recommended area – total 
floor area except parking area) 
x 0.2
Compliance area should 
exceed 20% of total floor 
area
Partial compliance SD x (recommended area – area 
of the relevant floor) x 0.1
Compliance area should 
exceed 30-50% of area of the 
relevant floor
Open space within 
development site
Compliance with recommended 
location
SD x 0.1
Compliance with recommended 
form and size
SD x [(donated area – mandatory 
requirement)/lot size] x B
Piloti form: B=0.5
Open form: B=1.0~1.2 
Plaza within 
development site
Compliance with recommended 
location
SD x 0.1
Compliance with form and size SD x (donated area/lot size) x C Piloti form: C=0.5
Bed form: C=0.8~1.0
Open: C=1.0~1.2
Open space in front of 
building line
Entire area from curb to building 
line
SD x (donated area/lot size) x D Piloti form: D=0.5
Open form: D=1.0~1.2
Requirement for bonus award Mitigation standard
Pedestrian path within 
development site
Walkway on surface SD x (donated area/lot size) x E Piloti form: E=0.5
Open form: E=1.0
Underground walkway 
connected with subway 
station, underground plaza 
and underground pathway
Underground or elevated 
walkway
SD x (donated area/lot size) x E
Mixed-use for pedestrian and 
vehicle path
SD x (donated area/lot size) x E
Form and appearance 
of building
Joint installment of outdoor 
signboard
SD x 0.05
Connection with subway station SD x 0.1 ~ 0.15 Connection point within 
building or lot
Environment-friendly 
construction
Conservation of ground soil SD x (conserved area/lot size) x 
0.1 ~ 0.2
Planting on building’s rooftop SD x (planting area/lot size) x 0.3
Recirculation of wastewater or 
use of rainwater
SD x 0.05 ~ 0.1
Parking lots with pervious 
surface
SD x 0.05
Vehicle circulation Cross-lots joint entry and exit 
lane or ramp to parking lot 
SD x 0.1 ~ 0.2
Cross-lots joint parking space SD x 0.1 ~ 0.2
Opening part of indoor space to the public SD x 0.2 ~ 0.3
Note: SD = standard density.
Source: City of Seoul, 2004
Table 4.1 continued
and the acreage of the extra open space created by the extended building set-
back are 95.33 m2 and 69 m2, respectively. The further expanded setback space 
was reserved for pedestrian walkways. In addition, besides the two forms of 
space-related dedication, the developer suggested complying with one non-
dedication of space requirement. Specifically, the developer chose to land-
scape the proposed building’s roof with planting, for which an extra density 
bonus is offered of up to 30%.
The total FAR obtained as density bonuses amounted to 60.07%, of which 
5.26% was an award provided in return for the public plaza, 24.81% in ex-
change for the expanded pedestrian space, and 30.0% for the roof planting, 
respectively. In this case, the dedication of a segment of the development site 
to the public does not include a transfer of the title to the city and therefore 
the construction as well as subsequent maintenance of the plaza and pedes-
trian walk remains the responsibility of the developer.
The permitted density of this application was therefore 360.7%, which is 
the sum of the standard density, 300%, and the extra density bonus, 60.7%. 
The upper-limit density is therefore identical to the permitted density. Since 
the developer did not propose the dedication of property without compen-
sation, no extra bonus is awarded additionally above the level of permitted 
density.
As with the Jeonong-dong case, this application represents non-financial 
compensation, where extra densities are offered in return for space donation 
as well as non-space compliance. Yet the title of the space dedicated for pub-
lic use is not conveyed to the city government, but held by the property owner. 
Due to the lack of transfer of ownership, further development rights are not 
granted above the permitted density.
This case also uses the transferable density tool to preserve the square 
footage for public purpose which could otherwise be built, resulting in the de-
velopment of the property at a much higher density. Obviously, neither con-
servation nor conversion purposes are aimed at in this case. Therefore, this 
case can be classified as an application of the Case 3 re-allocation tool.
On the other hand, the contribution of the transferable density technique 
to the feature of the development is balanced with that of non-space compli-
ance. That is, half of the density bonuses offered are attributed to the com-
pliance with non-spatial requirements, and the remaining half is awarded in 
return for the dedication of public spaces.
The Isoo development tract case
The Isoo development tract, located adjacent to Isoo station on Line 7 of 
Seoul’s subway network, is the special planning district defined inside the 
boundaries of the Bangbae-dong DUP district. A special planning district is 
established in subareas of a DUP district. If a development tract is occupied 
by multiple owners the development of a large-scale project is not appropri-
[ 86 ]
ate. By discouraging voluntary cooperation and agreement on development 
among multiple owners, the fragmented ownership of a development tract 
forms a significant barrier to the large development project. The primary pur-
pose of the special planning district therefore is to facilitate large scale proj-
ects in tracts where developments in a single unit are desirable. The key pro-
cess of the special planning district is the transfer of individual ownership to 
the development company chosen by the property owners to carry out the de-
velopment on their behalf. As the project is completed, the property clearing 
step is processed. Specifically, the development company redistributes part 
of the new development to individual property owners, the remainder being 
used by the development company to compensate the hard as well as soft 
costs incurred in the development process.
In 1996, the Bangbae-dong DUP district area, encompassing the Isoo devel-
opment tract, was re-zoned up from a general-purpose residential district to 
a general-purpose commercial district. As an orderly and quality urban envi-
ronment is increasingly demanded, the area was designated a DUP district by 
the City of Seoul in 2002, setting up the Isoo tract as a special planning dis-
trict at the same time.
The Isoo development site, which is 3,882 m2, was a built-up area occupied 
by obsolete residential dwellings with divided ownership and unplanned, ir-
regular roads. The residents in the tract agreed to cooperate to redevelop their 
properties in a single project and selected Delco Design as the development 
company, who were contracted to manage the whole complicated process of 
development as well as the development costs.
Once agreement on the features of the development project had been ob-
tained, the property owners of the Isoo development tract conveyed the titles 
of their properties to the development company. Thus, as the existing struc-
tures on the tract were demolished, a number of individual lots were assem-
bled into a single development site. The property owners and Delco Design 
agreed to construct three 25-story buildings with 7-story underground base-
ments, with a total floor area of 40,514.26 m2. Of the three high-rise buildings, 
one was to accommodate offices, whereas the other two buildings were for 
apartments. On the lower floors of all three buildings, specifically from base-
ment one to the sixth floor, commercial facilities were to be accommodated, 
while the remainder of the basements were set aside for parking spaces.
To take advantage of increased FAR awards, the development plan for 
the Isoo special planning district proposed two kinds of public amenities, 
amounting to 633 m2, which would account for about 15.5% of the total area 
of the development tract. The donated public spaces included 248 m2 of pe-
destrian roads and a small-scale public plaza of 255 m2. The pedestrian roads 
were proposed to provide streamlined access to the users of Isoo subway sta-
tion who have to cross over the development site. On the other hand, the pub-
lic plaza was constructed on the northeastern corner of the site, which was 
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open to the general public.
To the satisfaction of the existing residents, Delco Design launched into 
negotiations with the city to determine the amount of FAR bonuses. The city 
and the company agreed to provide a 330% of extra FAR, added to the stan-
dard density, set at 300%, giving a permitted density of 630% as measured in 
FAR. In addition, as the development company agreed to transfer the titles of 
the constructed public roads and plaza to the city, further bonuses amounting 
to 145% in FAR, were granted to the project. As a result, the upper-limit densi-
ty as applied to this development project increased to 775%. The total amount 
of FAR granted in return for the donation of public spaces is therefore equal 
to the sum of the two individual incentives, i.e. 475%.
Unlike the previous two cases, the Isoo special planning district represents 
a case where the property owners of the development site hand over land 
rights to the development company, which, in turn, carries out the planning 
and development of the site on behalf of the indigenous owners. From the 
standpoint of the development company and the property owners, the case 
represents a case heavily laden with transaction costs. The development pro-
cess is complicated and costly, coordinating the different interests of the mul-
tiple owners on the one hand and negotiating with the city to reach an agree-
ment on the public features to comply with and the corresponding level of 
density incentives to be awarded on the other.
Like the previous two cases, this case employs the non-compensation 
technique for the re-allocation purpose, under which the spaces dedicated for 
public use are compensated for in the form of extra density bonuses. Thus, 
the government achieves the purpose of establishing public amenities with-
out depending on public finance.
Discussion of Korea’s DUP process4.4 
Although Korea’s DUP process is a non-financial compensation tool evolving 
from pro-market thinking, its operation relies on the combination of mar-
ket-based and command-and-control approaches. In the DUP process, the 
creation of transferable density does not replace the traditional planning ap-
proach, but rather integrates the former to make the latter more efficient. In-
tense and articulated administrative controls are utilized to convert the fore-
gone development rights for dedicated public space into a density incentive. 
Many steps are invoked to facilitate the DUP process: the ex-ante preparation 
of elaborate DUP plans, the evaluation of the conformity of development ap-
plications to the preset requirements, the articulation of recommended de-
sign features, and the inducement of development applications fitted to the 
proposed DUP planning features. These procedures all demand a higher de-
gree of frequent and complicated transactions.
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Development decisions in the DUP process are accomplished through the 
time-consuming and inter-locked rounds of negotiation between the devel-
oper and the city government. The DUP review board, which is responsible for 
mediating the conflicts occurring in the process of development, is often hit 
by snares. A break in mediation can be particularly critical when a develop-
ment track for which joint development is highly desirable is shared by sepa-
rate owners. In order to achieve agreement for a joint development from a 
multiplicity of property owners their diverse preferences and interests need 
to be satisfactorily fulfilled. Negotiations around the distribution of develop-
ment benefits among the multiple agents tends to be complicated and te-
dious however, and as the number of property owners increases the costs of 
negotiation becomes a substantial problem.
As Coase (1960) indicates, when it becomes very costly to operate the mar-
ket mechanism, it may be preferable to impose special regulations. The effec-
tiveness of market-based tools is not completely ensured and therefore the 
recourse to command-and-control mechanisms remains a possible solution. 
The operation of Type I DUP may fit in this case. In practice, planning inter-
vention significantly conditions the operation of the DUP process. Specifically, 
local government designates the area to which Type I DUP is applied, prepares 
detailed plans designed to guide property development within the DUP dis-
trict, manages the interactive negotiations to reach agreement between the 
relevant stakeholders, and monitors the developer’s compliance with the ne-
gotiated agreements.
On the other hand, the maximum satisfaction of differentiated interests is 
not easily safeguarded when the DUP decisions are made based solely on the 
legally bounded standards, which include the requirements of complying and 
the formulae by which the amounts of extra density are determined. Under 
the current DUP process, the discretion of the DUP review board is confined 
within the limits of the prescribed standards. Given this limited flexibility, the 
DUP process is costly because, by engaging in it, developers are shut off from 
other profitable options they could otherwise have pursued. If property own-
ers are not pleased with the pre-determined standards, therefore, it is not 
easy to prevent separate, stand-alone developments occurring, even if joint 
development is highly recommended.
In general, market conditions pertaining to real-estate development are 
dynamic over time. The conditions under which the developer’s interests are 
maximized are not constant. Furthermore, even in the same city, market con-
ditions are segmented into several geographical sub-areas. Given the turbu-
lent and idiosyncratic attributes of real-estate markets, then, the relatively 
rigid standards set up for the DUP process are not necessarily conducive to 
promoting collaboration between multiple agents with conflicting interests, 
including, for example, property owners, city governments, citizen groups, etc.
The efficiency of the DUP process varies with the attributes and preferenc-
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es of individual developments on which a maximum attainment of develop-
ment benefit depends. If the preset DUP standards do not match a developer’s 
preferences, the DUP process can become an inefficient tool for facilitating 
the developer’s participation, failing to minimize transaction costs unless 
agreements can be negotiated in a short time. To encourage the developer’s 
transaction cost economizing behavior, more flexibility needs to be embed-
ded into the DUP process by, for example, authorizing the DUP review board 
to exercise more discretion, thereby liberating the stringent restriction of the 
qualifying conditions for incentive award and its magnitude.
On the other hand, Type I DUP can contribute to solving the policy prob-
lems with which the city is commonly faced in the implementation of urban 
development. First, the DUP process mitigates the resistance of property own-
ers to the compulsory exactions of public infrastructure. The private provi-
sion of resources to serve public infrastructure, usually mandated by the zon-
ing regulation, significantly reduces the value of their holdings. If developers 
are required to construct, at their own expense, and then dedicate all public 
improvements within a development project to the city the property owner 
would strongly object to the obligatory dedications. The density incentive 
awarded to make up for the loss of confiscated properties therefore relieves 
the property owner’s opposition to the proposed DUP plan.
Second, the DUP process provides an alternative source of capital financing 
for new facilities needed to serve public purposes. Local governments usually 
suffer a shortage of financial resources, and general tax revenues are general-
ly inadequate to finance the public services and infrastructure needed. In this 
situation, Type I DUP, which is a kind of something-for-nothing approach, pro-
vides a promising non-financial compensation technique to facilitate financ-
ing. By offering a density incentive to the developer, the city’s government is 
able to establish the required public facilities without spending general tax 
revenues.
Although Korea’s DUP has some creditable features from the point of view 
of urban development, it is unfavorably compared with TDR in terms of pre-
serving valuable physical and natural resources. The cornerstone of the TDR 
concept is the recognition that the possibility of developing property is a fun-
gible commodity distinct from the property itself (Nelson & Duncan, 1995). 
Under the typical TDR program, property owners in sending districts sell the 
unused development rights to developers in specified receiving districts. The 
TDR’s potential for facilitating the preservation of precious resources stems 
from the separation of the sending site from the receiver site, thereby allow-
ing development rights to be transferred between different sites. As far as the 
property owner who possesses historic structures or natural areas worthy of 
preservation agrees to participate in the TDR program, the privately owned 
assets in question can therefore be protected from demolition or conver-
sion. Unlike TDR, however, DUP does not permit the transfer of developments 
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rights across separate sites. Given that the cross-zonal transfer of develop-
ment rights is prohibited, the DUP process fails to safeguard the preservation 
of a specific site or the structure on the site. In practice, the three cases re-
viewed in the previous section indicate that development rights transferable 
within a single site cannot be used to serve two other purposes of the non-fi-
nancial compensation techniques: the conservation purpose (Case 1) and the 
conversion purpose (Case 2). They show that the Transferable Development 
Rights (TDRs), if operated within a single site, can facilitate only the Case 3 
re-allocation purpose. In Table 4.2 the cases are summarized.
Recognizing the DUP’s inadequate role in preservation, the Korean central 
government has recently enacted two pieces of legislation to overcome the 
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Table 4.2 Overview of Korean cases in catchwords
Conservation Conversion Re-allocation
Period in which the case was 
introduced
– – Since 2003
General objectives of the proposed 
instrument
– – Re-allocation (provision of public 
amenities without public finance)
Characteristic factors – – Implemented on the basis of a single 
developer
Particular economic and social 
circumstances that have 
determined the instrument
– – Shortage of public finance to meet the 
demanding public spaces
The burgeoning trend of market-
oriented approaches to planning
Fit with the planning and legal 
system: What relation with spatial 
plans?
– – Compatibility with the relevant urban 
planning required
Were specific laws and regulations 
drawn up?
– – Yes:
PUNTA at the national level -
City ordinance for specific regulation -
Spatial level at which the case is 
tackled
– – National and local levels combined
Relevant public actors and role – – Local government (the City of Seoul)
The role of formulating the DUP plans 
and issuing the development permit 
after negotiation 
Balance between private and public 
exchange
– – Resolved by rounds of negotiation 
between the city and the developer 
(in the third example, between city 
and property owners, mediated by the 
development company) 
Parties which financed the case – – Example 1+2: Individual property 
owner (developer)
Example 3: The development company 
and the future residents to be housed 
in the developed property
Possibility for public participation – – Not legally required
current institutional limitations. One is the SAURP and the other is the En-
forcement Decree of the SAURP, by which the cross-zonal transfer of develop-
ment rights can be initiated. These twin enabling laws, the primary objective 
of which is to promote the urban renewal of blighted areas, allow multiple 
districts separated from each other to be designated as a single development 
area. In addition, the enabling acts permit the creation of development rights 
in one district and the transfer of the created development rights to another 
district. SAURP and its Enforcement Decree have, however, only been effective 
since May and October 2006, respectively and thus are very recent newcom-
ers. Accordingly, no cases of TDR application have been executed for the pur-
poses of conservation and/or conversion. As Cullingworth (1997) admits, the 
TDR process is quite simple in concept but complex in operation. To put the 
TDR technique into practice in Korea, detailed standards and procedures first 
need to be elaborated.
Concluding remarks4.5 
Urban development in Korea has been heavily dependent upon the traditional 
command-and-control regime. It is only recently that non-coercive pro-mar-
ket tools have been introduced into Korea’s planning system. The technique 
of density bonus, which is a variant of incentive zoning, is representative of 
Korea’s new innovative planning tools. The density award scheme is imple-
mented through the Type I DUP process. The complicated and frequent nego-
tiations required to operate the DUP process can incur high levels of transac-
tion costs. To encourage the relevant actors to economize transaction costs, 
therefore, intensive planning intervention is coupled with the DUP process. 
Type I DUP appears to fit the device of realizing the prescribed planning fea-
tures on the limited scale of a single track well. It also makes a substantial 
contribution to mitigating the financial stress on the government to provide 
public infrastructure. However, the DUP process fails to provide an adequate 
instrument to preserve community heritages of historic significance and en-
vironmental resources. Under Type I DUP, the transfer of unused development 
rights between separate sites is not permissible. Given the sizable acreage of 
resource lands seemingly transcending the boundaries of a single lot, small 
scales of development density, with intra-zonal transfer only allowed, may 
not serve conservation and/or conversion purposes.
The legal foundation enabling the use of a more innovative tool close to 
the typical non-financial compensation has been recently initiated into Ko-
rea’s planning system. To facilitate the non-financial compensation process, 
elaborated guides and standards need to be established a priori. As Korea’s 
non-financial compensation is still emerging, it is too early to be able to find 
and in particular evaluate cases of the non-financial compensation process.
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Spain: non-financial 5 
compensation 
instruments and the 
Valencia model
Francisco Blanc
Introduction5.1 
Non-financial compensation techniques are frequently used by Spanish public 
bodies in the management of a city’s development. In fact the opposite tech-
niques (compulsory purchase of land and the public funding of basic urban 
infrastructures) have become the exception in recent years. Despite the fact 
that land readjustment was already established by ancient legislation (1956), 
it has only become a major tool in planning practice since the legal reforms 
fostered by the regional powers at the turn of the century. This chapter pres-
ents three significant cases of application of such techniques. The Almería 
case (Section 5.4) explains how the transfer of development rights was intro-
duced with the support of the Courts of Justice without changes in the statu-
tory law. This case focuses on the recovery of the urban architectural heritage. 
Avenida de Francia (Francia Avenue) in Valencia (Section 5.5) is a pioneer case 
which inspired the more relevant and recent changes in Spanish law headed 
by the Valencian Region Law; it focuses on the transformation of an indus-
trial area with residential purposes. The Orriols case (Valencia) (Section 5.6) 
focuses on the techniques of land readjustment on a large scale, managed by 
a developer chosen through public contest.
Institutional framework and legal 5.2 
principles18
In Spain, the public powers regarding land use planning are structured at three 
levels of decision-making:
National powers – Acts of National Parliament regulate basic property rights 1. 
such as legal rules regarding compulsory government purchase, the litiga-
tion procedures established to deal with claims against public powers, and 
planning actions and decisions.
Regional powers – Regions have their own respective Parliaments with full 2. 
capacity to produce their own legislation. Theoretically (according to the 
Constitution), Regional Parliaments are the only ones empowered to rule 
on land use planning. Such power is, practically speaking, limited due to 
18  The institutional framework as described in the text was mainly established by Judgment 61/1997, grant-
ed by the Constitutional Court.
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national regulations which determine the guidelines of regional legislation, 
especially when relevant economic issues are at stake (Parejo-Alfonso & 
Blanc-Clavero, 1998). Additionally, national powers include the administra-
tive power to control the actions of local powers, to grant the final approval 
of major planning structural provisions, and to devise policies to do with 
the use of land when more than one local boundary district is affected.
Local powers – Local powers play an important role. They grant prior ap-3. 
proval to most of the planning schemes, or Partial Plans, and grant final 
approval when no regional issues are involved. They also grant building 
permits.
Legal principles are binding plans, compensation cases and compulsory pur-
chase.
Binding Plans
Zoning regulations included in town and country plans not only forecast the 
future use of the land but also have legally binding effects for the later au-
thorization of most private and public construction and urbanization proj-
ects. Planning schemes drafted with respect to a particular area inside the 
municipality have to be consistent with the so-called General Plan drafted 
for the whole municipal constituency. Nevertheless, the hierarchical design 
of the planning sequence has been softened by legislation during the last 
decade. An important difference between Spanish and other European laws 
is that in most countries the equivalent of the Spanish General Plan does 
not have such binding effect on the development rights of individual prop-
erties.
Compensation Cases
As a general rule, landowners do not have the right to be compensated for 
restrictions imposed by planning provisions when developing, building on, or 
using their land. Nevertheless, in three limited cases the right of compensa-
tion for these policy power decisions arises:
Landowners have the right to maintain, exploit, and enjoy existing uses on 1. 
their land. This right includes the prerogative to obtain new permits for the 
maintenance of existing buildings in their basic former physical condition 
or for economic purposes. Planning provisions that foresee the suppres-
sion of existing uses will only be enforced if full compensation has been 
granted following due process.
When a landowner or any other developer with relevant interest in the 2. 
land has properly initiated an authorized development, new planning pro-
visions will not deter the development in progress without proper compen-
sation which would include the reimbursement of the expenses that the 
developer has already incurred, and to some extent the loss of potential 
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benefits.19
When limitations and the potential uses of land affect the various proper-3. 
ties included in the same area with inequitable economic effects on the 
different properties, landowners who suffer a less profitable treatment 
have the right to be compensated for this discrimination. To be more pre-
cise, all the landowners whose properties are in the same area have equal 
rights to share the windfall benefits (betterment) derived from planning 
provisions (García de Enterría & Parejo-Alfonso, 1981). In order to enjoy this 
equitable share of the benefits, they have to contribute equally to the nec-
essary investments to provide the area with the public facilities that the 
new buildings would demand around them, such as public spaces, roads, 
or streets. If it is not possible to enforce a non-financial compensation 
technique – such as land readjustment – to redistribute equal benefits and 
costs amongst the landowners, the public budget will pay compensation to 
those who do not obtain profitability equivalent to the average.20
Compulsory purchase
In the case of compulsory purchase or eminent domain proceedings for a pub-
lic purpose, the land has to be appraised at market value and compensation 
must be paid. Until the recent reform of 2007, the market value included the 
amount of potential benefit loss for not being allowed private development 
at an average level for the area where the condemned property is located. For 
this reason, since the late 1980s until the present, compulsory purchase has 
become a progressively obsolete technique, giving way to non-financial com-
pensation techniques such as land readjustment and the Transfer of Develop-
ment Rights.
Techniques5.3 
The above-mentioned principle (fair redistribution of benefits and encum-
brances imposed by the planning provisions) was introduced into the Spanish 
legal system in 1956. The purpose of this principle was to provide the neces-
sary funding to provide the public infrastructure for new development. The in-
crease in land value was made possible by the development potential granted 
by the planning provisions. Additionally, it is intended to grant an equal eco-
nomic effect on all the properties affected by the planning provisions, in spite 
19  Recent legal changes approved by Act no. 8 of 2007 have extended a similar regime to the case of devel-
opment which is going to be initiated even though it has not yet begun. (art. 24).
20  This rule was stipulated in art. 3 of Act of 12 of May 1956, art. 3 of Act 1346/1976, art. 3 of Act 1/1992 and art. 
5 of Act 6/1998. Please note that art. 8 of the recent Act 8/2007 marks a turning point limiting such a principle.
[ 97 ]
of the different physical treatment that must necessarily apply to each indi-
vidual property. In its original form, the rule of fair redistribution was limited 
as a means of dealing with the urbanization within planning pools (polygons). 
The original scope of such a redistribution could hardly be applied to manag-
ing redevelopment in downtowns, nor could it be involved in large spaces re-
served for major public infrastructure projects. The legal reforms of 1976 and 
1992 attempted to extend and broaden the scope of application of such redis-
tribution. Recent legal reforms enacted on July 1, 2007 marked a turning point 
limiting the relevance of this principle in future public projects.
Land readjustment is the technique for redistribution applied when the af-
fected land is a continuous space of several properties subject to a common 
process of new development. The TDR technique – in its special Spanish man-
ner – is applied when the affected land in a downtown area is subject to re-
development, or when large spaces are targeted as major public facilities that 
will provide common services to different parts of the city.
In spite of its well-established position in the Spanish legal tradition, the 
practical experience of land readjustment was unsatisfactory practical up 
until the mid-1990s. Landowners were frequently unable to manage such a 
complex process on their own. It became clear that associations of landown-
ers were an impractical tool in managing land readjustment. Full cost recov-
ery was a brilliant legal theoretical principle, but not a practical concept that 
could be applied. Such impractical procedures were circumvented by means 
of rezoning contracts between developers and municipalities.
The Valencia Regional Planning Law of 1994 (no. 6) provided a turning point 
to this scenario. A developer agent was assigned to manage responsibilities 
of land readjustment over an area that could exceed his own property. The 
quick success of this formula prompted its adoption by the rest of the region-
al legislations throughout Spain. Two variants are combined in each regional 
system. One is the original Valencia formula in which the developer agent in 
charge is chosen in a public contest open to non-landowners, but in which 
the owners have some say. Another variant is the 50%-claim-the-title system 
in which the owner or owners of more than half of the total surface of the 
pool have the exclusive rights to manage the land readjustment, if they claim 
that right, and undertake the financial commitments within a stated period 
after the approval of the General Plan.
Conservation case: TDRs applied to listed 5.4 
buildings in Almería 1984-1988
Transferable Development Rights5.4.1 
During the 1980s, Spanish cities had a serious deficit of public spaces in the 
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overbuilt downtown areas. With the change to a democratic form of govern-
ment, new planning provisions were drafted to fill the void but municipalities 
could not afford to purchase the necessary urban land. Non-financial com-
pensation tools were drafted to resolve the problem. On many occasions, the 
planned public facility was assigned to a plot where a historically-designated 
building existed, even one in poor condition.
TDRs were sometimes used in Spain during the 1980s in order to preserve 
designated historic buildings. This technique was introduced in Spain for the 
first time in the small town of Elda-Petrer (Valencia) in 1978 and it was later 
applied to mid-sized cities such as Getafe (Madrid), Jerez and Almería (Anda-
lucía). In spite of the fact that the relevant law (Act 1346/1976) did not include 
detailed provisions for this technique, it was backed by two judgments of the 
Supreme Court in 198221. The Spanish planner, J. García-Bellido, originally pro-
moted the idea, which was officially accepted by the Courts after a notorious 
legal battle. The legal grounds of this acceptance was based on considering 
this technique as a valid simplification of the land readjustment proceedings 
(García-Bellido, 1979). These proceedings are legally binding when the affect-
ed landowners in densely-built neighborhoods are willing participants.
The technique worked as follows: The General Plan (Plan) of the city estab-
lished a so-called Standard Development Right (Aprovechamiento Tipo) for each 
homogeneous zone of the inner town. This Standard Development Right was 
an equitable Floor Area Ratio (FAR), which included an equal development 
right for all the properties inside the particular zone. This development right 
was only a legal reference, not necessarily coinciding with the material build-
ing possibilities that could be authorized with regard to each particular site. 
Those private properties designated for public facilities (such as green public 
areas) had allotted the same development right but it could not be utilized on 
that location. Instead it could be transferred to a plot capable of being devel-
oped. Most of the sites capable of private development could eventually be 
built up with a density that exceeded the Standard Development Right, but 
this surplus of development rights had to be transferred from properties with 
an equivalent deficit. Properties that their owners cede to the municipality 
for public uses are considered in deficit by definition. Owners therefore ceded 
land for public purposes to the municipality and obtained in exchange the 
potential to develop other receiving plots. The physical density was therefore 
ultimately above the level of the Standard Development Right. This process 
was implemented via a mutual agreement between the owner of a plot that 
could be developed and the owner of a site assigned by the Plan for public fa-
cilities which had only theoretical developing rights without actual-physical 
21  Judgments delivered on 6/22/1981 and 5/4/1982. Art. 78.3 of the Decree 3288/1978 was used as legal 
back-up of this technique.
[ 99 ]
possibility to be built up. A maximum FAR above the Standard Development 
Right was foreseen by the Plan for each site and TDRs were not allowed to be 
used to surpass this maximum.
Landowners of sites available for development therefore have two options: 
to develop only the Standard Development Right FAR, or to reach an agree-
ment with the owner of a plot assigned by the Plan for public facilities to cede 
it to the municipality, use Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), and share 
the benefits of the plot to be developed between both owners. Landowners 
of land not capable of development which has been assigned for public fa-
cilities by the Plan have two options as well: to enter into an agreement, as 
mentioned above, or to sell their land to the municipality. In this last case, 
the municipality would re-sell the development rights of the purchased land, 
subrogating itself to the landowner in future TDR transactions.
Almerías historic buildings5.4.2 22
Between 1950-1980, without legal restrictions, 90% of Almerías buildings con-
structed before 1900 were demolished. In 1979, however, the new city council, 
(the first one elected in many years by democratic means), was interested in 
preserving the remaining historic buildings (Fernández, 1994). The buildings 
included small palaces or other large structures such as the old Liceo theatre. 
New regulations forbade the demolition of buildings and obliged owners to 
preserve their internal structures.
At that time, neither the original owners nor private developers were in-
terested in restorations. The General Plan of Almería in 1986 (146,000 inhabit-
ants) allowed the use of TDRs from any property designated for restoration 
which had been ceded to the municipality to be restored as a public facility. 
Normally, a professional developer would buy the building with the single 
purpose of ceding it to the municipality in order to transfer the development 
rights to other plots in different locations. These donations of property, in 
spite of their lack of financial compensation, were absolutely voluntary. If the 
building owner was not willing to use TDRs, he had the alternative of restor-
ing or maintaining the property himself, and had the option to use it for pri-
vate purposes.
The municipality incurred no costs in obtaining the properties as they had 
to be ceded as a prerequisite for obtaining TDRs. Public funds were only em-
ployed for restoration projects and for necessary improvements to rehabili-
tate the buildings as public facilities.
The first TDR that produced the transfer of the property to public hands 
22  The information about this case including copies of several official files was provided by Justice Mr. Sil-
vestre Martinez, Judge of the Administrative Courts.
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was not sufficient to make use of all the development rights, so developers 
held onto the remainder of the development rights for the future. To some 
extent there was a free market of development rights and the municipality 
played a relevant role in this as broker or TDR bank.
Different zones had different Standards of Development Rights, ranging in 
FAR density from between 0.8 and 2. The TDR could be transferred between 
different zones after taking into account the different values. The rule was 
that in the case of the TDR, the land where the development rights came from 
had to be ceded to public hands, but obviously if the ceding consisted of a 
property already developed, its value was greater than if it were undeveloped 
land. Because of this, the TDR had a bonus when the ceding included a des-
ignated historic building. The bonus consisted of the allocation of additional 
TDRs.
Table 5.1 explains a hypothetical basic case in which a property with a list-
ed building is transferred to public administration. The TDR requires a bal-
ance between two equal values: the value of the development rights which 
are transferred (deficit) and the value of the surplus of FAR over the Standard 
Development Right, which is going to be developed. The first one depends on 
the area ceded to the municipality, on its Standard Development Right, on its 
positional value, and it includes a bonus (150%) in exchange for the ceding of 
the constructed building. The second depends on its land area, on its respec-
tive Standard Development Right, and on its positional value.
This technique has a dual purpose (García-Bellido & De Salamanca, 1979). 
On the one hand, it enables different landowners to be treated equitably, in 
spite of the different provisions that the zoning regulation has provided for 
their respective plots. It strives to acknowledge equal development rights for 
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Table 5.1 Hypothetical basic case in which a property with a listed building is transferred to the public 
administration
Concepts Developable plots Historic buildings
Standard development 
right (Zone)
1 m2 floor area/m2 land area (FAR 100%) 2 m2 floor area/m2 land area (FAR 150%)
Surface 1,000 m2 land area 833.33 m2 land area
Existing construction 
bonus
.+ 0% .+ 50%
Development rights (DR) (100% x 1,000) = 1,000 m2 floor area (200% x 150% x 833.33) = 2,500 m2 floor area
Zone value € 1,000/m2 floor area € 800/m2 floor area
Land value (1,000 m2 floor area x € 1,000/m2 floor area) 
= € 1 million
(€ 800 x 2,500 m2 floor area) = € 2 million
FAR (Plot) 300% = (3 m2 floor area/m2 land area) Existing building
Potential building allowed (300% x 1,000 m2 floor area) = 3,000 m2 floor 
area
Restoration
Surplus/Deficit DR (3,000 m2 floor area - 1,000 m2 floor area) = 
+2,000 m2 floor area
(0 m2 floor area - 2,500 m2 floor area) = -2,500 
m2 floor area
Surplus/Deficit Value (2,000 m2 floor area x € 1,000/m2 floor area) 
= + € 2 million
€ 0 - € 2 million = - € 2 million
those landowners who can build or rebuild their plots, and those others who 
can only make restoration with presumably few financial benefits (García-
Bellido, 1985). On the other hand, it allows the municipality to obtain public 
spaces without the financial costs that would otherwise have to be charged 
to the taxpayers. This has the effect of shifting the burden from the taxpay-
ers to the developers who prefer new development over restoration. The re-
ports say that in Almería, in the long term, the technique became obsolete 
when private developers began to be not only interested in new development 
or redevelopment, but also in restoration. There were a total of 146 TDRs pur-
chased between 1984 and 1988 which involved the development of more than 
1,800 new dwellings. In the initial years, the municipality gained a ratio of 
0.63m2 for every 100m2 of floor area developed by the private sector without 
incurring any financial costs. This ratio diminished after the mid 1980s to 0.28 
when the municipality became more interested in obtaining historic build-
ings than open land to develop new public facilities.
Conversion case: Francia Avenue 5.5 
in Valencia, 1991-1996
Land readjustment is a technique23 primarily devised to transform rural land 
into urban land. It is applied to a continuous area usually outlined in the pre-
vious planning provisions which also define the future development potential 
and necessary public facilities and infrastructure. In land readjustment, the 
original rural properties are exchanged for the new developable plots includ-
ed in the same outlined area. In this way, the landowners affected receive a 
developable site in exchange for their original rural property. The exchange 
is managed on an equitable basis, granting to each landowner a development 
right proportional to the surface area of his or her original property. Land re-
served for public facilities is transferred to the Public Administration which 
also receives a minor part of the developable site to support its public hous-
ing policies. Most of the new urban sites are distributed among the original 
landowners who can individually build up the plots they obtain. The expenses 
generated by the required public works to be developed are distributed among 
landowners proportional to the development rights of the plots that each one 
obtains. This includes the costs of construction of the sewage system, roads, 
streets, gardens, and other public facilities. It is a rule that the final balance 
derived from the benefits and costs has to produce a net benefit for all the 
landowners affected and not only compensation for the value of their original 
23  Guidelines of land readjustment in Spain are regulated by the National Act 1346/1976 (arts. 94-102) and 
by the Royal Decree 1079/1997, but there are relevant peculiarities in each particular Regional Regulation.
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properties. Landowners who are not satisfied with the proposed terms of the 
land readjustment have the right to sell their original property and receive 
financial compensation. The public administration or, on its behalf, the devel-
oper Agent selected in a public contest, are obliged to pay the compensation 
if so requested by the landowner.
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Figure 5.1 Valencia, Francia Avenue: original property structure
Source: Ajuntament de Valencia, Concejalía de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Calidad Urbana (Valencia City Council)
Existing buildings
Inside the area affected by land readjustment there may be existing us-
es such as buildings, farms, or plantations which have to be destroyed as a 
consequence of the joint development. The owner, or any person with the 
relevant rights over these existing assets, has to be compensated with an 
amount of money equivalent to their market value, discounting the value 
of the land (which will be compensated with development rights). The total 
amount of these compensations also has to be redistributed on an equitable 
basis amongst all the landowners according to their respective development 
rights. Therefore, there has to be an account drawn up in which each particu-
lar landowner has a double entry as debtor and creditor against the pool. This 
technique has obvious limitations: the new planning provisions have to sig-
nificantly increase the value of the whole property inside the pool over the 
value of the set of pre-existing uses. For this reason, this technique has not 
been applied to operations to decrease residential density but in the substitu-
tion of industrial uses for residential and commercial uses. The point to note 
here is the extent to which the broadness and quality of the renewal, and not 
its density, can be the tool for producing added values to finance the redevel-
opment. Such was the case in the Francia Avenue Sector in Valencia.
Social background
Francia Avenue sector has been the most relevant redevelopment project per-
formed in the City of Valencia in the last decade. It is an entire neighborhood 
located between the city centre and the port, formerly occupied by industrial 
facilities. New planning provisions in the late 1980s outlined the need to sub-
stitute the pre-existing industrial area by a new residential and commercial 
area. The proper connection between the city centre and the seafront required 
supporting the redevelopment with necessary public infrastructure and pub-
lic works. The Plan established that the area had to be developed as a whole, 
that the active industries had to be stopped, demolished, and that the ground 
had to be cleaned. Additionally, the development had to include a bridge con-
necting it with the city center. It had to accomplish the following: convert a 
former river bed into a park, landscape additional gardens, construct a new 
web of avenues, streets, plazas (with a sewage system, traffic lights, and re-
lated infrastructure) and provide several plots for public buildings and public 
social housing. The developers had to pay a substantial contribution to bury 
the railway track.
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History of Francia Avenue
There were 170 different properties24 located in an area of 65 hectares (see 
Figure 5.1). Many of the properties included factories, some of which were ob-
solete, but others were still active (see Figure 5.2). Landowners had the op-
tion of setting up an association to cope with the land readjustment and the 
development of common works, but they were not interested in doing this. 
Costs were high, possible benefits were too speculative, and it was difficult to 
coordinate the actions of so many affected people in a task which involved 
managing major civil works.
The municipality chose to perform compulsory purchase of all properties, 
but as there were no public funds to finance the program, a public contest 
was held to select a developer prepared to buy the properties (on a compulso-
ry basis if necessary) and to perform all the works. Some landowners protest-
ed because they were interested in participating in the development. Because 
of this it was stipulated that the developer had to meet in association with 
those landowners that were interested in participating in the development. 
It was also stipulated that any interested landowner could choose between 
making a financial investment, only contributing with their property in ex-
change for development rights, or simply selling their property and receiving 
cash.
The selected developer agent was the joint venture of a bank and a major 
contractor who had previously bought a couple of large properties inside the 
area. Unexpectedly, in the end, all the landowners chose to be part of an asso-
24  Valuable information has been provided by Prof. José Cardona of the University C.E.U.S. Pablo of Valen-
cia.
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Figure 5.3 Valencia, Francia Avenue planning scheme 
Source: Ajuntament de Valencia, Concejalía de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Calidad Urbana 
(Valencia City Council)
ciation with the developer agent, all signing several standard financial agree-
ments. Land readjustment was the result (see Figure 5.3). This does not mean 
that the specific details of the land readjustment were willingly accepted by 
all the affected people. Obviously there was a broad consensus about those 
details (reached through negotiations with the developer agent, landowners, 
and the municipality), but there were also specific disputes about particular 
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Figure 5.4 Valencia, Francia Avenue final properties allotted by land readjustment
Source: Ajuntament de Valencia, Concejalía de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Calidad Urbana (Valencia City Council)
decisions that were initially resolved by the municipality which enforced its 
own decisions. These decisions were either confirmed afterwards, or modified 
through judicial review, depending on each particular case.
Results and consequences
The land readjustment and the development of the infrastructure were per-
formed between 1991 and 1996. Today the area – almost completely devel-
oped – is a downtown hotspot for the commercial and residential real estate 
markets (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). 80% of the area is assigned to public uses 
and the footprint of the 130 private buildings is 8.5% of its total surface area.
This experience inspired the Valencia legal reform of 1994 and further in-
spired regional legal reforms all around Spain. Finally, the recent national law 
enacted in July 2007 established this operating model as a basic pattern all 
around the country.
Re-allocation case: Orriols sector as part of 5.6 
the General Plan of Valencia, 1988-200125
The extent of land readjustment and TDRs5.6.1 
Since 1994, land readjustment has been applied all around the Valencia Re-
gion – and in other Spanish Regions – in hundreds of cases which involve 
thousands of hectares. The General Plan of Valencia and the development of 
the Orriols sector provide a good example to explain its mechanics. Almost all 
of the major real estate development in Spain is performed by means of land 
readjustment. It is also important to note that sometimes land readjustment 
techniques are combined with TDR techniques.
The Orriols sector was envisaged in the General Plan of 1988. The area 
for land readjustment covered 541,000m2 in the northern outskirts of the 
city surrounded by developed neighborhoods to the south, east and west. It 
stretched over farmlands with many scattered small buildings, dumps, a few 
trees, one historic listed building, a professional league soccer stadium, as 
well as blighted areas.
Transferable Development Rights5.6.2 
In Spain, TDRs require the donation to a municipality of those areas from 
which the development rights are transferred. The General Plan of Valencia 
25  The information about this case has been obtained from the official files of the City of Valencia Munici-
pality. Useful information has been also provided by the planner Mr. A. Escribano Beltrán.
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was approved in 1988. It divided the city’s outskirts into 15 planning sectors 
of land that could be developed (suelo urbanizable programado). The size of the 
sectors ranged from 11 to 59 hectares with a total area of 310 hectares. The 
number of new dwellings foreseen for them was around 20,000. The General 
Plan delineated the boundaries of each sector and assigned to them a specific 
use for future urban development, the number of dwellings to be developed, 
and a precise area of floor that could be built, distinguishing between resi-
dential, industrial, or tertiary use.
Provisions of the General Plan had to be completed along with the more 
detailed ones of specific Partial Plans (Plan Parcial) drafted for each sector, and 
each Partial Plan had to be developed by means of land readjustment. The 
Partial Plans consisted mainly of a draft of the respective sector streets, pub-
lic parks, and plots allotted for public facilities. The major spatial reserves for 
large public facilities were allocated directly in the General Plan. The develop-
ment of 15 sectors had to be linked with the parallel development of major 
public facilities (i.e. the new Public University) which occupied approximately 
200 additional hectares.
The General Plan established a particular Average Development Right 
(aprovechamiento medio) for all the properties included in any sector or as-
signed for any public major uses. The same FAR for any single square meter 
was established with the exclusive purpose of determining equitable rights 
for all properties. The Average Development Right was calculated by divid-
ing the total amount of development potential assigned by the General Plan 
by the total area occupied by the sectors and by the major reserves for pub-
lic spaces. As each particular sector was assigned a different FAR in terms 
of physical building limits, it was necessary to implement TDRs in order to 
equalize the differences between the physical FAR of each property and the 
Average Development Right established for all the land involved in these new 
developments. There were several sectors in which the physical FAR coincided 
with the Average Development Right, but no sector with a physical FAR under 
this average. The TDRs had to transfer development rights from the land re-
served for major public facilities to the sectors or, to be more precise, to each 
land readjustment process with actual building potential. We have already 
mentioned that in Spain TDRs require the donation to a municipality of those 
areas from which the development rights are transferred. The mechanics of 
the TDRs in this case were so flexible that in the land readjustment a portion 
of land was included located in another part of the city that would be ceded 
to the municipality for public uses.
For example, the Orriols sector has an inner area of 38 hectares but it 
needed to include in its land readjustment an external area of 16 hectares 
assigned to a public park and large avenues. For the Orriols, this external area 
was located adjacent to the sector, but in other cases it was located far away. 
As land prices vary according to location, the General Plan established value 
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coefficients to calculate the land needed for TDRs according to the location of 
the non-continuous areas included in the same land readjustment.
Table 5.2 shows a simplified example of how TDRs operate in land read-
justment. As a consequence of the correction determined by the coefficient, 
the Average Development Right is not the same FAR for all the sectors. Never-
theless, all the landowners obtained the same land value. In the example: (0.4 
m2 floor area/m2 land area * €20) = €8 = (0.8 m2 floor area/m2 land area * €10).
The system discussed above is an implementation of compulsory rules 
stipulated in National Law (art. 84, Act 1346/197626) that have been applied in 
most of the large and mid-sized cities in Spain during the last two decades. It 
is noteworthy that for Valencia in 1998 (as in others, such as Madrid in 1985) 
the value coefficients were calculated based on a serious market study. The 
intended final result was that all the landowners affected by the new devel-
opment in the outskirts of the city could obtain an equal benefit as a result of 
the implementation of the General Plan.
With regard to the Almería conservation case previously discussed, it must 
be noted that TDRs in that case are not necessarily founded on mutual agree-
26  The detailed regulation comes from arts. 30-34 of Royal Decree 2159/1978.
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Table 5.2 Simplified example of how TDRs operate in land readjustment cases
Sector A (with private uses) Sector B (with private uses) Sector C 
Concepts (with private uses) (with private uses) (only allowed public uses)
Equalized average 
development right (i)
0.8 r.d.u. (ii)/m2 of land 0.8 r.d.u./m2 l (iv) 0.8 r.d.u./m2 l
Positional value (iii) € 10/m2 f € 20/m2 f (v) -
Coefficient* [1] [0.5] -
Operative average 
development right
0.8 m2 f/m2 l 0.4 m2 f/m2 l -
Total developable floor 
area inside the sector
9,000 m2 f 3,450 m2 f 0 m2 f
Land area’s sector 10,000 m2 l 8,000 m2 l 1,875 m2 l
Development rights 
without TDR
(0.8 r.d.u./m2 l*1*10,000 m2 l) = 
8,000 m2 f
(0.8 r.d.u./m2 l*0.5*8,000 m2 l) 
= 3,200 m2 f
(0.8 r.d.u/m2 l*1,875 m2 l) = 
+1,500 r.d.u
Deficit/Surplus of 
development rights in 
the sector
(8,000 - 9,000 m2 f ) = -1,000 
m2 f;
(-1,000 m2 f : [1])= -1,000 r.d.u.
(3,200 - 4,450 m2 f ) = -250 
m2 f;
(-250 m2 f : [-0.5]) = -500 r.d.u.
 +1,500 r.d.u = 1,000 r.d.u to 
S1 (66,66%)+ 500 r.d.u. to S2 
(33,33%)
Developable floor 
reserved for the TDR
-1,000 r.d.u *[1] = -1,000 m2 f;
[-1,000 m2 f ] : [-1,250 m2 l] = 
0,8 m2 f/m2 l
-500 r.d.u. *[0.5] = -250 m2 f;
[-250 m2 f ] : [-6,625 m2 l] = 0.4 
m2 f/m2 l
From 1,875 m2 l:
1,250 (66.66%) TDR to S1 
625 (33,33%) TDR to S2
(i) Established by the General Plan according to the ratio of positional values among the different sectors.
(ii) Right development units (r.d.u.) is used to measure the development rights transferred between different sectors.
(iii) Determined by means of a market study of prices realised at the time when the General Plan was approved.
(iv) ‘l’ stands for ‘land area’ or surface area.
(v) ‘f ’ stands for ‘floor area’ or developable area.
ments between the affected landowners, but instead on compulsory decisions 
enforced by the municipality and subject to later judicial review.
The proceedings
A public contest to choose a developer agent took place in 1995. There were 
three contending companies, all of which were joint ventures (more than 20 
companies participated in the process). All of the competitors presented a 
technical proposal and a bid with their respective economic conditions. The 
whole process of selection lasted 11 months. During this period, competitors 
started an aggressive campaign in the media to gain the favor of public opin-
ion and the municipality. This increased public interest more than the official 
proceedings and prompted debates about the proposals.
Each competing proposal comprised a complete design of the planning 
provisions, fully delineating the building plots including public spaces, the 
drafting of the micro-zoning of the use of land, the number of floors, footprint 
conditions, height of the buildings, uses, and the economic activities allowed. 
Land readjustment could not modify these provisions afterwards. Neverthe-
less, the planning provisions (Plan Parcial) only regulated the general condi-
tions of the minimal surface and shape to be respected in the design of the 
plots – the boundary limits of these plots. The precise shape of the individual 
plots was allotted later in the land readjustment – taking into consideration 
the conveniences of the distribution of rights among landowners. The total 
number of dwellings was established beforehand in the Plan; the land read-
justment distributed them amongst the sites, establishing a limited number 
of dwellings for each one. The proposals were also accompanied by a basic 
project of public works (a description of the landscaping and urban design 
qualities, provisions to construct the streets, as well as water, gas, electric, 
traffic light and sewage systems). Such documents had to be consistent with 
the General Plan strategy; no major changes were allowed with regard to the 
General Plan (the pre-established Average Development Right).
The bids contained a schedule to perform the land readjustment and the 
development of the public spaces, and economic conditions offered to the 
landowners.
After a developer agent was selected as promoter by the Municipal Assem-
bly, the process of land readjustment began.
Ownership structure5.6.3 
The original land was divided into 300 separate farming properties. In the be-
ginning, more than 90% of the surface was in private hands (see Figures 5.6 
and 5.7). Neither of the companies in the contest had significant ownership of 
the properties. During the official period of representations, landowners had 
an active role supporting one company or the other because of agreements 
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that had been negotiated. Several landowners argued against particular fea-
tures of the development, but virtually none were opposed to developing the 
area.
During the contest and the land readjustment process, relevant changes 
in property took place, reducing the number of landowners. There was a clear 
difference between the Valencia model which included developer agents cho-
sen in open contests and other scenarios. In the Valencia model, movements 
in the real estate market evolved at the same time as the administrative pro-
cedures (Blanc-Clavero, 1997; Modrego-Caballero, 1997; Fernández, 1998). By 
the time land readjustment was to be approved in 1999, half of the original 
land surface was in the hands of ten owners. The total number of landowners 
was still high, but many of them were not the original owners but rather pri-
vate and company investors. In the open market, the developer agent bought 
12% of the surface land and 18% of the development rights. Of particular note 
in this case was that 21 of the plots were assigned in joint property shared by 
several associated owners.
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Figure 5.6 Valencia, Orriols original property structure
Source: Ajuntament de Valencia, Concejalía de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Calidad Urbana (Valencia City Council)
The landowner’s role in land readjustment5.6.4 
Landowners were notified of the approval of the selected developer agent 
granting them the choice to make a financial investment in the development 
works of common interest or to only contribute with the original land. The 
first choice obviously implied more development rights. The economic condi-
tions of both options were fixed in advance according to the winning bid in 
the previous contest. In the case of cash investment, the landowner had to 
present a bank guarantee or other kind of payment guarantee. The developer 
agent had to present bank guarantees covering the value of the development 
rights gained in exchange for its investments and increase the total cost of 
the public works by 7%.
The Average Development Right for an owner who made a financial invest-
ment in the urbanization works was 0.64m2 floor area per m2 of the original 
property, but only 0.3328 if the owner only contributed the original land with-
out cash payment. The required investment if there was a cash contribution 
was €39/m2 of the original property. Owners representing 22% of the total ar-
ea affected declined to contribute a cash investment, and the developer agent 
had to cover this lack of investment, and acquired in exchange equivalent de-
velopment rights.
Landowners can decline to participate in land readjustments. They have 
the prerogative to claim a cash compensation for the original land in its en-
tirety, but this is very unusual. Nevertheless, landowners, in some cases, can-
not participate in land readjustment because their rights are so limited that it 
is impossible to compensate them with an entire building plot or with a mini-
mal share in a plot over the legal minimum (50% of the smaller plot planned). 
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The developer agent has the duty to make these payments and the right to 
acquire the equivalent development rights. In the case of the Orriols sector, 
the properties amounted to 6.9% of the total development rights.
Allocation rules5.6.5 
Finally, the building plots were distributed among the holders of development 
rights in such a way that the physical building potential of each plot equal-
ized the development rights of the relevant parties involved. In order to de-
cide the location of each assignment, several criteria had to be used. First of 
all, most of the affected people had to obtain an assignment of land. Second-
ly, the assignment in full property had to be preferred over the assignment 
of shares for the same property. Thirdly, it was mandatory that when other 
equal conditions allowed, each owner had to obtain the new site in the same 
location as the original property or as close to it as possible. It was also man-
datory to calculate the different values of the different uses of land (commer-
cial or residential) to correct the assignment of plots when necessary (as in 
the case of a soccer club). All the preceding rules could be avoided as long as 
there was a willing agreement between the parties involved.
Such a complex set of rules would be impossible to manage if the devel-
oper agent did not have the ability to negotiate and patiently forge a broad-
ened consensus among the majority of the affected owners. This is one of the 
major roles of the developer agent and the key to the success of land read-
justment. This role is easy to carry out when the property is acquired by dif-
ferent developer companies or when the developer agent is familiar with the 
local culture of the farm land ownership. Conversely, in particular areas of 
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the coast where many properties are family investments by foreign landown-
ers, conflicts have been frequent.
Land readjustment procedures5.6.6 
The project of redistribution was subject to two periods of representations 
advertised with wide-spread publicity. The project not only comprised a de-
scription of the initial and final properties, but an appraisal of them as well, 
distinguishing land values from the appraisal of other assets. The project was 
registered in the Land Registry27 after obtaining the official endorsement of 
the municipality.
The respective landowner also needed to be compensated for existing uses 
of the land that could not be preserved (warehouses, trees). Tenants and hold-
ers of rights over the properties (distinct to those of ownership) also had to be 
compensated. The total amount of these compensations had to be proportion-
ally distributed among the relevant parties who would benefit from the devel-
opment rights. Cash compensations had to be paid before property could be 
taken. Future investments had to be guaranteed by the responsible party by 
means of a mortgage on the assigned plot or a bank guarantee (Parejo-Alfon-
so & Blanc-Clavero, 1998).
27  The enforcement of Royal Decree 1079/10997 was a landmark in the regulation coordinating planning 
decisions and the Land Registry in Spain. 
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Figure 5.9 Valencia, Orriols final properties allotted by land readjustment
Source: Ajuntament de Valencia, Concejalía de Urbanismo, Vivienda y Calidad Urbana (Valencia City Council)
Development5.6.7 
The number of plots after land readjustment dropped considerably (see Fig-
ures 5.8 and 5.9) In the Orriols sector, 75.5% of the area was assigned for 
public use; 19.7% for gardens; 12.4% for municipal plots for public services; 
8.6% for a tram transport system; and the remaining 34% for roads, streets, 
bicycle lanes, and public squares. The developable land for private purposes 
was 24.5% (1% private gardens). The total number of final plots assigned for 
private purposes were 56; 3 for private facilities and 53 for blocks of apart-
ments and semi-detached houses. Furthermore, 90% of the area set aside for 
development was for residential purposes and 10% for commercial purposes. 
Urbanization was fully accomplished in a few months. Among the works in-
cluded was the restoration of an historic building, a new track trajectory for 
the tram service, a public sports facility with a swimming pool, and a park for 
the pre-existing neighborhood. Most of the area is now developed (see Figure 
5.10). This same system has been enforced in all but two of the sectors fore-
seen in the Valencia General Plan of 1988.
Conclusions5.7 
Since the mid 1990s, investment in public urban infrastructure has been im-
portant across Spain. It is important to recognize, however, the extent of the 
private contribution to this investment. Spanish public opinion deems it nor-
mal that developers have to finance the cost of the basic public facilities that 
new development will demand. It is generally assumed that the public bud-
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get would not be burdened with the acquisition costs of the land required for 
public purposes, or for the basic facilities of its urbanization. A tax increase 
to finance the creation of new urban infrastructure, whose main effect would 
be to re-appraise the surrounding land, would be unpopular. Land readjust-
ment and other techniques of non-financial compensation are therefore seen 
as the normal rule. Developers have accepted the principle because it allows 
them to boost their investment initiatives without depending upon bureau-
cratic public expenditure decisions. Local landowners have become familiar 
with these techniques, and a majority of them are strong supporters of new 
urban development. This is particularly true in areas where small landown-
ers abound. This tendency towards development was forged by the economic 
decline of traditional farming and by very low interest rates which stimulated 
the mortgage market.
Large benefits and unexpected problems have arisen from this new sce-
nario. Public finances are healthy, and budgets, released from the burden of 
traditional expenses, can be re-allocated in new directions. Nevertheless, crit-
ics point out the risk that the public sector could lose the ability to direct ur-
ban development because it does not manage the financial leverage. It may be 
symptomatic that until recently Spanish development was still being directed 
by wide-scale public planning drafted during the 1980s. In some regions, it 
has not been replaced by the comparable effort to create structural planning 
during the 1990s. Supporters of the new trend argue that public authorities 
are more demanding and rigorous when they exert the planning control over 
private investment than when they have to finance public infrastructure with 
public funds.
Another problem has come in the form of a conflict of cultures. In very 
specific coastal areas of southern Valencia, a wave of protest against planning 
law has arisen amongst the foreign European landowners of small properties 
(these number in the thousands). They cannot understand land readjustment 
and deem it to be an expropriation without fair compensation. The majority 
of locals have a very different point of view. This clash of opposing percep-
tions has a multi-tiered explanation. Mechanisms like land readjustment, 
when applied to a very fragmented property structure, demand that the af-
fected people are familiar with the political process and the legal environ-
ment that nourishes community life. Nevertheless, there is not only a conflict 
of cultures but of divergent interests in these debates, and this introduces an 
interesting point.
It is not a coincidence that these conflicts are geographically focused in 
areas where sprawl has been the pattern of development for decades. Land 
readjustment and TDRs are meaningless if there is no expectation of econom-
ic benefit for the affected people. It functions when landowners regard their 
property as a capital asset that can be invested through a joint development 
process, but not if they consider it to be an urban site that they can develop 
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individually. It is also important to point out that the increase in land value 
(‘windfall benefits’) that public planning decisions produce does not derive 
from the vicinity of a particular public facility to a particular property, but 
instead from the potential to override the legal restrictions to develop such 
property. In sprawl areas where rural property has been extremely fragment-
ed and where there has traditionally been tolerance towards allowing the ir-
regular construction of so-called ‘farm houses’ by everybody everywhere, new 
planning provisions with more public space and public infrastructure is not 
popular with many landowners (Fernández, 2005). There will only be an in-
crease in the previous value of small properties in the short term if public 
infrastructure is generously paid for from public budgets28.
Things are decidedly different in the rural vicinity of a major city which 
has had strict restrictions against scattered development. In this second 
scenario landowners consider land readjustment as leverage that overrides 
the limits to development and as a tool that transforms rural land into ur-
ban land, re-appraising it. The problem in this last context will be to convince 
landowners that development on the land surrounding the cities has to have 
limits. New experiences with TDRs have been explored through recent legal 
changes29 to preserve rural spaces, but it is too early to evaluate them30.
28  A new regulation has been enacted to deal with such conflicts in Valencia Regional Act 6/2005 arts. 27-29.
29  Valencia Regional Act 14/2004.
30  Harsh criticism has been made by García-Bellido (2007).
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Table 5.3 Summarizing the Spanish cases
Conservation (Almería General 
Plan)
Conversion (Francia Avenue 
Program (Valencia))
Re-allocation (land readjustment 
Orriols (Valencia))
Period in 
which case was 
introduced
1984-1988. Our case study 
finished in 1988 but the 
experience that started in 1984 
lasted several more years
First public decision (official 
announcement of a public 
contest) in 1991
Public works of urbanization 
finished in 1986
Building process finished in 
2006
The bases were established in 
the General Plan of Valencia in 
1988
Orriols operation started in 1995 
(public contest) and finished in 
2001 (completion of the public 
facilities and land readjustment)
General objective 
of proposed 
instrument
General objective was to boost 
the restoration of historic 
buildings in derelict condition 
and to reuse them as public 
equipment to assist the cultural 
and social needs of the city 
center of Almería
Redevelopment of a very large 
industrial area between the 
city center of Valencia and its 
seafront
Development of a new 
neighborhood in green land
Land readjustment among 
300 properties connected with 
12 other land readjustments 
around different parts of the city
Characteristic 
factors
All the techniques involved 
were applied on a free-will basis 
between private and public 
actors
Relevant public infrastructure 
works developed or afforded by 
the private sector
Global impact in the life of a 
major city
Pioneer experience of public 
contest to choose a developer 
in charge of an area that 
exceeds its own property
The case combines the 
techniques of land readjustment 
with TDRs, and public contest to 
select the developer in charge. 
The number of landowners 
affected was unusually large 
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined 
the instrument
Public reaction against a 
previous historic process of 
development which neglected 
the preservation of heritage
Financial difficulties for the 
public sector
Financial requirements that 
exceed the possibilities of the 
public budget
Large number of landowners 
affected (170) with passive 
attitudes and the need to find 
leading actors to promote the 
private involvement in the 
public targets
Typical development in the 
Valencia Region during the mid-
1990s. The premise was that all 
the landowners of green land 
affected by development around 
the city had to have equal 
development rights gauged in 
terms of financial value 
Fit within planning 
and legal system: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Regulatory framework 
established by ordinance 
contained in the General Plan 
(master planning instrument) 
of the municipality. Special 
physical provisions drafted in 
the planning
Private project selected in 
public contest inside the 
guidelines prior established 
in the General (Master) Plan 
drafted by the municipality 
Spatial planning of 1988 
established all the relevant 
physical and social parameters 
which rule the development
Conservation (Almería General 
Plan)
Conversion (Francia Avenue 
Program (Valencia))
Re-allocation (land readjustment 
Orriols (Valencia))
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
Only at the local level No, only at the regulatory local 
level. Procedure legally foreseen 
but never before applied. 
Relevant practical discovery 
(possibility of a third actor 
between landownership and 
public administrations). The 
experience inspired major legal 
changes at the regional and 
national levels
No, only the details of the 
land use regulation were 
drawn up for the case, but 
it was based on parameters 
previously established. It was 
also necessary to establish the 
economic details related to 
landowners’ participation, but 
they were strictly fixed applying 
the general legal rules and also 
the result of bids offered during 
the public contest
Spatial level at  
which case is tackled
Local (municipality) Local (municipality) Local (municipality)
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
City council of Almería 
established the policy and 
the rules and it controls its 
enforcement. Developers 
and building owners are the 
economic actors by means of 
free agreements amongst them.
146 TDRs achieved
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 170 property 
owners contributed in different 
ways to the development. 
Professional developers 
managed and financed the 
process 
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 300 property 
owners contributed in different 
ways to the development. 
Professional developers 
managed and financed the 
process
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
Building owners and developers 
not interested in restoration 
battled with the municipality 
in exchange for development 
rights that could be allocated in 
other areas. Historic buildings 
were transferred to the 
municipality which restores and 
reuses them as public facilities
Public targets performed by the 
private sector. The city gains a 
new neighborhood in a former 
industrial area in an obsolete 
position as it also obtains 
many properties and major 
infrastructures. No cost to the 
public sector. Profitable results 
for the numerous private actors 
affected 
Development rights equally 
redistributed among landowners 
proportionally to their respective 
original area. Participation of 
external properties assigned 
for public uses in order to 
compensate the greater 
development possibilities in 
the area 
Parties which 
financed the case
Properties are contributed by 
the private sector. Public sector 
finances the restoration works 
Private developers. Landowners 
contribute with properties 
Developers and landowners
Possibility for 
public participation
Each one of the deals, which 
performs a TDR, is subject to a 
period of public participation to 
allow possible representations 
and suggestions of third private 
parties
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land-
use plan
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land-
use plan. The experience proved 
that public contest stimulates 
public participation 
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Table 5.3 Summarizing the Spanish cases
Conservation (Almería General 
Plan)
Conversion (Francia Avenue 
Program (Valencia))
Re-allocation (land readjustment 
Orriols (Valencia))
Period in 
which case was 
introduced
1984-1988. Our case study 
finished in 1988 but the 
experience that started in 1984 
lasted several more years
First public decision (official 
announcement of a public 
contest) in 1991
Public works of urbanization 
finished in 1986
Building process finished in 
2006
The bases were established in 
the General Plan of Valencia in 
1988
Orriols operation started in 1995 
(public contest) and finished in 
2001 (completion of the public 
facilities and land readjustment)
General objective 
of proposed 
instrument
General objective was to boost 
the restoration of historic 
buildings in derelict condition 
and to reuse them as public 
equipment to assist the cultural 
and social needs of the city 
center of Almería
Redevelopment of a very large 
industrial area between the 
city center of Valencia and its 
seafront
Development of a new 
neighborhood in green land
Land readjustment among 
300 properties connected with 
12 other land readjustments 
around different parts of the city
Characteristic 
factors
All the techniques involved 
were applied on a free-will basis 
between private and public 
actors
Relevant public infrastructure 
works developed or afforded by 
the private sector
Global impact in the life of a 
major city
Pioneer experience of public 
contest to choose a developer 
in charge of an area that 
exceeds its own property
The case combines the 
techniques of land readjustment 
with TDRs, and public contest to 
select the developer in charge. 
The number of landowners 
affected was unusually large 
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined 
the instrument
Public reaction against a 
previous historic process of 
development which neglected 
the preservation of heritage
Financial difficulties for the 
public sector
Financial requirements that 
exceed the possibilities of the 
public budget
Large number of landowners 
affected (170) with passive 
attitudes and the need to find 
leading actors to promote the 
private involvement in the 
public targets
Typical development in the 
Valencia Region during the mid-
1990s. The premise was that all 
the landowners of green land 
affected by development around 
the city had to have equal 
development rights gauged in 
terms of financial value 
Fit within planning 
and legal system: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Regulatory framework 
established by ordinance 
contained in the General Plan 
(master planning instrument) 
of the municipality. Special 
physical provisions drafted in 
the planning
Private project selected in 
public contest inside the 
guidelines prior established 
in the General (Master) Plan 
drafted by the municipality 
Spatial planning of 1988 
established all the relevant 
physical and social parameters 
which rule the development
Conservation (Almería General 
Plan)
Conversion (Francia Avenue 
Program (Valencia))
Re-allocation (land readjustment 
Orriols (Valencia))
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
Only at the local level No, only at the regulatory local 
level. Procedure legally foreseen 
but never before applied. 
Relevant practical discovery 
(possibility of a third actor 
between landownership and 
public administrations). The 
experience inspired major legal 
changes at the regional and 
national levels
No, only the details of the 
land use regulation were 
drawn up for the case, but 
it was based on parameters 
previously established. It was 
also necessary to establish the 
economic details related to 
landowners’ participation, but 
they were strictly fixed applying 
the general legal rules and also 
the result of bids offered during 
the public contest
Spatial level at  
which case is tackled
Local (municipality) Local (municipality) Local (municipality)
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
City council of Almería 
established the policy and 
the rules and it controls its 
enforcement. Developers 
and building owners are the 
economic actors by means of 
free agreements amongst them.
146 TDRs achieved
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 170 property 
owners contributed in different 
ways to the development. 
Professional developers 
managed and financed the 
process 
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 300 property 
owners contributed in different 
ways to the development. 
Professional developers 
managed and financed the 
process
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
Building owners and developers 
not interested in restoration 
battled with the municipality 
in exchange for development 
rights that could be allocated in 
other areas. Historic buildings 
were transferred to the 
municipality which restores and 
reuses them as public facilities
Public targets performed by the 
private sector. The city gains a 
new neighborhood in a former 
industrial area in an obsolete 
position as it also obtains 
many properties and major 
infrastructures. No cost to the 
public sector. Profitable results 
for the numerous private actors 
affected 
Development rights equally 
redistributed among landowners 
proportionally to their respective 
original area. Participation of 
external properties assigned 
for public uses in order to 
compensate the greater 
development possibilities in 
the area 
Parties which 
financed the case
Properties are contributed by 
the private sector. Public sector 
finances the restoration works 
Private developers. Landowners 
contribute with properties 
Developers and landowners
Possibility for 
public participation
Each one of the deals, which 
performs a TDR, is subject to a 
period of public participation to 
allow possible representations 
and suggestions of third private 
parties
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land-
use plan
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land-
use plan. The experience proved 
that public contest stimulates 
public participation 
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Italy: experiments with 6 
non-financial compen-
sation instruments to 
preserve, conserve and 
re-allocate buildings
Giancarlo Leoni
Introduction6.1 
It is important to make some preliminary remarks about the Italian national 
framework before looking at specific cases,. In Italy, townplanning regulations 
are delegated to regions which, according to the principles stated in the na-
tional directive, have the opportunity to define in detail the rules concern-
ing territorial organization. Over the last fifteen years this prerogative has 
spawned many regional laws, some of which have provided innovative results 
in the area of Transferable Development Rights (TDRs). Each region was free 
to follow its distinctive philosophy, and this has resulted in a multitude of 
different approaches. Italian townplanning legislation has therefore become 
one of the most complex of its kind in the whole of Europe, caused by numer-
ous management issues. Nevertheless, many of these different experiences 
have contributed to the delineation of better procedures in the management 
of urban developments. The fundamental rules for the governing of the re-
gions, provinces and municipalities, are identified in a 1990 law31 and in the 
constitution (see Table 6.1).
Planning framework6.2 
The new national regulations have identified the province as the intermedi-
ate body (between the municipality and the region) for spatial planning. The 
Territory Coordination Provincial Plan (TCPP) is the master plan, on which ter-
ritorial and environmental policies with a supra-municipal vision are based. 
31  Law no. 142, June 8, 1990, Regulation of Local Autonomies, with respect to articles 117 and 118 of the Con-
stitution.
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Many regions transferred urban planning competence to the provinces32 in 
line with the national directive, although most planning is executed at the 
municipal level. At this level of scale major changes and challenges can be 
distinguished over the years, like the introduction of new comprehensive plan 
figures (for example the IIP – Intervention Integrated Plan). Challenges include 
the problem of organizing instruments to mediate between public and private 
interests. In some cases, the conflicts create stalls due to legal disputes, or 
due to scarce public financial resources. In many other cases, corruption or 
lack of clarity in planning choices has led to the mediation of interests with 
satisfactory results for private development, but with few benefits for public 
interests. In cases with more positive outcomes, such negotiations were only 
partially governed by the available urban instruments (executive plans and 
contracts – see the conservation case further on). Nevertheless, most nego-
32   Based on the above-mentioned regulation, the TCPP is intended to:
coordinate the identification of general objectives relating to the shaping and the protection of the  ■
landscape and the environment of the provincial territory;
determine the resultant policies, measures, and actions falling under provincial competence; ■
define the strategic direction for territorial shaping at the supra-municipal level, as well as the direc- ■
tion for infrastructure, landscape preservation and environmental protection, water, hydro-geological 
and hydraulic-forestry framework; and, upon agreement with the competent authorities (regional and 
basin authorities), public services; and
promote and provide added value to local proposals. ■
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Table 6.1 Planning instruments
Territorial level Institutional role Instruments
State/National 
(Federal)
Production of general laws
(main criteria, references and standards) and 
National Law of Local Administration Reform 
(planning capacities of public authorities)
National Infrastructure Plan -
National Law of Cultural and Historical Heritages  -
and Landscape Estates
Region Production of territorial governance laws 
and definition of more detailed criteria and 
standards 
Regional Infrastructure and Transport Plan -
Regional Industrial, Services and Supra-Local  -
Settlement Programs
Regional Territorial Plans -
Regional Landscape Plan -
Regional Park Territorial Plan Sector Plans -
Province Control of coherence between the municipal 
plan and provincial plan
Provincial Territorial Plan -
Sector Plans (Quarries, Energy, Transport and  -
Traffic)
Municipality Urban plan management -
Executive plans -
Negotiation -
Local Land Use Plan (former General Town Plan  -
(GTP)), now in Lombardy Territorial Government 
Plan
Town Traffic Plan -
Executive Plans: for example the IIP (Intervention  -
Integrated Plan)
Municipality
Province, Region
Institutional negotiation based on general 
laws 
Negotiated Agreement Instruments (Program 
Agreement/Territorial Development Framework 
Agreement)
Private investors Public-private negotiations Executive private plan proposals
tiation experiences conducted by public administrators have created the Con-
tracted Townplanning movement, emphasizing the role of the urban project 
rather than the planning of the project. Since the 1990s, these negotiations, 
which included vast sectors of private representatives together with public 
administrators, resulted in the development of public-private planning strate-
gies in IIPs, guaranteeing clarity and public control.
Another challenge that municipalities have met in the management of cit-
ies has been the reduction of expropriation powers since the 1980s. Further-
more, some judgments by the Constitutional Court have introduced the man-
datory principle that public institutions acknowledge land value at its fair 
market value rather than at the agricultural price, thus significantly increas-
ing expropriation costs. The Constitutional Court has, in this way, acknowl-
edged the possibility of collecting the differential value that the development 
of a town and its collective infrastructures on agricultural land would create 
for private parties. As a result, municipalities are financially unable to plan 
the acquisition of vast areas to be earmarked for public activities.
This has forced municipalities to choose between the following actions:
acquisition of the areas by utilizing their own funds, if available (improb- ■
able due to the policy of reducing the Italian public financial deficit);
renewal of the restriction of certain uses through a variation of the General  ■
Town Plan (GTP) for an additional period of five years;
renegotiation of the earmarked uses, and the consequent change of the  ■
GTP through an agreement with the private sector.
Since the 1980s, much discussion has centered on creating new instruments 
to allow municipalities without financial resources to acquire public areas 
and to compensate private individuals with permission to develop in other 
areas. This has motivated the creation of instruments and managerial prac-
tices based on bargaining between public and private interests. These experi-
ments with innovative townplanning instruments, led to the introduction of 
new modalities by the regions for the management of public-private conflict. 
These regulations included most notably equalization instruments that en-
abled public goals to be achieved, and improved transparency and citizen in-
volvement.
The Intervention Integrated Plan (IIP)6.3 
The IIP, mentioned in Section 6.2, a device for implementing public decisions, 
and not just to execute them, has some distinctive features. According to the 
General Arrangement Document (which serves as a framework for IIP), private 
parties may propose a project to the administration. Negotiations then fol-
low concerning the organizational scheme and the characteristics of the proj-
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ect; after an agreement between the two sides has been reached, the Town 
Council has the last word in ratifying the decision. At the same time, possible 
modifications of the IIP project may be proposed, such as the inclusion of ad-
ditional partners, the need for public and private funds, or the requalification 
of areas assigned to public services.
The General Framework Document approved by the municipality (prelimi-
nary to the IIPs) requires the combination of the separate intervention pro-
grams solicited by the private sectors in order to obtain an overall view. This 
view is important for public administrators in formulating proper objectives 
and in the selection of the intervention proposals. For private parties it influ-
ences the presentation of their intervention proposals, as these should be co-
herent with the public administration strategies and the municipal Territorial 
Government Plan.
The municipalities within the potential sphere of the planning document 
promote the organization of the IIP in order to re-structure townplanning and 
the developmental and environmental needs within the boundaries – down-
town and peripheral areas – including the redevelopment of former industrial 
areas (see the conversion case in section 6.4).33 It is characterized by the pres-
ence of at least two of the following elements:
the forecasting of multiple destinations and functions, including those in- ■
herent to the infrastructure of public interest, and the environmental, nat-
ural and landscaping renovation;
a mix of public and private actions and integrated intervention modalities,  ■
including reference to the realization and development of primary and sec-
ondary urbanization projects; and
territorial relevance as applied to the reorganization of urban problems. ■
The IIP is to be implemented in areas that may not be contiguous and may 
be either wholly or partially developed, or earmarked for new development, 
including those that are locked or related by lapsed expropriating ties. When 
the IIP is implemented the parties involved enter into a contract with the mu-
nicipality which provides for the reciprocal rights and obligations of the vari-
ous public and private parties, as well as the timing (in any case not over ten 
years) for the completion of the interventions proposed in the IIP. Within the 
same contract, or within a separate specific deed, the types of management of 
public equipment are established as well as those of public or general inter-
est realized and managed by private subjects. Provisions are included regard-
ing the following: obligations for the manager, appropriate sanctions, transfer 
methods to third parties, conditions for the possible acquisition of goods by 
the municipality, and the proper guarantee forms in favor of the municipal-
33  Article no. 87 Lombardy Region Law no. 12 2005.
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ity. This last provision is innovative because it enables a private subject the 
possibility to be assigned the management, for a given number of years, of 
some public service that is realized in the IIP, such as public gardens or sport 
facilities. This reduces the town’s management costs. In any case, the public 
is guaranteed access to the services and control over the tariff system. Public 
interests, in terms of minimum public standards, are provided for by the Mu-
nicipal Town Plan and the many compensations are defined with the various 
owners.
Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 examine some significant cases of the application 
of these new and innovative Italian townplanning instruments oriented on 
non-financial compensation.
Conservation: the case of Schio (Veneto)6.4 
Objectives6.4.1 
The conservation of green areas and facilities of public interest such as urban 
parks and district gardens, including broader ex-urban areas, has been adopt-
ed since the second half of the 1980s. Although the planning statute of 1942 
provides the basis for a Municipal General Town Plan (MGTP)34, the develop-
ment of innovative planning tools which include non-financial compensation 
without government takings was not commonplace before the 1980s.
The Schio municipality in the Venetian Region, provides a pertinent exam-
ple of the above35. It extended the traditional Executive Plan by earmarking 
areas for services and increasing densities. A uniform development potential 
was awarded across the targeted area to get the same property values per 
plot. The plots earmarked for public use were transferred to the municipality 
at agricultural land value, and development took place in the private areas. 
With an non-financial compensation mechanism, the public administration 
obtained the proposed urbanization of the zone.36
34  National Townplanning Law (no. 1150) of 1942.
35  In the 1980 Schio case, the areas earmarked for public services are equal to 1/3 of the entire compart-
ment of transformation. In the first year, 2003, the areas earmarked for public services were equal to l50% 
(up to 75% if falling within the landscaping tie) of the equalization. The landowners were not previously 
consulted regarding the consequential large-scale operative uncertainties (Piazza & Lucato, 2005). 
36  During the first experiences of Schio, in the 1980s, public areas were acquired according to 33 m2/inhabit-
ant, whereas the GTP increased the percentage by up to 50%, and for the areas with landscape ties it was 
75%.
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Case circumstances6.4.2 
The Executive Plan (both for residential development and for manufacturing 
activities) provides the municipalities with the option to negotiate a series 
of private sector duties. This includes duties of payment and supplying pri-
mary and secondary infrastructure. Such an agreement is formalized through 
a contract that may include the transfer of development rights. This transfer 
takes place within the same parcel and sometimes in other areas.37
In general, the contract38 is subject to obtaining building permits and must 
provide for the release of development rights within pre-established time 
constraints. It must also provide for the areas necessary for essential urban-
ization projects and areas with public facilities and of public or general inter-
est – as provided for by the government plan for the territory.
If the acquisition of such areas is not possible or is considered not applica-
ble by the municipality due to their size, layout or location, or relation to the 
municipal intervention programs, then the contract can alternatively provide 
either a total or a partial release of development rights. Upon drafting, the 
parties subject to the contract must pay the municipality an amount equal 
to the economic value of the released development rights, which cannot be 
lower than the value of other comparable areas. The revenue from the release 
of development rights must be used for the realization of services provided in 
the plan. These services include the acquisition of other areas earmarked for 
public use. As an alternative to payment, private parties were able to use this 
opportunity to exchange green or agricultural areas in the town’s other zones.
The contract must also provide compensation to the owners of primary 
and secondary urbanization projects necessary to connect the area to public 
services. These provisions must be exactly defined; where realization of the 
works entails lesser onuses than those distinctly provided by the primary and 
secondary urbanizations, then the difference must be paid back to the private 
37  The first model is the classic one, referring to the institute of the compartment in terms of article 23 of 
urban law. It is limited to particular zones in which the right, being the object distributed amongst the own-
ers, coincides with the building attributed by the plan; the criterion of the partial or subsequent equaliza-
tion, is part of the model being examined. In this case the rights matured within the compartment cannot 
be externally transferred. A variant of this model states that providing for the building attributed also to 
areas external to the compartment (even if not contiguous) which can contribute to the transformation of 
the said model itself. In this case, the conventional building attributed to the external areas for which con-
servation is called for, is shifted inside the compartment, leading to an added building capacity, while the 
equalization of the onuses is subdivided among all the areas external or internal thereto; this is the case of 
the General Townplanning scheme of Reggio Emilia to which the famous sentence no. 22/9833 of the Re-
gional Administrative Court of Law refers.
38  Urban Law no. 12 2005 Lombardy Region, Article 46 (Convention on Actuation Plans).
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contributors;39 completion dates by private developers can vary and can ex-
tend to a maximum period of ten years. As such, in many cases the possibility 
to negotiate within the contract exists, so that a private investor might con-
tribute to the costs of a park or a public garden or sports facility for public use, 
including the maintenance or management costs for the years preceding de-
livery to the municipality. In the past, this approach was motivated by mutual 
interests – the private developer increased the desirability of the property due 
to the public infrastructure, and the municipality provided a public service 
without any maintenance and management costs for at least ten years.
Compartment number 36.4.3 
The case of Compartment number 3, Cappuccini, in the Schio municipality 
(see Figures 6.1 and 6.2) provides an example of ‘volume equalization’, where-
by urban zoning made it possible to pursue the objective of distributive jus-
tice towards the owners of non-contiguous parcels of different urban zoning 
classifications. The Executive Plan (Piano Particolareggiato) was used to trans-
form a portion of the area classified as suitable for development into a zone 
earmarked for public use (see Table 6.2).
This has led the owners of areas which were previously suitable for devel-
opment and are now earmarked for public use by the Executive Plan, to claim 
the previous development rights. The owners stated that before the actuating 
plan, the GTP allowed them to build on an area with a higher landscape value 
than that attributed in the new plan. The municipality consequently proposed 
the possibility of transferring the development rights to other non-contiguous 
areas scattered over the territory to private developers.
The owners of Comparto 3 have realized only the primary urbanization in-
frastructures (such as roads, energy net) that are strictly functional for the 
intervention area and whose cost, €66,500.00, has been deducted from the 
primary urbanization obligation. All the surfaces with standard green areas 
(green and parking) have been deducted from the secondary urbanization ob-
39  Instead of the direct realization of the works, the municipality has the possibility of requesting the pay-
ment of an amount equal to the effective costs of the urbanization works inherent to the actuating plan, in-
cluding to the entity and to the characteristics of the settlement and not lower than the obligations as pro-
vided for by the municipal relative resolution. Regional law also provides that the convention could contain 
other agreements between the contracting parties according to the criteria approved by the municipalities 
for the realization of the interventions.
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Table 6.2 Transfer of development rights to other non-contiguous areas
Size Comments
Total sq m of urban executive plan 
(C2+F)
13,248 m2 On this land it is possible to build 13,248 m3, but part of this area 
must be ceded to the municipality
C2 Zone: urban plan category for 
development
9,416 m2
F Zone: urban plan category for public 
infrastructure and activity
3,832 m2 The potential development building volume of this area is 
transferred to a C2 area and private space (F) is ceded to the 
municipality for green (3,265) and public services (e.g. parking 567)
ligations at a cost of €7.50 per m2. In liquidating the compensation operation 
of the urbanization costs and the value of areas for primary and secondary 
standards, the linear obligations of primary and secondary urbanization have 
been essentially equivalent. Due to this practice, the town administration 
managed to grant the district a larger green zone, thus pushing it to a higher 
level of qualification, without resorting to expensive expropriations.
The same operative philosophy has also made it possible to fulfill the ob-
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Figure 6.1 Schio, Cappuccini area in recent General Town Plan after executive plan
jective of preserving intact the social, townplanning and architectural fea-
tures distinctive of many Italian historical urban sites. In many instances, in 
fact, restoration of the historical hearts of Italian cities has been executed 
according to the principle of a constant dialogue between public administra-
tors and private owners. This has often resulted in a peaceful and agreed ap-
propriation not only of green areas, but also of portions of residential sites 
owned by private citizens.
Conversion: the case of Cremona 6.5 
(Lombardy)
Objectives6.5.1 
In the town of Cremona40 (71,000 inhabitants), a large, abandoned industri-
al area was re-zoned. The area, Park Ex Feltrinelli, consisted of warehouses 
and deposits of reinforced concrete (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). The Interven-
tion Integrated Plan (IIP) Park Ex Feltrinelli intended to create a new part of 
town by promoting a so-called new ‘urban door’. The first objective was to 
re-organize the existing viable areas by paying particular attention to envi-
ronmental issues. The second objective was to promote more and better ser-
vices by reconfiguring the urban plan, paying particular attention to a higher 
residential quality (Lombardy Region, 2005a). The area owned by the private 
applicant occupies 202,000m2, for the most part corresponding to the area 
occupied by the unused industrial complex. The remaining part of the IIP in-
tervention includes approximately 80,000m2 of roads owned by the Cremona 
municipality.
The Cremona conversion process6.5.2 
The Cremona case shows that the IIP gives the public entity authority41 to of-
fer flexible solutions, resulting in the awarding of public services and private 
development rights. This legislation is used, in diverse ways, in many regions 
(Lombardy Region, 2005b). In the Cremona case vacant industrial buildings 
will be demolished. Subsequently a multifunctional settlement will be devel-
oped which includes a business center integrated with recreational facilities, 
three residential complexes, an arts and crafts facility, a public building for 
collective services and sports activities, a school complex earmarked for high-
40  Territory Management Department of the Cremona municipality.
41  More precisely, the IIP is the executive plan based on authorities that are attributed in various regional 
and municipal regulations.
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er education, a public square, green areas with public areas and underground 
parking facilities.
The ability of the new compartment to communicate with the center and 
nearby suburban areas was a major goal of the project. The major structural 
elements that were a concern were the traffic directives, in particular Paullese 
Road and Via Sesto that surround the project area. Residences and a school 
complex would be situated along the Via Sesto, separated from the road by 
a green belt with three rows of trees (within which there would be cycle and 
pedestrian pathways) and a future parking area. The receiving and dispatch-
ing areas of the commercial center and craft pavilions would be along the SS 
415 and the urban bypass. These areas would also be protected against the 
negative traffic effects through mitigating green areas (a tree-lined belt ap-
proximately 20 meters wide along Paullese Road). The area earmarked for a 
municipal-wide urban park (approximately 20,000m2) would be located be-
tween the southeast side of the commercial center and the urban bypass. The 
park is flanked by pathways for cycles and pedestrians. Over a total territory 
of 283,440m2, the private owner owns 202,000m2 of this surface; after imple-
mentation of the project, however, a portion amounting to 106,972m2 (92,862 
+ 14,110) would be given to the municipality.
The buildings are placed in some of the sections of the area, and their in-
ternal space will be employed for public uses. The private developer would 
build 21,520m2 of Gross Floor Area (GFA) for residential use, 31,500m2 of GFA 
for commercial uses, 6,000m2 of GFA for manufacturing activities and 4,000m2 
meters of GFA for sporting activities.
The goals already attained by the project are the following:
The developer has benefited from a slight increase in the volume of the  ■
building area due to the movement of development rights from the areas 
now owned by the municipality to new, privately-owned areas.
The administration has acquired spaces and infrastructure suitable for  ■
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public uses, paid and realized by private subjects following a process of ne-
gotiation which has received wide resonance and public visibility.
The city and the citizens now benefit from newly-created green areas and  ■
from services that have significantly improved the quality of life.
Thus, the IIP of Cremona provides a promising example of a conversion-case 
that includes some examples of non-financial compensation whereby build-
ing volumes are increased in exchange for land for public uses.
Re-allocation: the case of Rome (Lazio)6.6 
Objectives6.6.1 
The most innovative procedure that has recently been introduced in some 
regions concerns the Urban Development Rights Equalization Principles that 
allow the transfer of building rights. In the previous cases, the issue of trans-
ferring development rights from one subject to another was mainly handled 
through the definition of fragmented executive plans. This approach has 
demonstrated its effectiveness since the 1990s. Lacking clear and definite na-
tional legislation on this matter, many regions have decided to employ this 
strategy and many town administrators have resorted to equalizing proce-
dures.
The case presented here does not concern a single building project but a 
general strategy with which the municipal district of Rome faced the general 
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matter of the transfer of development rights. The same line of conduct has 
also been practiced by other municipalities, sometimes in different ways, and 
this allows us to discuss these matters in a concrete way, with an experimen-
tal basis rather than a merely theoretical one.
A significant case that has recently developed is the General Townplan-
ning Scheme (GTPS), provided by the Townplanning Scheme variant for Rome 
(Rome Municipal Council, 2003) which has actuated (in Plan art.13) the crite-
ria to be used to apply townplanning equalization and the transfer of build-
ing rights. This article states in particular that the executive plans define the 
overall building capability, the destination for use, as well as the ties and the 
characters necessary in forming the actuating instruments. It also allocates 
the building expectations amongst areas and subjects according to equity 
and uniformity principles, taking into account the existing town development 
discipline, the existing building set-up and its legitimacy and the pursuit of 
objectives of public and general interest.
Circumstances6.6.2 
It is interesting to note that the debate and the experimentation of equaliza-
tion has developed even in the absence of a structured normative picture, as 
shown by the intense elaborations in nearby local areas. Experiences can be 
clarified by focusing on the three main approaches and strategies aimed at 
guaranteeing the TDR to acquire public utility areas either at agricultural pric-
es or gratuitously to the municipality. The first strategy enables townplanning 
equalization to become the main instrument in the regulation of the use of 
the grounds by the administration in terms of managing the changes in the 
area, and in urban and agricultural land uses by intervening on the entire mu-
nicipal area. The second enables the equalization instrument to only be ap-
plied to a quota earmarked for townplanning transformation and in the pres-
ence of executive Plans. There is also a third equalizing model which tends 
to attribute a general application mechanism to the equalization, extended 
to only a part of an expanding or transforming area but not to the whole mu-
nicipal territory.
In such a case, conventional building parameters are awarded for cate-
gories that are normally low and uniform, based on the actual state of the 
buildings or the rights. Rights are classified with preventive criteria with re-
spect to choices of the plan and are not correlated to the urban load defined 
by the said plan. The complexity of the volumes acknowledges uniformity for 
all the properties of the same class but does not coincide with the effective 
townplanning included as an objective of the plan. In this case, the equaliz-
ing mechanism allows additional density. Part of this additional right is gra-
tuitously reserved for the municipality, and coincides with the need for other 
public works. The other part remains within the user’s prerogative. According 
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to Stanghellini (2005), the practical variants of the experience also include the 
following aspects:
a choice to include the equalizing ceiling (the building index or the ter- ■
ritorial utilization conceived in an equalizing way) of the building rights 
relative to public residential housing and to other public works that the 
municipality reserves for itself;
a degree of acknowledgement, in the case of ground either fully or par- ■
tially built – the possibility of re-using the existing building capacity (over 
and above that deriving from the equalizing ceiling) and the criteria for its 
quantification;
the adoption of the indexes on the report on building rights, when these  ■
refer to a townplanning destination whose property value is highly differ-
entiated;
the possibility that some properties transfer building rights to non-contig- ■
uous properties, and as such, the provision in favor of the buyers tends to 
favor this transfer.
Under the methodological profile, attribution to the equalizing ceiling grounds, 
and of the consequent building rights, depends on a consolidated application 
procedure from the methodological point of view, at least as far as the main 
passages are concerned:
identification of areas earmarked for townplanning transformation either  ■
the whole territory or only some actuating areas;
analysis and evaluation of the townplanning characteristics (destination  ■
and quality) and legal analysis of the property in order to create an equal-
izing basis upon which to assign the third phase index;
attribution to the classes identified in the relative building index; ■
identification of the actuating and building compartments, inside which  ■
the areas earmarked for services and public structures to be assigned to 
the municipality are measured.
The heart of the matter is that if the equalizing ceiling produces a land value 
higher than that incorporated in the grounds, the property is likely to real-
ize the transformation even if the municipality ‘gratuitously’ gave additional 
value to the private property. If the ceilings are too low, there is the risk that 
the owner’s will not be interested in the townplanning transformation.
In the early 1980s, a few planners, in particular Stefano Pompei (1998), re-
alized that the problem could be approached and solved by means of urban 
planning tools, hence shunting eminent domain procedures. The methodi-
cal Equalization of Urban Development Rights emerged as the most suitable 
tool to attack the problem. The main principle of these rights has been de-
scribed as: “Urban land development rights must be defined regardless of 
zoning uses, yet they must depend on status of fact and law that the land 
[ 133 ]
is in at the moment the master plan is produced”. The equalization’s main 
principle’s first corollary states that “Any development planned in excess of 
the equalized rights extent is reserved for municipal administration to uti-
lize for community improvement and social interest programs”. The second 
corollary states that “The development rights within a Planned Unit can be 
utilized by landowners only according to their transfer to a minor portion of 
such unit (usually 12 to 24%), leaving to municipal domain its major portion” 
(Pompei, 1998). Some of this major portion is handed over without cost ac-
cording to per-inhabitant law standards. The rest is compensated at agrarian 
value now that the urban surplus value has been fully exploited within the 
minor portion.42
A new institutional framework for re-allocation 6.6.3 
processes
Together with some other experiments like in Casalecchio di Reno (Bologna), 
the Rome experiences have resulted in the regions introducing their own 
laws that compensate, equalize and incentivize townplanning instruments 
with strong innovative characters compared to the previous norms. In the 
case of the Lombardy Region (2005b), the municipalities, on the basis of crite-
ria defined in the planning document, the executive plans and the negotiated 
programming deeds with territorial value (for example the IIP), can allocate 
the building rights amongst all the owners of the properties interested in the 
interventions. Furthermore, they can allocate the onuses derived from the al-
location of areas for urbanization works through the attribution of the same 
territorial building index. For the purpose of realizing the overall volume de-
rived from the attributed building index, the above-mentioned programming 
42  Pompei applied this experimentation to the Town Plan of Casalecchio di Reno (Bologna), adopted in 
1989 and approved in 1992, which represents one of the first and best known examples of a town plan actu-
ating the equalization principle. The Town Plan classified the land into four categories: consolidated urban 
territory, marginal urban territory, suburban territory, and open territory. The townplanning equalization is 
applied to the second and third classes, whereas building is not allowed in the other two classes. In the first 
step towards the concrete actuation, the equalizing plan is constituted, after the attribution of the building 
index to the areas object of the townplanning transformation, to the identification of the compartments, 
which consist of two types. The first can be constituted by areas under the same ownership, or made up of 
areas belonging to diverse owners, some of whom are in a position to exploit their building rights. In Ca-
salecchio di Reno, the municipal administration, in order to eliminate the problem concerning actuation of 
the compartments, has reduced to the minimum the number of owners involved in the said compartment 
and it has associated those for whom reaching an agreement was deemed possible at the beginning. In or-
der to set the Land Development Right values, incorporated land is divided according to four main classes. 
The first class is Consolidated Urban Land. It consists of fully-existing or partially-developed subdivisions, 
urban streets, and public open spaces.
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plans and deeds identify the potential buildings, the areas where building ac-
tivity is concentrated, and the areas to be gratuitously ceded to the munici-
pality or to be subjugated for the realization of services and infrastructure, as 
well as townplanning compensations in exchange for areas of public utility.
On the basis of such criteria, rights can be transferred according to the mu-
nicipal Regulation Plan to all the areas of the municipal territory, with the ex-
ception of the areas earmarked for agriculture, those subjected to townplan-
ning transformation or those with an identical territorial building index. This 
is done by designating the ratio with the cubic area of the existing buildings, 
in relation to the various projected intervention types. When availing oneself 
of these transfer rights, the regulated gratuitous transfer to the municipality 
of areas earmarked within the plan itself for the realization of townplanning 
work needs to take place, as set out in the regulation plan. This townplanning 
work includes services and structures of either public or general interest to 
be carried out upon the utilization of the building rights, determined upon 
application of the equalization criteria.
The areas earmarked for the realization of either public or general interest 
that are not controlled by programming plans or deeds can be granted to the 
municipality in exchange for transferable building rights to areas provided by 
the GTP deeds, even if they are not subjected to an actuating plan. As an al-
ternative to such a transfer of building rights, on the basis of the provisions of 
the service plan, the owner could directly realize the interventions of public 
or general interest, via a contract with the municipality for the handling of 
the service. Regional law also establishes that TDRs are freely marketable.
The planning document includes, besides the relevant public benefits add-
ed in respect to those due and related to the fixed objectives, an incentive dis-
cipline of not more than 15% of the cubic area allowed for the interventions 
included in the actuating plans aimed at urban re-qualification. This consists 
of the transfer of differentiated indexes determined by the objectives. An 
analogous incentive plan can also be foreseen for the purpose of promoting 
the green building industry and for energy conservation.
The Italian regional legislation had already granted the authority to mu-
nicipalities to determine the principles governing the matter of equalization 
in their local planning activity, in order to give the issue of transferring de-
velopment rights a general framework and to more effectively handle urban 
growth. The specific case of Rome, moreover, introduces further elements into 
the discussion, elements that we can summarize with a single expression: 
‘marketing of Transferable Development Rights.’
The Rome re-allocation process6.6.4 
First of all, it is necessary to take an in-depth look at how the General Frame-
work of the Plan of the district of Rome handles the concept of distributing 
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TDRs in areas that have yet to be realized and in those already existing ar-
eas of the city linked to them. In the latter case the owners, after approval of 
the executive townplanning instrument, cede, either to the municipality, or to 
third parties identified by that municipality, the land surface corresponding to 
the building expectations reserved for the municipality. In this way the GTPS 
guarantees the allocation (to the owners interested in the executive town-
planning instruments) and the fair distribution of the building expectations, 
independent of the specific destinations assigned to the single areas and pro-
portionally to the quota of the surface owned. Independent of the criteria and 
modalities of attributing the building rights, the GTPS guarantees the alloca-
tion of the onuses to be taken on towards the Administration in proportion to 
the building expectations assigned.
In the areas earmarked for the expansion, the building expectations can be 
transferred between the areas belonging to homogeneous territorial contests, 
without constituting a variant of the GTPS. This is on condition that the inter-
ested urban areas are the object of only one actuating instrument, in the form 
of an integrated Program aimed at better insertion or overall coordination of 
the interventions in the settling, infrastructural and environmental systems.
These regulations also allow private investors to move the building rights 
that were originally linked to those areas (that have been later acquired by 
the municipality for services of public utility and works of urbanization) in-
to new areas. Furthermore, the possibility to transfer development rights to 
other areas stated inside the plan stimulates the birth and growth of a new 
market for TDRs, fueled by the offer of surplus development rights owned by 
subjects that either do not intend to or are not able to exploit them on-site, 
and the parallel demand of them from subjects who are willing to expand the 
volume of their activities beyond the share originally assigned by the Plan.
These opportunities have not only been controlled by the city in expansion 
but also by the consolidated city and in the city to be reused and the city to be 
restructured, where the building expectations can be transferred to different 
areas falling within the same area for integrated programs. In the case of de-
molition and reconstruction, the building expectations can also be transferred 
from other areas of the consolidated city to planned areas, as well as from 
public service areas to other areas in the city to be restructured or reused.
The transfer of building rights in areas with ecological-environmental is-
sues does not take place directly between landowners but between landown-
ers and the City of Rome. An exception states that the landowners in areas 
within wider extra-urban areas which include an area of ecological-environ-
mental value in conflict with the commercial value derived from the owner-
ship of a building right in the same area, can obtain a volume of equal value 
from the municipality that will be created in the planned area of expansion 
of the city, which could include area that already belongs to the municipality 
or that will be acquired by it in the future.
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Conclusions6.7 
The cases presented are significant in the debate within the European com-
munity regarding the procedures needed to render the documents and deci-
sions regarding the public-private ratio in town transformation management 
more transparent and visible to the citizens.
A second theme of particular interest, strongly tied to the previous one, 
concerns the problem of the owners’ equal treatment in the face of the op-
portunities – ties to the urbanization of the town. Often in fact, the distorted 
use of negotiations between institutions and private citizens creates differ-
ences in treatment and discretionary power that may jeopardize citizens’ ele-
mentary rights. As maintained by Stanghellini (2005), “between the negotiable 
townplanning scheme experiences and equalizing ones, there are some basic 
objectives, or some results, that are common, nevertheless the two method-
ologies are significantly different; not only as far as the municipal role as an 
Administration negotiator is concerned (and, therefore, of discretionary risk), 
but also for the non application of the equality and equal treatment princi-
ple. The equity approach inborn in the equality system of the grounds does 
not refer only to the owners of the grounds, but also to the community in 
its complexity and to the owners of the urban re-qualification”. Consequently, 
the problem of guaranteeing equal treatment to the investment opportunities 
for property owners provides a better stimulus with respect to planning com-
petition and, in the meantime, affirms the principle of competition among in-
vestors.
Finally, the experiences highlighted offer a third theme that has often in-
terested the European townplanning debate: the ratio between the strategic 
planning of general plans and executive-management planning over a short 
period of time (MILU, 2007). As already described above, townplanning instru-
mentation management has always evolved by finding high degrees of flex-
ibility with respect to the GTPS or to the strategic master plan. This approach 
has allowed, on the one hand, a quicker response from the municipalities re-
garding the town changing pressures, and, on the other hand, it has created 
the problem of the loss of the strategic vision of public actions in favor of spo-
radic private pressures. Therefore, the need exists to re-think the role of stra-
tegic plans, or of master plans, in their function as government instruments.
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Table 6.3 Summarizing the Italian cases
Characteristic factors Conservation: Schio Conversion: Cremona Re-allocation: Rome
Period in which case was 
introduced
From 1960 From 1995 2005
General objectives of the 
proposed instrument 
Actuating management on 
the municipal General Town 
Plan (GTP) choice 
Actuating management 
of the modification 
requirements-integration 
of the GTP by the private 
parties
Introduction upon drawing up 
the GTP of the management 
and transfer rules of the 
building rights
Characteristic factors Little urban vision -
Public/private negotiation  -
is very informal
Urban vision is requested -
Public/private negotiation  -
is public
Urban vision is necessary -
Public/private negotiation is  -
planned and organised
Particular economic and 
social circumstances 
that have determined the 
instrument
Need for public control of 
the expansion of large urban 
areas 
Creating flexibility of the 
public instrument to face the 
requirements of the private 
landowners
Lack of public resources to 
expropriate and equity of 
treatment of owners in a 
preventive way and not in 
retrospect
Fit within planning and legal 
system: which relation with 
spatial plans?
This instrument is used in 
a few parts of the municipal 
General Regulation Plan
This instrument is used with 
a strategic vision document 
related to municipal General 
Regulation Plan
The instrument is an 
important part of the new 
municipal GRP
Were specific laws and 
regulations drawn up?
General national and 
regional legislation
Specific national and 
regional legislation
Regional legislation
Spatial level at which case 
is tackled
Only in the areas for the 
actuating plans
In new areas not provided 
for by the actuating plans
Both in the actuating plan 
and all over the municipality 
territory 
Relevant public actor(s) 
and role
Municipality Municipality Municipality
Balance between private and 
public exchange
More public interest than 
private 
Good balance Equalization between private 
interests
Parties which financed the 
case
Private Private and public Private
Possibility for public 
participation
Low Medium High
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U.S.: some best 7 
practices of Transferable 
Development Rights
Bianca Putters
Introduction: national framework7.1 
Although planning and land use regulation in the U.S. are for the most part 
accomplished at the municipal level of government, municipalities have ob-
tained power that has been passed down through a series of government lev-
els beginning at the very top with the Federal Constitution (Constitution). The 
Constitution delineates the powers of the federal government, referred to as 
‘enumerated powers,’ because if the power is not specifically included in the 
Constitution, the federal government does not possess it. The power to en-
act land use and planning laws is not listed as one of the federal government 
powers, but it falls within the auspices of the Constitution’s Tenth Amend-
ment which grants to the individual states all powers not specifically grant-
ed to the federal government. These powers passed down to the states are 
referred to broadly as the ‘police powers’ and grant to the states the power 
to pass laws for the “health, safety, morals or general welfare” of their citi-
zens. Land use and planning laws belong precisely to this category of laws. 
The fifty states in turn pass these powers down to lower levels of government, 
namely the counties, cities, townships, villages and such within their bor-
ders, through an enabling act which enables or allows this transfer of power. 
The ASU Department of Commerce drafted a standard zoning enabling act in 
the 1920s which provided a model for most states. Alternatively, cities can be 
granted home-rule authority through the individual states’ constitutions. This 
authority is generally broader and allows cities to adopt laws governing land 
use and other affairs.43
This being said, laws passed by federal and state legislatures are interpret-
ed by the courts. Among the powers allocated to the federal courts are the re-
sponsibility to interpret federal laws and the Federal Constitution (Jacobstein, 
Mersky & Dunn, 1998). The highest level federal court is the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and its decisions are binding on all jurisdictions across the country 
when the decision involves questions of federal law or the interpretation of 
the Federal Constitution.
In 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Euclid v. Amber Realty44 
and ruled that zoning was constitutional. Zoning is a land use device which 
superimposes a grid on land, dividing the different zones into categories, gen-
43  City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 640 So.2d 237, 242 (La. 
1994). If the state constitution does not include any provisions regarding the transfer of municipal author-
ity, “local governments have no independent power of initiation or immunity; they possess only those pow-
ers granted them by the state legislature”. This is known as Dillon’s rule. 
44  Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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erally including types of use, area requirements, and height allowances. After 
Euclid was decided, zoning, the most common form of land use regulation in 
the U.S., was referred to as ‘Euclidean’ zoning. In addition, cities throughout 
the country then began to pass zoning laws – dividing cities into areas sepa-
rating commercial and industrial property from residential, and further sepa-
rating single family residences from denser residential building types such as 
apartment buildings. Zoning has been widely upheld by the courts; it is con-
sidered constitutional within the very broad parameters of the states’ Tenth 
Amendment police powers. However, zoning is subject to the Federal Consti-
tution’s fairness (due process) requirements which are categorized into proce-
dural due process and substantive due process.
In order to avoid offending both state and federal constitutional provi-
sions such as the due process, or fairness requirements, methods exist to 
provide some flexibility to zoning laws. These tools include exceptions and 
special exceptions or variances to zoning ordinances, amendments to zoning 
ordinances, provisions for non-conforming uses and conditional use permits. 
Each of these provides some measure of accommodation to the landowner 
who would suffer disproportionately under local zoning laws. The exceptions 
and special exceptions are uses that are expressly listed in zoning ordinances, 
and therefore are different from variances which are not expressly permitted 
uses.
The second most widely used form of land use regulation in the U.S. is 
the comprehensive plan, also known as a master plan or general plan. The 
comprehensive plan sets forth, in broader terms than the zoning ordinance, 
the policy that a city has adopted regarding the future use of land within its 
boundaries. It is therefore not as specific and detailed as zoning. The Housing 
Act of 1954 required local governments to enact comprehensive plans in order 
to qualify for federal grant monies. States began to require their cities to pre-
pare comprehensive plans, and in later years the courts decided that cities’ 
zoning laws should conform to the policies set forth in those comprehensive 
plans.
Transferable Development Rights7.2 
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) are one of several creative land use 
planning devices which assist in resolving inequities resulting from land use 
regulations45 and which also function to protect the environment. Basically, 
in American property law, the theory holds that ownership of land entitles 
45  Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 865 (Cal. 1998).
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the owner to a certain ‘bundle of rights.’ 46 Among these rights are the right 
to possess the land, the right to exclude others, and the right to develop the 
property. Under the TDR model, one of these rights, the right to develop, is 
severed from the property in question, referred to as the sending or donor 
property, and transferred to another property, referred to as the receiving or 
donee property. More broadly, the sending property is said to be located in a 
sending area and the receiving property is said to be located in a receiving 
area. The result is that the sending property is restricted from developing to 
the same extent as surrounding properties, and the owner of the property in 
the sending area gets compensated monetarily for this restriction while the 
owner of the property in the receiving area pays for permission for addition-
al development beyond that which he would otherwise have been permitted. 
Both of the owners benefit, society benefits, and private rather than public 
funds are used to compensate the owner of the restricted property.
One of the first examples of the use of TDRs in the U.S. took place in New 
York City. New York City’s zoning laws include TDR provisions to minimize 
the impact of the Landmark Preservation Laws on individual landowners. In 
Penn Central v. New York City47 the U.S. Supreme Court decided issues revolving 
around a key provision of the U.S. Constitution within the Fifth Amendment, 
the Takings Clause.
The Takings Clause prohibits the government from taking “private prop-
erty” for “public use” without “just compensation.”48 This provision was part 
of one of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, known as the Bill of 
Rights, ratified in 1791, and included in order to protect Americans from abus-
es when governments simply appropriated property, leaving citizens with no 
recourse under the law (Mandelker, 2004). Bodies of law have developed over 
time which define the terms ‘property,’ ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation.’ 
In this chapter, we focus on the effects that TDRs have had on the require-
ment for ‘just compensation.’
In general, when the government takes a landowner’s property, under the 
doctrine of eminent domain (Kanter, 2006), the landowner should receive the 
fair market value for the taking. However, government regulations were even-
tually seen as capable of being classified as ‘takings’, and a body of law known 
as ‘regulatory takings’ developed. As such, when a landowner was prevented 
from doing something with his land due to the restrictions of a particular reg-
ulation, the courts began to rule that this could be the equivalent of a physical 
taking, and the landowner might be entitled to “just (or fair) compensation.”
46  Estate of Gibbs v. U.S., 161 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
47  Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. City of New York, et al., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
48  U.S. Constitution, amendment V.
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Takings law, and more specifically, eminent domain, is often the subject of 
heated debates among landowners and municipalities and can be illustrat-
ed by the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kelo v. City of New London.49 Here 
the Court determined that the City of New London, Connecticut, could use its 
powers of eminent domain to take property for private development in order 
to strengthen the tax base of the city. This power of eminent domain in which 
the government can take private property for public use had previously been 
restricted to situations where blight or extreme degradation existed. The deci-
sion sent waves of outrage throughout the states, mobilizing groups to enact 
anti-Kelo legislation.
In Penn Central, the owners of New York’s Grand Central Terminal applied 
for permission to build a fifty-five story tower atop the eight-story train ter-
minal in order to increase revenue. The terminal, located in the prime com-
mercial area of midtown Manhattan, had been designated a landmark under 
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law. The city denied the application 
arguing that the proposed plans would dramatically alter the historic appear-
ance of the beautiful 1916 Beaux Arts terminal. As a result, the owners of the 
terminal sued the city, alleging that the city was taking their property in vio-
lation of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. The case made its way through 
the hierarchy of New York’s courts before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court 
which decided that the New York Landmarks Preservation Law was constitu-
tional and the owners of the terminal had not experienced a taking requiring 
compensation.
Of relevance to the decision were the determinations that the law did not 
interfere with the Terminal’s present uses, that the owners of the Terminal 
were able to obtain a reasonable return on their investments, and that the 
pre-existing air rights were transferable and valuable.
The New York City TDR provisions originally provided that owners of real 
property could transfer development rights to parcels they owned which were 
contiguous to (bordering) their parcels and on the same block. Later, the TDR 
provisions were expanded to include the transfer to parcels under the same 
ownership and across a street or intersection. Still later, the provisions were 
further expanded (apparently to assist the owners of the Grand Central Ter-
minal) to include transfers to parcels adjacent to parcels which were across 
a street or intersection provided that all parcels were under the same owner-
ship. A further expansion allowed all development rights to be transferred to 
the same parcel.50 This proves to be an example of how TDR provisions can 
change over time to accommodate the requirements of the jurisdiction to 
which they apply.
49  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
50  Penn Central Transportation Co., et al. v. City of New York, et al., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Recently, religious institutions have used TDRs to supplement their funds 
in order to expand their services and fulfill their religious missions. These in-
stitutions are selling the air rights above the churches to owners of properties 
eligible to receive additional density, and in this manner, they are receiving 
needed funds, and communities are benefiting from the preservation of these 
magnificent historic structures.
Other similar tools have developed throughout cities in the U.S. that have 
many similarities to TDRs. Examples of these include Transferable Develop-
ment Credits (TDCs),51 Purchase of Development Rights (PDRs) (Feitshans, 
2002), Marketable Credits (Littlewood, 1998), and Residential Development 
Rights (RDRs). Furthermore, credit exchanges for waste reduction (Tripp & 
Dudek, 1989) are the equivalent of TDRs in the context of pollution control 
(Stewart & Wiener, 1992). Differences among these different land use tools in-
clude the level of coerciveness that is mandated, the difficulty in setting up 
the programs, and the expenses required to operate and administer the pro-
grams (Feitshans, 2002).
Several factors have been identified as being determinative of a strong TDR 
program. Among these are marketability, sufficiency of receiving area, ac-
ceptance by the public and efficiency in administration (Tripp & Dudek, 1989; 
Biber, 1999). The three case studies that follow present different examples of 
TDR programs that have assisted cities in resolving issues pertinent to their 
particular locale and citizenry.
Conversion case: the Hudson Yards Project7.3 
Objectives7.3.1 
Over eight million people now live in New York City,52 the most densely popu-
lated city in the U.S. It is projected that in the next 20 years, New York City 
will need 111 million ft2 (10.3 million m2) of office space to accommodate al-
most one half million new workers. Manhattan is one of New York City’s 5 
boroughs. Midtown Manhattan will need to absorb 45 million ft2 (4.18 million 
m2) of this office space, and it currently has the capacity to expand only 20 
million ft2 (1.86 million m2).53 The last area of land that is not developed in 
Manhattan is the Hudson Yards area which is on the western edge of Manhat-
tan bounded approximately north/south by West 43rd and West 30th Streets 
51  To be discussed below under Conservation case.
52  2000 Census: U.S. Census Bureau at www.census.gov/population.
53  New York City Department of Planning: www.nyc.gov/.
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and east/west by Seventh Avenue and the Hudson River.54 The area mainly in-
cludes transportation infrastructure, commercial and industrial uses, parking 
lots, garages, a convention center and residential uses.55 In short, it is not a 
friendly pedestrian area, and instead can be described as having a “gritty in-
dustrial character”56 which lacks public transportation and recreational facili-
ties.
The construction of a deck over the Hudson rail yards will provide land up-
on which to construct the necessary office and residential buildings, conven-
tion facilities, parks and related infrastructure for the coming decades. The 
under-utilized Hudson rail yards area (roughly 360 acres or 144 hectares) will 
be converted into developable land, and this improvement will help to defer 
additional development in outlying suburbs which would contribute to sprawl 
and its negative impacts.
TDRs, together with other financing tools, will make the conversion of this 
last frontier a reality. One of the owners of the property, the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority (MTA),57 will sell some of its air rights which will eventu-
ally be used to allow developers to reach target densities. Public financing will 
provide for the initial developments: the deck, a convention corridor, parks 
and subway service. The private sector will contribute to the longer term de-
velopments: office and residential buildings.
The Hudson Yards Project7.3.2 
Thirty-three acres of Hudson Yards is “below grade railroad tracks”.58 The plan 
includes covering this area with a deck which will provide the land for com-
mercial and residential buildings, an improved convention center and parks.59 
Similarly, in the early 1900s, New York City’s Park Avenue was built on a deck 
covering unsightly railroad tracks which ran from East 42nd to East 56th 
Streets between Madison and Lexington Avenues. As we know, Park Avenue 
became the successful, thriving center of New York City’s Central Business 
54  The Council, Report of the Finance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
55  Http://home2.nyc.gov: Hudson Yards, the Area. 
56  Http://home2.nyc.gov: Hudson Yards, the Area.
57  The MTA is a public benefit corporation responsible for transportation in New York State. The MTA is re-
sponsible for the development and implementation of a unified mass transportation policy for the New York 
metropolitan area which includes New York City and certain suburban counties. The MTA owns the Eastern 
Rail Yard and the Western Rail Yard. 
58  New York City Department of Planning: www.nyc.gov: the rail yards consist of the Western Rail Yard and 
the Eastern Rail Yard. The Western Rail Yard is the portion between 11th Avenue and the Hudson River. The 
Eastern Rail Yard is the portion between 10th and 11th Avenues. 
59  Completion of the redevelopment of the Project will take 30 to 40 years. The Council, Report of the Fi-
nance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
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District. Among the buildings on the deck is the beautiful beaux art Grand 
Central Terminal. The Hudson Yards Project (hereafter called the Project) in-
cludes plans to construct a Hudson Boulevard with bordering parks running 
the length of the Project.
The Project includes the extension of an existing subway line,60 making a 
subway station accessible within a 10 minute walk from anywhere in the Proj-
ect. It also includes over 20 acres of open space and a public square. The Proj-
ect includes plans for affordable housing – approximately 28% of the 13,000 
planned units will be affordable to low and middle income families.61
Originally, the plan was to build a football stadium for the New York Jets 
over the Western Rail Yards. However, opposition to the plan led to its de-
mise62 which in turn allowed for the birth of new ideas for the area.
The Project includes plans for extensive underground parking facilities 
which have incited public opposition and led to the filing of a lawsuit against 
the Mayor, the planning director, the MTA and the New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation.63 The crux of the plaintiffs’ arguments centers 
on alleged violations of environmental control laws. As such, the Project has 
included a healthy share of debate and controversy among political factions 
and the public.
Municipal zoning7.3.3 
New York City enacted the country’s first comprehensive Zoning Resolution 
in 1916. The Zoning Resolution consists of zoning text which establishes zon-
ing districts (and their regulations) and zoning maps which delineate the zon-
ing districts. The City has three basic zoning districts: residential, commercial 
and manufacturing, and each of these includes low, medium and high density 
variations.
In 1961, the Zoning Resolution classified the Hudson Yards area as manu-
facturing, and few changes have been made to this initial classification.64 In 
order to revitalize the area and create the combination of uses to make the 
area successful and vibrant, rezoning with respect to densities and uses was 
necessary. In 2005, the bulk of the area was rezoned – except for the Western 
60  Completion of the subway line is scheduled for late 2012. The Council, Report of the Finance Division, 
October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
61  Press Release dated September 27, 2006: www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.
62  www.manhattancb4.org: “West Side Railyards/Hudson Yards Rezoning” What is the Hudson Yards 
Plan?” Last Updated May 25, 2007.
63  New York League of Conservation Voters, “HKNA Enviro Lawsuit v. Bloomberg Moves to Court,” May 4, 
2007.
64  Http://home2.nyc.gov: Hudson Yards, the Area.
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Rail Yard.65 The City also approved changes to the city map and it acquired 
property necessary to extend a subway line to service the Project.66 Therefore, 
the framework has been laid for the construction of infrastructure to be fol-
lowed by development of commercial, retail and residential buildings.
Financing of the Hudson Yards Project7.3.4 
The Project will draw monies from the City’s general fund, but in addition, 
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTS)67 and property taxes will help to pay for 
infrastructure improvements.68 Property within the Project will be exempt 
from real property taxes and instead owners will pay a PILOT as set forth in 
the PILOT calculation tables.69 The Project’s financing has been divided into 
two phases: the first phase includes construction of the deck, the subway ex-
tension with one stop, Hudson Boulevard and a park; the second phase in-
cludes a second subway stop and an extension of the boulevard.70 This phas-
ing was imposed to make the Project financially feasible.
The Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) and the Hudson Yards 
Development Corporation (HYDC) were formed in 2004 and 2005, respectively, 
to finance and manage the improvements and construction. The MTA and the 
City entered into an agreement which outlined their respective duties and as-
signments with respect to the Project. The MTA would sell some of its Floor 
Area Ratio (FAR) in the form of TDRs to the HYIC for $200 million (€126 mil-
lion) and the HYIC would market the TDRs71 and recover its $200 million and 
the capital costs, the remainder being transferred to the MTA.72 The initial 
$200 million was raised through the sale of bonds.
The railyard TDRs cannot be used in the Eastern Rail Yards where they 
originated, but instead can be sold to developers of land located to the north 
65  The Council, Report of the Finance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info. City Council 
Resolution 760. The area was rezoned for increased commercial and residential density. The City of New 
York, Zoning Resolution, Article IX, Chapter 3 at www.nyc.gov/planning.
66  Rail Yards Agreement among the MTA parties dated September 28, 2006.
67  PILOT payments will help service the bonds that will pay for the infrastructure improvements; The 
Council, Report of the Finance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
68  The Council, Report of the Finance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
69  Second Amended and Restated Uniform Tax Exemption Policy of the New York City Industrial Develop-
ment Agency, as approved on December 12, 2006 by the Board of Directors of the New York City Industrial 
Development Agency, Appendix E, Tax Exemption Policy for the Hudson Yards UTEP Area. 
70  New York City Independent Budget Office Fiscal Brief dated August 2004.
71  The TDRs will be marketed to developers of property located 8 blocks north of the Eastern Rail Yards and 
will allow those developers to build more densely on those sites. The Council, Report of the Finance Divi-
sion, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info.
72  Rail Yards Agreement among the MTA parties dated September 28, 2006.
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of the Eastern Rail Yards. FAR there can be increased from a total of 13 to a 
maximum of 18 via the use of TDRs.73 The railyard TDRs can only be used for 
constructions above 13 FAR and are thus strategically designed to promote 
high densities.
In Phase 2 of the development of Hudson Boulevard and the park area, 
TDRs will be transferrable to separate receiving sites in 4 different districts.74
In addition to TDRs, density bonuses would be available to developers fol-
lowing a contribution to the Hudson Yards District Improvement Fund. The 
contribution was set at a particular dollar amount per square foot of floor ar-
73  The City of New York, Zoning Resolution, Article IX, Chapter 3, 93-21at www.nyc.gov/planning.
74  The City of New York, Zoning Resolution, Article IX, Chapter 3, 93-32 at www.nyc.gov/planning.
[ 149 ]
ea, and the amount is annually adjusted on July 1st.75 The density bonuses 
must be employed prior to the use of TDRs.
Approximately $3 billion of long-term bonds should have been issued by 
the HYIC by the fall of 2006 to be serviced from revenues generated by the 
Project.76
Tax exemptions7.3.5 
Financial incentives are necessary to promote development of the Project due 
to the lower rate of rentals in this more remote area of Manhattan. The Uni-
form Tax Exemption Policy (UTEP) controls tax exemptions in New York City. 
On August 8, 2006 the UTEP was amended to include three components: PI-
LOTS, Payments in Lieu of Mortgage Recording Tax (PILOMRT) and Payments 
in Lieu of Sales Taxes on construction materials (PILOST). A project must be 
at least 1 million zoning ft2 (93,000m2) and 75% of the usable space must be 
class A office space or otherwise approved commercial space. The City will 
receive all PILOTS generated by the development of the Project.77 These incen-
tives will be available for 19 years and will graduate depending on proximity 
to Midtown Manhattan and proximity to inception of the Project.
Since the Project is still in its early stages, its success may be determined 
by a variety of factors including the timeliness of the construction of the infra-
structure such as the deck over the Eastern Rail Yard and the subway extension, 
the strength of the economy, and the response of developers and the public.
Conservation case: the City of Malibu7.4 
Objectives7.4.1 
The City of Malibu has provisions for a Transferable Development Credits 
(TDC) program that was established to ensure that no net increase in den-
sity would occur within environmentally sensitive areas as a result of land 
divisions and/or multi-family residential development. Because the purpose 
of the TDC program is to protect the environment, it provides a good example 
of the application of non-financial incentives for conservation. The TDC provi-
sions are written into Chapter 7 of the City of Malibu LCP Local Implementa-
tion Plan. Recently, TDCs were purchased by a landowner of two parcels of 
75  The City of New York, Zoning Resolution, Article IX, Chapter 3, 93-31 at www.nyc.gov/planning.
76  The Council, Report of the Finance Division, October 10, 2006: webdocs.nycouncil.info; Rail Yards 
Agreement among the MTA parties dated September 28, 2006; New York City Independent Budget Office 
Fiscal Brief dated August 2004.
77  www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgove/menuitem: September 27, 2006 release.
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property within the City of Malibu, and they were used to subdivide each par-
cel into two parcels. 
A description of the uniqueness of the land of the City of Malibu and the 
recent successful application of the TDC program related to the subdivision 
follows.
Topography and history of Malibu7.4.2 
The City of Malibu is located in Northwest Los Angeles County along a twen-
ty-one mile (34 kilometers) stretch of the Pacific Ocean. Its width varies from 
one to eight miles (1.6 to 12.9 kilometers). Thirteen (21 km) of the twenty-one 
miles of coastline has residential development directly on the beach. This de-
velopment blocks most views and access to the beach by the public.
Malibu has a varied mix of climates due to terrain that varies from beach-
es to canyons, mesas, and rugged mountains. It includes a Mediterranean 
ecosystem that is unique. In addition, it is the most unstable area per square 
mile in the world due to geological faults and predisposition to landslides. 
The combination of its topography, soil conditions and resultant instability 
create conditions incompatible with density. In fact, as a result of the wide-
spread development along the beaches of Malibu, erosion has been greatly ac-
celerated, the beaches are not as wide as they once were, and there is less 
land available for public use (Duncan, 2004).
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Figure 7.2 City of Malibu, zoning map of project location 
Source: courtesy of the California Coastal Commission
The City of Malibu was incorporated in 1991 because its residents were 
fearful that a Los Angeles County proposal to install a sewer system would 
be the beginning of massive subdivisions that would have converted Malibu 
into another part of Los Angeles. Residents of Malibu continue to attempt to 
preserve its rural atmosphere. Another example of environmental challenges 
involves water contamination. The City of Malibu has recently been pressured 
into correcting the sources of contamination of its creeks, its lagoon and the 
Santa Monica Bay. The city has purchased a stretch of property for $25,000,000 
(€16,000,00078) and plans to install a $5,000,000 (€3,200,000) storm water 
treatment center there in order to correct the problem.
The City of Malibu has a history of fierce legal battles to maintain exclu-
sivity and control over passageways across its beaches and inland territory. 
Today, although trains travel along many miles of the California coastline, a 
southbound train just north of Malibu turns sharply inland, away from the 
coastline and away from Malibu. A prominent landowner in the city was able 
to prevent the Southern Pacific Railroad from linking the train tracks which 
stopped both north and south of Malibu. The same landowner vigorously 
fought the construction of public, county and state roads through Malibu, and 
this time was unsuccessful – a road through Malibu exists today, a state high-
way known today as the Pacific Coast Highway, and when it was completed in 
1929, it ended Malibu’s isolation.
More recently, legal battles have been viciously fought over the public’s 
right to beach access along the coastline which some argue is overdeveloped 
with celebrity mansions. Easements for public use have been pursued by both 
78  The author calculated euros from dollars based on the exchange rate at the time of writing this particu-
lar chapter. 
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Figure 7.3 Malibu Coastline 
Source: courtesy of Chris Hlad
the California Coastal Commission79 and a program created to focus on the 
processing of the easements, the Coastal Access Program.
Despite the yearly fires, floods, landslides and political battles, Malibu re-
mains one of the country’s most prestigious, expensive, and sought-after 
properties – known for its celebrities and status as well as its excellent cli-
mate and conditions for surfing.
The planning and legal system 7.4.3 
and fit within a spatial level
Coastal development
The U.S. enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972 in order to en-
courage states with coastal borders to enact their own set of laws regarding 
the development of land along their coastlines. Following this, the voters of 
California passed the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 which 
created the California Coastal Commission (Commission) and six regional 
boards. One of the Commission’s duties was to help local governments adopt 
their own coastal plans (Breemer, 2004).
The Commission has the authority to approve development projects in the 
coastal zone (Duncan, 2004; Lycett, 2000) and the power to control develop-
ment in a way that should balance the unique environmental needs along the 
coast with the desires of private property owners (Breemer, 2004). The coastal 
zone is defined as land that is 1,000 yards (914 meters) from the mean high 
tide line of the sea, but where significant coastal areas exist, the zone can 
extend to the lesser of the first major ridgeline parall to the sea or five miles 
(8 kilometers) from the mean high tide line (Breemer, 2004). The entire City 
of Malibu is located within the coastal zone.80 Any new development in the 
coastal zone requires a Coastal Development Permit. The Commission retains 
the authority to approve these development permits until a county approves 
a Local Coastal Program (Lycett, 2000).
The Commission submitted a comprehensive coastal development plan to 
the state legislature which became the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal 
Act). The Coastal Act encouraged the creation of local coastal programs and a 
transfer of the power to approve development permits to local coastal govern-
ments (Breemer, 2004). However, the Commission retains jurisdiction to hear 
the appeals of decisions of the local government authorities. The basic goals 
of the Coastal Act are the preservation of the ecological balance of nature and 
the public’s right to access the coast. A TDR program was enacted in 1979, to 
be administered by the California Coastal Conservancy, a government agency 
79  Created by the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.
80  Malibu General Plan, Land Use Element at 1.1.4.
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established by the state of California to protect the coastline.81 The Mountain 
Restoration Trust was formed in 1981 to assist in locating transferable devel-
opment credits (TDCs).82, 83
Coastal development in the City of Malibu
The City of Malibu Local Coastal Program (LCP) consists basically of a Land Use 
Plan, zoning ordinances, and zoning district maps.84 The Local Implementa-
tion Plan (LIP) carries out the policies of the Land Use Plan. It contains specific 
policies and regulations applicable to each and every project which requires a 
coastal development permit. It was adopted by the Commission in 2002.
The Commission was concerned that development from Los Angeles 
would spread into the Malibu mountains before sufficient infrastructure was 
available (Merriam, 2001). Provisions for a Transferable Development Credits 
program are included in Chapter 7 of Malibu’s Local Coastal Program/Local 
Implementation Plan. Its stated purpose is to ensure that no net increase in 
density would occur within the environmentally sensitive areas of the city as 
a result of land division and/or multi-family residential development in two 
zoning districts: the Multiple Family (MF) district and the Multi-Family Beach-
front (MFBF) district. This is accomplished by retiring rights to develop on cer-
tain other parcels in the Santa Monica Mountains Area coastal zone from pri-
vate property owners.85
The fact that the area where the donor lots are located does not correlate 
completely with the area where the land divisions take place may place the 
benefits of the TDC program outside Malibu’s city borders. However, one can 
argue that natural habitat as well as the built environment, such as roads, do 
not follow political boundaries, and a general improvement of the environ-
ment does benefit the cities in close proximity to the preserved areas.
The TDC program is supposed to mitigate the negative effects of develop-
81  http://www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/About/about.htm.
82  Telephone interview with Steven Harris, Director of the Mountain Restoration Trust (October 19, 2006). 
83  http://creec.edgateway.net/cs/creecp/view/creec_org/1378. The Mountains Restoration Trust is a Cali-
fornia Public Nonprofit Organization committed to preserving and protecting the resources of the Santa 
Monica Mountains, and it accomplishes this by acquiring land, doing restoration work and providing edu-
cational programs. More broadly, land trusts are local, state, regional or national level charitable organiza-
tions “created under federal tax laws” in order to “conserve land for its ‘natural, recreational, scenic, histori-
cal and productive values. Land trusts can purchase land for permanent protection (…) accept donations of 
land or the funds to purchase land (…)’” (Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding 
Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 University of Colorado Law Review 283, fn. 2, Spring 2006). 
84  Commission Agenda Report, May 17, 2005; Malibu General Plan, Land Use Element at 1.1.4.
85  City of Malibu LCP Local Implementation Plan, Chapter 7 – Transfer of Development Credits at 7.4(B) 
Objectives of the Transfer of Development Credit Regulations.
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ment in the Santa Monica Mountains area86 coastal zone, an area with limi-
tations created by its topography. The Santa Monica Mountains area was se-
lected as the donor or sending area in order to transfer development from 
lots located far from necessary infrastructure to lots that are closer to major 
roads and other vital support. The rationale consistently provided is related to 
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents and specifically fire protection, 
reach of emergency vehicles, and the limitations of septic or sewer systems.87
The coastal zone is considered an environmentally sensitive area88 which 
requires intervention to protect the natural resources – the mountain areas 
and the beaches. Some problems inherent in the location are dangers of in-
creased flooding due to paved surfaces, increased risk of fire as a result of in-
creased development and the resultant increase in erosion which then exac-
erbates floods and landslides.
The provisions of this TDR chapter do not apply to affordable housing units, 
but they do apply to new land divisions and new multi-family unit develop-
ment in the City of Malibu. As such, new land divisions, including the devel-
opment of multi-family units, “will not be approved unless Transfer of Devel-
opment Credits are purchased to retire development rights on existing donor 
lots in the Santa Monica Mountains area.”89 As a result of the transfer of these 
credits, the donor lot is forever restricted from development via the recording 
of a “permanent open space easement.”90 As a result, future development on 
the donor lots is completely prohibited into perpetuity.
For each newly created lot, sufficient donor lots must be retired to provide 
one TDC credit. The landowner wishing to develop must show proof of the 
purchase of the TDCs and proof that the donor site has been permanently re-
stricted by an easement dedicated to the City of Malibu and that it has been 
officially recorded.
Application of TDCs
An application to subdivide two properties in the City of Malibu was recent-
86  City of Malibu LCP Local Implementation Plan, Chapter 7 – Transfer of Development Credits at 7.3 
Definitions: “Santa Monica Mountains Area” means the Santa Monica Mountains within the coastal zones 
of the City of Malibu and the County of Los Angeles.
87  Telephone interview with Steven Harris, Director of the Mountain Restoration Trust (October 19, 2006). 
88  City of Malibu LCP Local Implementation Plan, Chapter 7 – Transfer of Development Credits at 7.3 
Definitions: “ ‘Environmentally sensitive habitat area’ means any area in which plant or animal life or their 
habitats are either rare or especially valuable because of their special nature or role in an ecosystem and 
which could be easily disturbed or degraded by human activities and developments.”
89  City of Malibu LCP Local Implementation Plan, Chapter 7 – Transfer of Development Credits at 7.1, 
Purpose and Intent.
90  City of Malibu LCP Local Implementation Plan, Chapter 7 – Transfer of Development Credits at 7.1, 
Purpose and Intent.
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ly granted with the purchase of two TDCs. The two properties that are being 
subdivided were the subject of an application to subdivide in 1989 in order 
to divide each of the two lots into three lots.91 At that time, the County of Los 
Angeles (Malibu was not incorporated until 1991) initially approved the ap-
plication, and in 1993 the City of Malibu approved a lot-line adjustment to 
change the lot lines of the Los Angeles County approved map. Thereafter, the 
Commission approved the revised six-lot subdivision.92 However, the approv-
als for the subdivision expired without any construction on the lots.
On March 3, 2003, the owner of the two lots submitted an application to 
the city for permission to subdivide each of the two lots into two lots – for 
a total of 4 lots, and it was approved by the Planning Commission in 2004. 
In December 2004, the owner filed an application for a Coastal Development 
Permit which was followed by the required publication of a Notice of Applica-
tion in a local newspaper and a mailing of a Notice of Public Hearing to all 
property owners and occupants within a 500-foot (152 meter) radius of the 
properties. These requirements are in place in order to provide the security 
and validity necessary for the TDC program to function effectively.
Each of the two original lots is located in a Single-Family Low-Density Resi-
dential zone district93 and has a house under construction at the time of writing. 
The owner’s plans include the construction of two additional houses, one on 
each of the newly created lots, following the subdivision and permit approvals. 
As such, each of the four lots will include one main house within its borders.
The landowner entered into a purchase agreement with the owner of two 
parcels located in an area defined as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Ar-
ea. The parcels were to be located within 200 feet (61 meter) of a park – how-
ever, they were not. A solution was reached to annex the surrounding prop-
erties, owned by the County of Los Angeles, to the park, and thus bring the 
donor lots to within the 200-foot requirement.
The owner of the two lots to be subdivided complied with the require-
ments of the General Plan, the Municipal Code and the Local Coastal Program. 
In addition, the project complied with the requirements of the California En-
vironmental Quality Act (CEQA)94 in that it was found that the project did not 
have a significant effect on the environment and was thus exempt from the 
requirements of CEQA.
Since the donor lots are not located within the City of Malibu, it appears 
that the city itself does not benefit from the retirement requirements of the 
91  City of Malibu, Commission Agenda Report dated May 17, 2005: After the subdivision, the four lots will 
have the following areas: Lot 1: 1.17 acres, Lot 2: .51 acres, Lot 3: .53 acres, and Lot 4: .99 acres.
92  City of Malibu, Commission Agenda Report, May 17, 2005.
93  This designation allows for the creation of up to two lots per acres with a minimum size for each lot of 
acre. 
94  City of Malibu, Negative Declaration No. 03-07 Dated December 18, 2003. 
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TDC program. However, it can be argued that the city will benefit in general 
with the reduction in development in the Santa Monica Mountain area coast-
al zone which borders the city. After all, if the surrounding mountain area is 
less developed as a result of the TDC program, less impervious surfaces will 
exist to affect the City of Malibu; animal and plant life will be less affected 
which will assist in the maintenance of native species, and all the innumer-
able advantages of a smaller footprint on the earth will benefit the city and 
the area. Furthermore, the city holds the easements acquired through the 
retirement of donor lots. Legislative amendments to force the retirement of 
property within Malibu’s city limits may be needed should it be determined 
that increased development, including subdivisions and the construction of 
multi-family dwellings, is harming the city.
The Malibu TDC program is based on goals protecting both the Santa Moni-
ca Mountain Coastal area and the City of Malibu from damaging development 
in these environmentally- sensitive areas. The burden is on the Malibu land-
owner who wants to subdivide to find landowners in the sending site area 
willing to sell TDCs, and this is often difficult. Therefore, this program does 
not appear to be as accessible as the Portland programs. The program may 
function well for the goals of the region, but should it be determined that the 
sending area needs more protection than is being provided by the current 
program, changes to the program may be necessary to allow it to be more ac-
cessible to the private developer.
Re-allocation potential: Portland, Oregon7.5 
Objectives7.5.1 
The state of Oregon is looked upon by the rest of the nation as providing an 
example of the positive outcomes that can be achieved with intelligent and 
diligent land use planning. Specifically, Portland is an example of a metropoli-
tan area with vibrant streets shared by pedestrians, cyclists, buses and other 
mass transit together with the automobile. An urban growth boundary (UGB) 
surrounds Portland and has served to contain sprawl and to provide infill de-
velopment and attention to the necessities of a healthy urban environment. 
At the same time, the UGB has preserved the environment and allowed forest 
land and farmland to be preserved outside the boundary.
The Pleasant Valley District encompasses an area that was part of the 1998 
expansion of the UGB. This district has a TDR provision within its zoning code 
whose purpose is to allow for the development of new housing and at the 
same time to protect environmentally sensitive areas within the watershed 
area of Portland. This district presents us, therefore, with an excellent exam-
ple of the use of TDRs for the re-allocation of resources to protect the envi-
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ronment by compensating for non-development in the watershed area while 
at the same time allowing the development of housing where it has been de-
termined it should be built and would be less harmful.95
The Central City Plan District has provisions for TDRs with respect to single-
room occupancy (SRO) housing in order to provide incentives to owners of this 
type of housing to preserve it. SRO buildings typically have single room rental 
units that are occupied by one person. Again, this provides a good example of 
compensation for non-development and compensation to support necessary 
low-income housing. The Sally McCracken Building, an SRO building, provides 
an example of the use TDRs to avoid the loss of low-income housing in a city 
where property values have been increasing at a tremendous rate.
The planning and legal system and fit within 7.5.2 
a spatial level
Before 1906, (in 1906, the state of Oregon adopted home rule amendments) 
cities within the state had no independent legislative power.96 Even today the 
grant of authority to home rule cities in Oregon is a limited grant, and not 
plenary.97 According to the Oregon Constitution, “legal voters of every city and 
town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, 
subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon” (Aoki, 
Briscoe & Hovland, 2005).
In 1973, Oregon passed Senate Bill 100 which provided a comprehensive 
plan that preserved open spaces, helped to develop lively and healthy cities, 
and in essence, curbed sprawl (Aoki, Briscoe & Hovland, 2005). In Oregon, each 
city must have an UGB which separates urban land from rural land.98 An UGB 
prevents infrastructure from spreading further and further out from metropoli-
tan areas, creating a sprawl frenzy which not only destroys farmland and forest 
areas but urban environments as well. In Oregon, UGBs are required to have a 
twenty-year supply of housing and development potential within their bound-
aries, and a report to review the remaining supply must be prepared every five 
years. The UGB must be expanded if it appears there is a housing shortage.
Oregon’s state legislature has enacted requirements at the regional level of 
government. The regional level was given the responsibility to coordinate re-
gional and local comprehensive plans in order to adopt a regional UGB, to im-
pose consistency between local comprehensive plans and state and regional 
planning goals, and to plan for regional level requirements like transportation, 
95  At the time of writing, a project with the use of TDRs in the Pleasant Valley District has not been ap-
proved. Telephone conference with Jay Sugnet, Planner, City of Portland (November 1, 2006).
96  City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or. App. 481, 499, (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
97  City of Sandy v. Metro, 200 Or. App. 481, 495, (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
98  www.metro-region.org.
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water and air quality, and solid waste. The Portland metropolitan region in-
cludes a growth management policy, the 2040 Growth Concept, which defines 
regional growth and development for the region.
Metro, an agency created in 1979, is responsible for managing the Portland 
metropolitan region’s UGB which came into effect in 1979.99 Throughout the 
years, many small increments have been made to this region’s area. Larger 
increments started in 1998 when 3,500 acres (1,400 hectares)100 were added 
to provide housing and jobs. Following this, in 1999, 380 acres (152 hectares) 
were added to balance the number of residences with the number of jobs. In 
2002, 18,867 acres (7,547 hectares) were added, again for residential and em-
ployment needs. Most recently, in 2004 and 2005, the UGB was expanded by a 
total of 2,301 acres (920 hectares) in order to provide for industrial needs. The 
current UGB encompasses about 256,360 acres (102,544 hectares). The UGB is 
often recognized as the primary reason for the successful rehabilitation of 
Portland’s downtown center.
Nevertheless, Oregon has been recently embroiled in controversy with the 
passage of two measures supporting property rights’ advocates. The measures 
have the potential to dangerously weaken the very land use regulations that 
have provided the state with exemplary land use successes. As a normal result 
of regulations, landowners who are impacted will voice opposition to the regu-
lations in the name of injustice and inequities, citing constitutional violations, 
both state and federal. Even though there was opposition by property rights 
advocacy groups to the regulations imposed by the comprehensive plan in the 
early 1970s, the passage of Measure 7 in 2000 came as a surprise to many. Mea-
sure 7 was designed to either compensate landowners for any loss in value 
of their properties due to any land use regulation or to allow landowners ex-
periencing a loss in value a waiver of those same land use regulations. Even 
though it was a major victory for property rights activists, Measure 7 was short 
lived since it was ruled unconstitutional by the Oregon courts because it vio-
lated the ‘separate vote’ requirement of the Oregon Constitution.101
99  www.metro-region.org.
100  An acre is .40 hectares or approximately 4046.86m2.
101  League of Oregon Cities, et al. v. State of Oregon, 334 Or. 645, 664 (2002). The Oregon Constitution 
provides that “When two or more amendments shall be submitted…to the voters of this state at the same 
election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately.” Measure 7 was 
found to amend the takings clause of the Oregon Constitution and the freedom of expression clause as well. 
The freedom of expression clause was found to be amended due to the following exception written into 
Measure 7: “Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a government regulation 
prohibiting the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling 
alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or gaming parlor.” Since pornog-
raphy is considered a form of speech, writing or printing, it is protected under the Oregon Constitution’s 
freedom of expression clause.
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However, property rights advocates persevered and, in 2004, Measure 37 
was passed by Oregon voters, and it included essentially the same provisions 
as had been included in Measure 7. After its passage, the lower Oregon court 
ruled that Measure 37 was unconstitutional, and the case went on to appeal 
in the Oregon Supreme Court where the lower court decision was overturned 
in February 2006. The Supreme Court of Oregon found no constitutional vio-
lations, and thus supported the decision of Oregon’s voters. Other states are 
currently faced with similar initiatives, and it will take some time to find out 
how the passage of these laws will affect the ability of cities to apply land use 
regulations – some of which are necessary to protect resources and allow for 
development that is beneficial to the health of urban areas.
Due to the political turmoil that Oregon and the rest of the nation is in-
volved in these last few years, the timing may be right for TDRs to play a more 
important role in resolving the different mind sets of both property rights ad-
vocates and those who have helped to create environments that the rest of 
the nation envies.
The plan districts7.5.3 
Areas that have unique characteristics or resources can form a district, and as 
such have separate zoning regulations applicable to them in addition to base 
zone regulations. The Pleasant Valley Plan District – located in southeast Port-
land, is one such area. In 1998, the Pleasant Valley Plan District formed part of 
what was added to Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary. The total area of this 
district encompasses 1.32 acres (5,300m2), and therefore, the developable area 
is small. The plan for this district is to create an urban community complete 
with transportation and natural resource areas and room for a population of 
12,000 together with the creation of about 5,000 jobs.
Overlay zones provide additional land use regulations to specific areas and 
may include controls regarding the preservation of historic areas or the pro-
tection of environmentally sensitive areas. The Pleasant Valley Plan District 
includes some of these additional land use controls in the form of the Pleas-
ant Valley Natural Resources Overlay Zone (designated as a ‘v’ zone) which 
applies to areas protecting natural resources and providing for appropriate 
development in the District, and the Environmental Protection Overlay Zone 
(designated as a ‘p’ zone) which provides the highest degree of protection to 
areas which include vital resources. Development is rarely approved in areas 
within a ‘p’ zone. The purpose of the Pleasant Valley Plan District is to inte-
grate the natural resources of the area with the newly developing urban area 
in Pleasant Valley. Some of Pleasant Valley’s land area is within the City of 
Portland and some is within the City of Gresham.
The provisions for TDRs are included in Chapter 33.564 of the zoning code 
which is the code for the Pleasant Valley Plan District. The development rights 
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are defined as “the number of potential dwelling units that are allowed on the 
site.” Sending sites are restricted to “sites where at least 50 percent of the site 
is within the Pleasant Valley Natural Resources overlay zone.” Receiving sites 
can include sites within the Pleasant Valley Plan District or the Johnson Creek 
Basin Plan District (with limitations) except where the receiving site is within 
the 100-year flood plain or within the Pleasant Valley Natural Resources over-
lay zone. Additional regulations restrict the additional density to 150 percent 
of the normal allowable density. The area is limited to twenty-acre (8 hec-
tare) development parcels, but can be subdivided with the purchase of TDRs 
to a maximum of one building per acre. To date, no TDRs have been sold or 
purchased to enable subdivisions within the Pleasant Valley Plan District. Al-
though one application had been received and was in process in March 2006, 
the matter was not finalized due to the lack of infrastructure, in particular 
sewer systems, in the Pleasant Valley Plan District at this time. The sewer sys-
tem is scheduled for expansion to this area in 2008, and it is expected that 
land subdivision applications will follow after that time.102
TDR provisions are also included in the Northwest Hills Plan District which 
allows transfers from the Environmental Protection overlay zone to the resi-
dential farming (RF) zone within the UGB and not within an environmen-
tal zone. The resulting density may not exceed 1 unit per acre (0.4 hectares). 
Likewise, the Johnson Creek Basin Plan District includes TDR provisions to al-
low “for new housing and to reduce development pressure on environmental-
ly sensitive areas.”103 Therefore, similar TDR provisions appear within several 
parts of the Portland zoning code.
Historic resource protection overlay zone7.5.4 
The Portland Zoning Code includes an overlay zone specifically constructed 
to protect historic resources in the region. Within this code are located provi-
sions regarding historic preservation incentives – TDRs specifically catering to 
the preservation of historic resources. The stated purpose of these provisions 
is to increase the potential for the protection, renovation and preservation 
of these resources through flexibility and economic opportunities.104 Density 
and FAR may be transferred from Conservation Landmarks and Historic Land-
marks. Density may be transferred from a landmark to another location in 
multi-dwelling, commercial and employment zones. Furthermore, landmarks 
in single-dwelling zones may be used as multi-dwelling structures without 
an increase in parking requirements. The potential exists to expand the floor 
102  Telephone interview with Jay Sugnet, Planner, City of Portland (November 1, 2006).
103  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, Planning and Zoning, at 33.537.110, 9/3/04.
104  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, Chapter 33.445, 1/7/05.
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area of the landmark. Additional provisions provide that structures located in 
multi-dwelling zones may be used as multi-dwelling structures with no maxi-
mum density, and that daycare is an allowed use in residential zones. Several 
additional provisions provide attractive flexibility which will motivate the re-
use of historic resources.105
Base zones7.5.5 
TDR provisions are included in zoning ordinances for two separate base zones, 
Employment and Industrial Zones (Chapter 33.130) and Commercial Zones 
(Chapter 33.140). The employment and industrial zones consist of areas that 
have industrial uses or a “mix of uses with a strong industrial orientation.”106 
Density in the form of FAR can be transferred from certain employment zones 
containing a Landmark to sites that are within a certain distance from the 
Landmark. However, the increase in FAR cannot exceed 3 to 1, and this in-
crease includes any other transfers of density. Therefore, stringent limitations 
exist regarding the particular receiving sites.
Portland has categorized its commercial zones into eight different types, 
from zones that support surrounding residential areas to zones that have a 
community or regional market. Once again, FAR can be transferred from a 
site which includes a Landmark to a receiving site that is within a certain dis-
tance from the Landmark. Similarly, the increase in FAR cannot exceed 3 to 1, 
inclusive of other density increases.
As previously stated, these provisions located within the base zone codes 
have as a primary effect the preservation of historic resources – as opposed 
to the preservation of the sensitive environmental habitat which is the main 
focus of TDR provisions within the Plan District codes.
The Sally McCracken Building7.5.6 
The Central City Plan District includes provisions for TDRs for the encourage-
ment of the development of new low-income housing in the form of single-
room occupancy buildings or hotels (SROs) and for the preservation of exist-
ing SROs.107 The owners of qualifying sites may transfer unused floor area to 
any location in the Central City Plan District. This provision provides the flexi-
bility necessary to make the TDR provisions user friendly. The money that can 
be obtained by an owner of an SRO property can be used to make improve-
105  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, Planning and Zoning, Chapter 33.445, Historic Resource Protection 
Overlay Zone, 33.445.610.
106  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, Chapter 33.140.010.
107  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, 33.510.200 (E), 4/22/06. 
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ments to the property, especially if it is currently vacant and unused. The SRO 
may not be “demolished or converted to other uses unless the number of SRO 
units will be replaced.”108
An example of a successful application of TDRs in the Central City Plan 
District is provided by the Sally McCracken Building, formerly known as the 
Athens Hotel.
The hotel had fallen into disrepair and was being used as a “shooting gal-
lery for drugs.”109 Central City Concern, a non-profit organization that owns 
and manages several SROs in Portland, bought the building and began reno-
vations, at a total cost of $4,000,000 (€2,525,000). In the early 1990s, 50,000ft2 
(4,645m2) of floor area were transferred from the hotel to adjacent properties 
owned by Kalberer’s Hotel Supply Company, Inc.110
The Athens Hotel was using 40,000ft2 (3,716m2) of an allowable 90,000ft2 
(8,361m2) of permitted development. A typical block in Portland has a 40,000ft2 
area of development, and as such, the 50,000ft2 of area that was transferred 
was significant.
The Sally McCracken Building currently has ninety-five single rooms and is 
108  Portland Zoning Code, Title 33, 33.510.200 (E), 4/22/06.
109  The Enterprise Foundation, Federal Policies Illustrated, June 1995 at 222.enterprisefoundation.org/
policy/monographs/pubpol3.asp.
110  Interview with Barbara Sack, City Planner II, City of Portland, Portland, Oregon (March 20, 2006); tele-
phone interview with Barbara Sack, City Planner II, City of Portland (November 3, 2006).
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Figure 7.4 Portland, the Sally McCracken Building
Source: courtesy of Central City Concern
home to formerly homeless and recovering drug and alcohol addicts who can 
remain at the building as long as they are in a recovery program.111 This case 
provides an example of a successful application of TDRs in the context of low-
income housing for special needs’ residents. These TDR provisions in the Cen-
tral City Plan District were drafted to motivate owners of special low-income 
housing to support the maintenance of this housing in the City of Portland, 
and the provisions compensate these owners for refraining from developing 
their land to its maximum potential. In this manner, development is re-allo-
cated to other sites that do not include SROs, and the city benefits by provid-
ing for a segment of the population which might otherwise be homeless.
111  The Enterprise Foundation, Federal Policies Illustrated, June 1995 at 222.enterprisefoundation.org/
policy/monographs/pubpol3.asp.
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The various TDR provisions available in the Portland region and outlined 
above are evidence of the flexibility of TDRs to assist in the protection of 
many societal needs: low-income housing; the protection of environmentally 
sensitive land areas, open space and farmland as well as the preservation of 
historic resources, to name a few. In addition, these provisions are evidence 
that once a particular TDR program is incorporated in the legal framework, it 
facilitates additional programs which together can form an available network 
of flexibility in addition to traditional financing of the past. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of a TDR program is unlike other land use determinations where an 
unwise decision can have unwanted and harmful, widespread consequences.
Conclusion and evaluation7.6 
A review of the many TDR programs available in several cities of various 
states reveals that although a city may have several TDR provisions that re-
semble each other in its zoning ordinance, outside of this context no two TDR 
provisions are exactly the same, and in fact, they can be very different from 
each other. This is because the needs of different areas are different because 
no two areas of land are the same, and no two areas of land have been his-
torically developed the same way.
TDRs are used in many ways to protect both the natural environment and 
the built environment. In New York City, TDRs are used for historic preserva-
tion and to convert underutilized land into a much needed new residential 
and commercial neighborhood. In Malibu, TDRs are used to protect the en-
vironmentally sensitive area known as the Santa Monica Coastal Mountain 
area. In Oregon, talented leadership instigated land use controls that allowed 
for the healthy development of cities and the preservation of farmland and 
forest land, and eventually this resulted in the inclusion of various TDR provi-
sions in Portland’s zoning and planning code.
However, it is perhaps most useful to the international audience to focus 
on the similarities that can be found and how the various provisions are in-
herently similar in substance in terms of achieving the same goal: resources 
in the natural or built environment that are in need of protection are identi-
fied. This protection may not be available through the current legal structure 
or certain owners cannot for legal reasons be forced to bear the burden of the 
necessary protection. These resources can form the equivalent of the ‘send-
ing’ area in a TDR program. Next, a ‘receiving’ area is identified, consisting of 
an area that may be ripe for development and that, due to market conditions, 
can economically absorb added costs. The specific legal structure of the region 
or municipality is analyzed to determine how TDR provisions can be incorpo-
rated. In order for the TDR program to function effectively, the receiving area 
should not have options available outside of the employment of TDRs. Ideally, 
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a form of TDR bank should be created in order to facilitate the trading of TDRs 
and to provide the necessary market reliability and stability. To ensure a suc-
cessful program, provisions that dictate clearly how the transfer is to be made 
and recorded are essential.
It is useful to study TDR programs that are actively being employed, as well 
as those that are not. A review of the American Planning Association’s Model 
TDR ordinance112 may provide a starting point for governments outside of the 
U.S. who have yet to draft TDR provisions. With an initial focus on separate 
needs, or the needs of separate areas, and the selection of one to contribute 
to the ‘subsidy’ of the other, what remains is an analysis of a country’s po-
litical and legal structure in order to construct a ‘tool’ to make the transfer of 
funds a reality.
Looking forward, TDRs are one tool that will assist in resolving the cur-
rent national controversy in the U.S. that exists between property rights ac-
tivists and concerned citizens regarding the right of government to regulate 
land use for the common good. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo and 
the passage of Measure 37 in Oregon have spurred initiatives throughout the 
country. Elections will give an indication of the national support for a laissez-
faire mentality towards land use controls, and the subsequent years will de-
termine the solutions that will be employed to curtail the damage that lurks 
for our cities and the natural environment.
The New York City TDR program provides an example of how TDR provi-
sions can be changed over time to accommodate the changing needs of the 
jurisdiction to which they apply. Originally, the New York City TDR program 
required that the receiving site had to be right next to the sending site. Later, 
in order to assist the owners of the Grand Central Terminal, the receiving site 
could be located across the street from the sending site, and still later, the re-
ceiving site could be even a bit more distanced from the sending site. At this 
time, TDRs are one tool that will be used to finance the Hudson Yards Project – 
ultimately providing developers the opportunity to construct denser buildings 
than otherwise allowed, and at the same time providing the funding for the 
construction of a deck over an otherwise underutilized rail yard area.
The various provisions available to the areas of the Portland Metropolitan 
Region evidence the interest generated by TDRs and the needs of municipali-
ties and regions to resolve land use concerns, but the fact that they are not 
employed more often is indicative of the need for changes to the provisions. 
Planners indicate that there are no provisions for a TDR bank to facilitate the 
exchanges between parties.113 Therefore, the planning for a TDR bank, at the 
initial stages of setting up a TDR program, will likely help ensure a successful 
112  Model TDR Ordinance at http://www.planning.org/smartgrowthcodes/phase1.htm.
113  Interview with Portland City Planners, Portland, Oregon (March 20, 2006). 
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program because of the confidence and ease that the TDR bank will engender 
in communities.
In the discussion of the conservation case in Malibu, where the sending 
parcels needed to be located within 200 feet of a park and were not, the solu-
tion to annex the surrounding Los Angeles County properties to the park, and 
thus bring the donor lots to within the 200-foot requirement, demonstrated 
necessary flexibility. This flexibility is a necessary component that can make 
the difference between a TDR program that exists nicely in print in a code of 
law and one that is actively used for conservation, compensation or the re-
allocation of resources.
[ 167 ]
[ 168 ]
Table 7.1 Summarizing the U.S. cases
Case 1: Conservation – 
Malibu, California
Case 2: Conversion – Hudson 
Yards Project
Case 3: Re-allocation – Portland, 
The Sally McCracken Building
Period in which case was 
introduced
2005 2003 Early 1990s
General objective of 
proposed instrument
No increase in development 
in environmentally-sensitive 
areas 
To make use of an  -
underutilized section of 
the City (part of Manhattan 
borough) where land is 
scarce and valuable
To provide office space -
to defer sprawl -
To encourage development 
of new low-income housing, 
specifically SROs (singe-room 
occupancy buildings)
Characteristic factors Sending area is the Santa 
Monica Mountains Area 
coastal zone; Receiving areas 
are only 2 districts in the City 
of Malibu – MF (Multiple 
Family) and MFBF (Multi-
Family Beachfront)
Sending areas are: Eastern 
Rail Yard (ERY) and Phase II 
Hudson Blvd & Park.
Receiving areas for ERY are 
located to the north of ERY; 
for Phase II districts C2-8, 
C6-2, C6-4, and M1-5 
Owners of qualifying sites can 
transfer unused floor area to 
any location in the Central City 
Plan District
Particular economic and 
social circumstances 
that have determined the 
instrument
The California Coastal 
Commission was afraid that 
development from LA would 
spread to Malibu; large 
number of undeveloped 
parcels with limited 
infrastructure 
TDRs will help finance the  -
deck over the Eastern Rail 
Yards
TDRs will allow the density  -
levels appropriate and 
necessary for NYC
Loss of low income housing 
due to gentrification
Fit within planning and 
legal system: which 
relation with spatial 
plans?
Special coastal regulation, 
but basically TDCs are within 
the city zoning code that 
conforms to the city Land 
Use Plan 
TDR provisions are in 
municipal zoning resolution
TDR provisions for this case 
appear within one of the plan 
districts (Central City Plan 
District).
Areas that have unique 
characteristics or resources 
can form a District.
Case 1: Conservation – 
Malibu, California
Case 2: Conversion – Hudson 
Yards Project
Case 3: Re-allocation – Portland, 
The Sally McCracken Building
Were specific laws and 
regulations drawn up?
Not for this particular case Hudson Yards area was 
rezoned in 2005
Not for this particular case
Spatial level at which case 
is tackled
Because of sending area 
being outside of the City of 
Malibu, this is regional-like
Municipal District level
Relevant public actor(s) 
and role
The City of Malibu approves 
the transfer of TDCs
New York City -
Metropolitan  -
Transportation Authority 
Two corporations formed  -
to manage the finance and 
construction (HYIC and 
HYDC)
City of Portland approves the 
transfer
Balance between private 
and public exchange
Negotiations take place 
between owners of sending 
lots and owners of receiving 
lots. The Planning Director 
calculates TDCs and 
maintains the records of 
transfer.
Control of financing and  -
management is in public 
hands
Private developers will pay  -
for density bonuses and 
TDRs
Tax exemptions will be  -
available to private parties
Private companies owned 
sending and receiving 
properties
Parties which financed 
the case
The landowner who 
subdivided the 2 lots paid for 
the TDCs
New York City (general  -
fund) & private developers
Sale of long-term bonds to  -
be financed by revenues 
from the improvements
Sending area was building  -
owned by a non-profit 
organization
Owners of adjacent receiving  -
lots were owned by another 
company
Possibility for public 
participation
Public notice and review took 
place
Public notice and review  -
took place
Public forums in November  -
2002 and February 2003
Public notice and review took 
place 
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The Netherlands: 8 
experiments with non-
financial compensation 
instruments in planning 
practice
Leonie Janssen-Jansen, Marjolein Spaans & Menno van der Veen
Introduction8.1 
The Netherlands is one of the world’s most densely populated countries. The 
population numbers approximately 16.5 million inhabitants. With an area of 
41,526 km2 (16,033 mi2; including 18.41% water), land is scarce and economic 
and population growth keep the Netherlands in a constant state of recon-
struction. It is becoming increasingly difficult to meet all these needs without 
damaging the overall quality of the rural and urban countryside. The Neth-
erlands has traditionally tolerated and accepted greater levels of public in-
tervention in the land market than neighboring countries like Belgium and 
the U.K. However, over recent years, the call for more market-oriented instru-
ments has been increasing.
Planning framework8.2 
The Spatial Planning Act (WRO) has formed the legal basis for Dutch plan-
ning since 1962. It established a framework within which spatial policy could 
be formulated. Each of the three government levels – national, provincial and 
municipal – has its own planning authority and growth is controlled by regu-
lations and policies at each of these levels. Although the planning system has 
a clear hierarchy, with each planning level monitored for consistency with the 
goals at a higher level, only the local land use plan is legally binding (Evers, 
2004: 212). The national policy is persuasive. There is no national plan as such, 
but national legislation obliges national government to publish its planning 
strategies periodically. The prevailing Dutch spatial policy is presented in 
the recently published National Spatial Strategy (Nota Ruimte, Ministerie van 
VROM et al., 2004). At the provincial level, regional plans are drawn up that 
implement goals articulated in the national reports, and which coordinate the 
various local land use plans within the provinces. The regional plan is regula-
tory. The local level is the most important: the local land use plans indicate 
where development is allowed and what uses are permitted. If a building ap-
plication conforms to the requirements of a local land use plan and additional 
requirements, the local authority should issue a permit. Although this system 
of zoning may appear quite rigid, flexibility has been built into the system by 
an exemption procedure (Article 19 of the WRO), which allows local authori-
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ties to move away from the provisions of an existing local land use plan. This 
planning by exception is used quite frequently (Evers, 2004: 213). Some argue 
(Evaluatiecommissie WRO/Bro, 1994; Sommer, 2003) that the famous Dutch 
planning doctrine, with its urban containment strategies and compact new 
towns, is therefore not as successful as planners in other countries usually 
think.
In response to the societal demand for new and more decentralized plan-
ning policies and area-oriented and location-specific policies, the Dutch 
growth-control policy seems to have been abandoned in the latest report 
on spatial planning (2004). Adaptive planning and spatial development, per-
formed by local and regional players in strategic alliances, with less national 
governmental steering, makes up the new Dutch planning style. With this 
shift, the Dutch government followed the international trend toward more 
regionally-focused planning (Peirce et al., 1993; Orfield, 1997; Katz, 2000; Essel-
brugge & Van der Heijden, 2004; Johnson & Peirce, 2004; WRR, 1999). After this 
change in planning philosophy, market-oriented developments have been re-
ceiving a lot of attention.
Towards more market-oriented 8.3 
planning instruments?
In the near future several new planning laws will become effective. The new 
Spatial Planning Act has become effective in mid-2008 (www.minvrom.nl). 
This revision is quite fundamental in Dutch terms and will provide a less 
complex Act: the two main planning documents will be a strategic plan and 
a legally binding plan. The distinction between policy statements and legally 
binding statements will be made clearer. Non-binding structure visions will 
reflect the strategic and indicative policies together with general descriptions 
provided by the provinces and national government (Spaans & De Wolff, 2005). 
However, in the new Act not only local governments will be able to provide 
for legally binding land use plans, but this competence will also be assigned 
to both national and provincial governments, which will then be able to draw 
up binding national and provincial land use plans. This will enable them to 
establish elements of spatial planning that are of national or provincial im-
portance. Furthermore, measures will be taken to keep the land use plans 
up-to-date (Spaans & De Wolff, 2005). Land policy is given a more regional di-
mension when the 2008 Land Development Act (Grondexploitatiewet) came in-
to effect. However, this Act is limited to the redistribution of land within one 
planning area. Although it offers some possibilities to redistribute between 
developments at different locations, this remains very problematic.
With these new laws, opportunities for more operational strategies are 
sought to enable more development-oriented spatial planning. This new fo-
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cus in planning is about interactive development and implementation aimed 
at developing value-added comprehensive plans for an area, in cooperation 
with all regional stakeholders. The ultimate goal is to improve spatial quality 
by coupling spatial investments, protecting natural resources and revitalizing 
communities in the Netherlands by means of comprehensive, area-oriented 
approaches. Furthermore, emphasis is placed on a more direct influence of 
private interests on planning. For the Dutch steering philosophy this repre-
sents a considerable change.
During the last decade, the price of land and the functioning of the land 
market through the specific Dutch land policy have often been discussed. For 
example, the classical governance concept of land use (the zoning of land) 
and the possibilities of a more market-oriented approach (impact fees, open 
space fees, imposing taxes on windfall profits) are currently being discussed. 
In Dutch planning practice, the possibilities of an area-oriented approach 
with so-called project envelopes in which profitable projects are coupled to 
non-profitable projects via scope optimalization, in order to integrate red (ur-
ban) and green (rural/nature) forms of land use receive attention. In this way 
surplus profits of projects can be invested in the quality of an area (De Wolff 
et al., 2004). For example, the realization of the Tweede Maasvlakte (an exten-
sion of the Rotterdam harbor area into the sea) also requires the realization of 
new countryside.
Public-private partnerships, such as development companies (i.e. special 
purpose companies that consist of both public and private parties whose goal 
is to develop one specific area or project), may facilitate the implementation, 
for example via benefit-sharing agreements. This implies that the profits of 
public as well as private actors above a previously agreed level of reasonable 
profit find their way back into the project budget. Most of these projects are 
local in nature; conversion at a regional level rarely exists. However, in ad-
dition to these local, experimental and often voluntary arrangements, pleas 
have been made for regional funds by the Council for Rural Areas (RLG, 2002) 
and the VROM-Council (2002), for example for the comprehensive develop-
ment of the rural countryside to prevent the fragmentation of policies. These 
concepts are close to the idea of non-financial compensation. The trend for 
area-oriented development planning thus shows an increasing popularity in 
the Netherlands for such pay-as-you-grow principles (confer concurrency), 
aimed at the realization of greater spatial quality (WRR, 1999; Spit, 2003) by 
redistributing between profitable and non-profitable developments.
There are some clear differences between Dutch planning practice and 
planning practice in many other countries. In the Netherlands there is no 
property rights shares, as for example in the U.S. (bundle of rights) (see al-
so the Chapter 7 on the U.S.). Development rights cannot be separated from 
the land. Furthermore, the starting point of land use differs (Needham, 2006). 
Non-financial compensation schemes are, in essence, legally possible in the 
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Netherlands if the goal of the program is explicitly related to the goal for spa-
tial quality improvement in the area (the causation requirement) (Tweede 
Kamer, 2004). At this moment, only one example exists in practice: the Space 
for Space concept (see Section 4.3 on the conversion case). Furthermore, the 
idea of recouping the ‘surplus value’ of planning decisions is becoming more 
important in the Netherlands.114 The surplus value, as a result of a zoning 
change, should be recaptured for the benefit of society. A financial planning 
compensation mechanism (planschade – article 49 Dutch Spatial Planning Law) 
has been in place for several decades, and now the discussion is about how to 
‘milk the cow of land value growth’. The idea behind it is that no individual 
property owner or resident has a legal right to a particular zoning ordinance. 
Thus, zoning is increasingly seen as a community property right, instead of a 
personal property right (Fischel, 1985: 36). Recapturing would result in more 
distributive justice (the gain is unearned), would reduce the temptation to 
misuse planning decisions for individual interests, might reduce land specu-
lation by reducing its gains, might increase trust in governmental planning 
decisions, and might reduce growing public objections to new development. 
This kind of levy is a sort of alternative fiscal source: there is money for com-
pensation because the market only develops if it is profitable (Alterman, 2005). 
As a result of these ideas, a new system of cost recovery (Grondexploitatiewet) 
in the forthcoming new Land Development Act has recently been introduced 
and accepted (Ministerie van VROM, 2007). Related to this idea is the discus-
sion about the question of the extent to which a community can require new 
developments to finance local public services. Only directly apportioned costs 
can be attributed to new developments according to existing law. The new law 
seems to broaden the grounds for cost recovery. At this moment there is also 
attention focused on non-financial compensation instruments as a manner to 
recoup surplus value. What kind of permutations of the classic non-financial 
compensation would be interesting for the Netherlands? An important as-
sumption is the belief that transaction costs can be changed into transaction 
opportunities. Via so-called ‘recombination’, different interests can be con-
nected (Van der Heijden & Slob, 2006). Recombination is about the innovative 
cooperation between sometimes differing interests. Two of the examples in 
this chapter, the conservation example in the province of Limburg and the 
re-allocation example in Amsterdam (described in Sections 4.2 and 4.4) re-
flect other ideas for the use of non-financial compensation in planning in the 
Netherlands.
114  However, also a counter movement exists, for example in Rotterdam. In this municipality the land lease 
system has recently been abandoned due to the political reasoning that this type of recouping of value was 
an outdated system.
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Conservation case:  8.4 
the Limburg experiment
Introduction8.4.1 
Recently, the pay-as-you-grow concept received attention in the province of 
Limburg in the south of the Netherlands in reaction to the decision by the na-
tional government to economize on the development of the countryside (2003). 
The policy to buy land for natural development was changed into a nature 
conservation policy. The province of Limburg had to differentiate between the 
national ecological infrastructure and the provincial ecological ambitions. The 
latter could not be realized or conserved anymore with national financial help, 
and so the provincial government searched for other – non-financial – mecha-
nisms to improve the quality of the Limburg landscape. The two priorities were 
new initiatives for partnerships to improve the spatial quality of the province 
as well as system innovations for agricultural nature maintenance (Verhoeven, 
2005: 280). The idea of TDRs was adopted (Bruil et al., 2004) as a way of using 
the market for area development. The Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing 
and the Environment was interested in the Limburg experiment (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2005) and in 2005 the concept of VORm was born. VORm (Verhandelbare 
ontwikkelingsrechten methode) can be translated as the TDR method.115 VORm is 
part of the Contourenbeleid (Growth Boundary policy) of the Province of Limburg, 
which has been in force since June 2005. This policy emphasizes the separation 
between rural and urban land. Around each urban area a growth boundary has 
been implemented. Development within the boundary is possible; but outside 
the boundary, development is only possible under strict conditions: there have 
to be accompanying improvements to the overall quality of the rural country-
side, the development site and the province as a whole.
VORm in Limburg: red for green policy8.4.2 
The concept of VORm is about recouping windfall profits from land that are 
the result of public decision-making for public goals. Desirable developments 
are encouraged, but public compensation is required through investment in 
the provincial program on nature development (POG – Provinciale Ontwikke-
lingsruimte Groene waarden)116. The province uses three models to decide on the 
amount of compensation due. The first model is used for the development of 
115  However, this name might be a bit misleading. The concept runs down to a form of planning obliga-
tions in the Dutch planning system. Furthermore, in Dutch the word transfarable is translated as tradable.
116  This is true for all development in Southern Limburg; housing developments in Northern and Middle 
Limburg will have to contribute to Limburg’s Space for Space program (www.limburg.nl). 
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one or a small number of additional117 development sites for expensive hous-
ing, without complicating factors such as soil and sanitation. The second 
model is used for the extension of an existing industry or farm. The last mod-
el is used for larger and more complex housing projects. An example of the 
VORm policy is the red for green policy for new country estates (nieuwe land-
goederen). This policy encourages the development of a country estate outside 
the growth boundaries. Each new development has to include sufficient new 
countryside, for example in a ratio of 1 hectare red to 10 hectares green land 
usage. Such an initiative should be laid down in the local land use plan, the 
red as well as the green components. A civil law contract binds the develop-
ers to realizing the green part (Provincie Limburg, 2006: 14).
Evaluation8.4.3 
Limburg’s VORm and the red for green policy concerning new country estates 
are new. No actual cases have been implemented yet, although it is already 
possible to apply for such development. Some project developers have looked 
into the program, but have decided not to develop because the conditions 
were too strict and they thought the share of the profit that would be redirect-
ed was too large. It is to be expected that most of the VORm development – if 
it happens – will take place at the local level, paid for by private parties (ci-
vilians). The project fits within the Dutch framework, as the VORm project is 
part of Limburg’s regional plan. However, it is questionable whether this form 
of non-financial compensation that in fact deals with planning gain in a more 
open and calculated way than what was used to be the case in land servicing 
plans, will hold up in court.
Conversion case: Noord-Brabant’s 8.5 
Space for Space program
Objective and background8.5.1 
An interesting conversion project in the Netherlands is the Space for Space 
program (Ruimte voor Ruimte) in the province of Noord-Brabant, in the south of 
the Netherlands. This Space for Space program is one of the most extensive 
red for green projects in the Netherlands. The aim of the project is to achieve 
a qualitatively better arrangement between urban and rural areas by means 
of a system of conversion whereby expensive houses on large parcels finance 
117  In addition to the agreements between the Province and the local authorities.
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the demolition of stables118 (see Figure 8.1). The project came from the EU’s 
new nitrate guidelines, which stated that phosphate and nitrate emissions 
had to be reduced. The Dutch national government focused on reducing the 
intensive livestock production of pigs by encouraging farmers to stop their 
business activities by buying their emission rights. Many farmers participated 
in this reconstruction program of intensive livestock farming laid down in a 
statute (Reconstructie concentratiegebieden Zandgronden: Tweede Kamer, 1999). It 
was not the location of the livestock industries that was of interest, but the 
amount of manure, reflecting the sectoral nature of the regulation. No atten-
tion was paid to the stables that might become vacant. Furthermore, no differ-
entiation was made between the locations of closed business activities, even 
though, from a spatial point of view, it would have been preferable to termi-
nate intensive livestock farming in environmentally vulnerable areas rather 
118  Additional financing is created through the municipal and provincial allowance of additional expensive 
housing. In exchange for paying demolition costs to a farmer, one can get such additional building rights 
and search for land to develop, which will be sold for a fixed price by the municipalities. Due to the risks in 
almost all cases, a public-private company functions as an intermediary. Surplus profits are paid into the 
fund, which pays for additional quality improvement to give the municipalities something in return.
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than in agricultural development zones. However, farmers in both zones were 
allowed to participate in the regulation. The five reconstruction provinces in 
the Netherlands decided to implement the Space for Space program.
Space for Space8.5.2 
This program aimed to demolish derelict stables on intensive livestock farms 
and also added a spatial dimension to the agricultural reconstruction. With this 
program it was possible to give an additional financial incentive above and be-
yond the cease and desist regulation to farmers terminating business activities. 
At the same time, the quality of the countryside was improved by clearing the 
landscape of vacant stables which were perceived as ugly. In doing so, rural ar-
eas were cleared of buildings. The demolition of the stables prevented a situa-
tion arising in which the former stables are used for undesirable activities such 
as those associated with car dealerships and caravan parking areas. This area-
oriented approach has been laid down in the Brakkestein Pact (Ministerie van 
LNV, 2000). National government approved the proposal whereby the provincial 
authorities allowed some additional expensive housing on large parcels (with a 
maximum of 6,500 units) in order to finance the demolition of the stables. The 
villas had to fit in with their surroundings. At the moment, the demolition pro-
cess is in full swing, and plans are being developed for the new housing plots. 
The project started in 2002 and will be finished around 2010. The project has a 
strong regional focus, especially in the province of Noord-Brabant. Each prov-
ince has its own elaboration of the Space for Space program.
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Organization8.5.3 
The regional conversion process in the province of Noord-Brabant is collabor-
atively organized in a development bank which was founded in 2001. This TDR 
bank is a public-private partnership called Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Ruimte 
voor Ruimte (ORR; Space for Space Development Company) (Janssen-Jansen, 
2004). Within this company five private actors, developers (Heijmans, IBC and 
Grontmij) and financial institutions (NIB Capital Bank and the Bank Dutch 
Municipalities (BNG)) work together with the province. The private parties 
each have a 16% share in the investments; the province leading the Space for 
Space process has a share of 20%. Thus, the parties in the consortium jointly 
look after the revolving fund for the demolition compensation, and in return 
receive permission to construct a large housing project. A farmer can also de-
molish his own stable and receive a building permit in return. That permit 
however, can only be used in a receiving area, not on the plot of his stable. 
These receiving areas are not explicitly designated. General conditions, for 
example that the villas can only be constructed within or adjacent to existing 
villages and cities, indicate which parcels are allowed as receiving areas. The 
development company enables a regional redistribution between sending ar-
eas and receiving areas. The whole countryside of Noord-Brabant is designat-
ed as a sending area. No priority provisions were made between, for example, 
agricultural development zones and vulnerable nature areas. This is because 
zoning followed the actual reconstruction. The negative carrots (‘sticks’) (fines 
imposed by the EU) have reversed the process. Most of the sites on which the 
stables are being demolished are unfit for new commercial activities. In this 
example, the conversion principle is coupled to a sort of containment because 
green boundaries define where building is not permitted, for example in the 
ecologically important zones. This presents the possibility of realizing Space 
for Space parcels on more spatially desirable lots located within or near the 
border of already urbanized areas rather than in vulnerable or valuable areas. 
Because only the requirements of the receiving areas are given, and not those 
of the locations themselves, this can be characterized as a form of ‘loose zon-
ing’. Establishing suitable locations is difficult because the local circumstanc-
es differ. The ORR is responsible for the localized fitting. The municipalities 
have to agree on the locations because they have to be included in their local 
land use plans.
Results: demolition of stables and realization 8.5.4 
of large parcels
Four types of demolition locations can be distinguished within the Noord-
Brabant Space for Space program: (1) a demolition location in an area where 
the livestock industry has been harmful for the environment; (2) a demolition 
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location on the border of a village or city; (3) a demolition location in an agri-
cultural development area; and (4) a demolition location that can also be used 
as a building location. This last type has to fulfill the receiving area require-
ments. This location type is uncommon in Noord-Brabant. Furthermore, there 
are a lot of farmers who sell their environmental rights, but do not continue 
with the demolition process. High residual values are the main reason for 
this. The increase of the overall quality of the rural land is greatest if stables 
are demolished in vulnerable locations. However, the nature of the Regulation 
ending the holding of livestock (RBV – Regeling Beëindiging Veehouderijtakken) 
is agricultural in nature and was not intended to have a spatial dimension. It 
is to be assumed that such locational differentiation was politically not pos-
sible because of the resulting social inequity for farmers. Furthermore, par-
ticipation in the RBV was voluntary. In addition, the timetable was too strict. 
Coupling a spatial goal to the environmental goal implied that both limitation 
on animal manure production (mestquotum) and the demolition of the stables 
had to be carried out in 2003 in order to meet the EU nitrate guideline. An op-
portunity seems to have been lost in that no sending areas were defined.
The other side of the Space for Space coin consists of the building/receiv-
ing sites. Parcels can be realized at three types of locations in Noord-Brabant: 
(1) within existing urbanized areas; (2) on the border of a village or (3) within 
an urban cluster in the countryside. No precise location is designated for the 
sending areas, there is only rather vague zoning. Local tailor-made solutions 
were preferred for each of these locations for which municipal and private 
initiatives are the point of departure. Research has shown that the realization 
of expensive housing on these three types of locations contributes to an in-
crease in overall quality of the area, for example if an unsightly urban fringe 
is complemented with housing on large parcels. Formerly denied proposals 
should not be resubmitted. What is needed is added value, and the province 
has a dual responsibility in this process. According to its governmental role, 
it must guarantee spatial quality and this might result in the rejection of 
proposed locations. According to its civil law role, as a partner in the ORR, it 
benefits most from the expedient realization of as many parcels as possible. 
Sometimes this causes conflicts. The municipalities are responsible for the fi-
nal quality gain at the level of the individual building, as they have to agree to 
the final building permits. The level of quality gain differs between the loca-
tion types. Housing development in existing urban areas benefits most from 
the careful use of space as referred to in the Noord-Brabant regional plan 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002).
Locally, no urgent need is felt for regional red for green. The urbanized ar-
eas in particular have little interest in realizing large housing parcels. They 
are able to build enough housing and find it financially more attractive to 
develop housing themselves. The realization of the Space for Space parcels 
has been slowed down by this lack of interest. Participation by the munici-
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palities was supposed to be on a voluntary basis, but at the start of the pro-
gram it was decided that all the Noord-Brabant municipalities should benefit 
from the additional profits as these have to be invested in the open space of 
Noord-Brabant (via a reconstruction fund). This extra green cost carrier is not 
acknowledged. On the contrary, the rural municipalities, which have limited 
building possibilities, are willing to participate. However, the national gov-
ernment recently relaxed the restrictions on building opportunities in the 
countryside. In addition, in its Administrative Arrangement of 2003 (Bestuurs-
akkoord 2003) the province of Noord-Brabant abandoned its strict building pol-
icy. Opponents of this change in policy, like the provincial governor of Noord-
Brabant, point out that it interfers with the Space for Space policy (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 2003). The relaxation referred to will result in an increasing 
supply of expensive housing in the countryside and a decreasing willingness 
of municipalities to participate in the Space for Space program. The condition 
that these rural municipalities are only allowed to build to cater to their own 
population increases will do little to change this situation. The policymakers 
assume that municipalities will only realize small houses for young people or 
the elderly and no large villas and thus do not see the relaxation as a threat 
to the Space for Space program.
To recapitulate, the quality of the parcels is not a problem at this stage of 
the process, but the same cannot be said for the number of potential parcels. 
Due to the economic recession in the first years of the program, it has been 
difficult to sell suitable parcels at desirable prices for a sustained period of 
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time and the prices have dropped because of increased competition. As the 
demolition subsidies have already been paid, these distributional difficulties 
appear to result in a financial deficit for the ORR (and thus for the province). 
The provincial and national governments abandoning the scarcity policy will 
undoubtedly have consequences for relations within the ORR. In the public-
private partnership contracts, the provincial authorities had covered this un-
certainty financially, and this turned out to be a significant risk. However, as 
the economic situation has improved over the last year, the parcels are selling 
more easily today.
Evaluation8.5.5 
The Space for Space program offers the opportunity to improve the overall 
spatial quality of the area, in this case Noord-Brabant, by demolishing empty 
stables and realizing expensive villas via a unique system of non-financial 
compensation. Although the Space for Space program has not yet been com-
pleted, the overall conclusion is that it is successful. However, some planning 
lawyers disagree with this method of spatial exchange. They view the recap-
turing of windfalls not as a sort of compensation to society for granting build-
ing permits but as payment for the permits together with neglect for quality 
improvements. This is not possible according to Dutch law, although none of 
them have appealed to this program to test the legal framework.
Re-allocation case8.6 
Introduction8.6.1 
Instruments for re-allocation, as in the Valencia case discussed in the chap-
ter on Spain (Chapter 5), do not exist in the Netherlands. However, in the last 
century, land re-adjustment was a common instrument in the agricultural 
sector. Land re-adjustment results in the exchange of agricultural areas with-
in a designated area in order to contribute to a more efficient use of space. 
More recently, the Dutch have created common land exploitation companies 
wherein some spatial exchange has taken place. These are called Joint Land 
Exploitation Companies (Gemeenschappelijke Exploitatie Maatschappij (GEM)) and 
were intended to deal with the building activities in the so-called VINEX areas. 
National government stated in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning Extra 
(VINEX) (Ministerie van VROM, 1990), that new, mostly greenfield development 
was necessary on a large scale. To prevent urban sprawl, well-indicated areas 
were designated for the development of housing, the so-called VINEX areas 
(see further Subsection 8.6.2). Also, in the new CBD of Amsterdam, the South 
Axis, functions will be re-allocated (see further Subsection 8.6.3).
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GEM in VINEX (Vleuterweide)8.6.2 
Since the VINEX report, plans for new urban expansions have been drawn up 
for many locations in the Netherlands. In the overall housing program about 
1.1 million dwellings were involved, to be built on both greenfield and brown-
field areas. The program is a policy rather than a plan, and consists of con-
tracts with local and regional authorities, allocated quotas and selected sites. 
The largest VINEX operation, Leidsche Rijn, is planned in the middle of the 
Netherlands, near Utrecht. Leidsche Rijn involves constructing 30,000 new 
homes (for 80,000 people) by the year 2015. The ambitious objectives of this 
project have required complex organization: 14 public players (national min-
istries, the province of Utrecht and the municipalities of Utrecht and Vleuten-
De Meern) reached an agreement to start the VINEX Leidsche Rijn operation 
in 1995. To begin with, the design was awarded to a private consultancy firm 
that produced a master plan in a single year by bringing together 50 profes-
sional urban planners. In 2000, the City of Vleuten-De Meern merged into the 
City of Utrecht.
Vleuterweide is one of the sub-centers of Leidsche Rijn. By 2010, about 
6,000 dwellings will be created in an area of 240 hectares. The City of Vleuten-
De Meern owned one third of the land in the area, and four project developers 
(Amvest, AMWonen, Ballast Nedam and Fortis) owned most of the remaining 
two thirds. Local government and private developers reached an agreement 
on establishing a joint venture in which both partners would have a 50% 
share. The name of this joint venture was GEM Vleuterweide (Joint Land Ex-
ploitation Company). This company, established in 2000, is responsible for ob-
taining the remaining land, preparing the site for building, selling land to the 
project developers that are the private shareholders in the joint venture and 
arranging the public area. Within this process, the plots of all owners have 
been re-allocated in order to obtain the optimal overall quality of the area. In 
this process, public as well as private partners have been involved. In the ini-
tial contracts, each owner has been allocated a share of buildable land in rela-
tion to its contribution. A so-called claim accounting (claimboekhouding) has 
been agreed upon to translate the distribution of development rights amongst 
the partners into numbers and types of houses. The risks for the government 
were reduced by sharing them on a fifty-fifty basis with the private partners 
(Glaser, 2005).
Sports in the South Axis8.6.3 
The Amsterdam Zuidas (South Axis) covers a linear area of 30 hectares on 
either side of the Amsterdam ring road, between the center of Amsterdam 
and Schiphol, the main airport of the Netherlands. The project aims to give 
Amsterdam a Central Business District (CBD) in a lively, prestigious, mixed-
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use neighborhood combining international headquarters with residential fa-
cilities, galleries, museums, theatres, shops, restaurants and sports facilities. 
As an international neighborhood, the aim is that the South Axis will com-
pete with major European cities. Its main railway station, Amsterdam Zuid 
WTC, will probably be connected to the high-speed train (under construction) 
to Paris (Salet & Majoor, 2005).
In 2005, a new partnership was established in order to enable the con-
struction of an underground ‘dock model’ in the central area (Salet & Majoor, 
2005: 40). By placing motorways and rail tracks underground, approximately 
1,000,000m2 of additional surface area can be made available for development. 
This will also greatly reduce air and noise pollution and enable greater varia-
tion in the urban development. Currently, large residential developments are 
forbidden due to environmental laws regarding noise and pollution associat-
ed with the infrastructural corridor that cuts right through the area.
Many public actors are financially involved in the project. In 2006, the City 
of Amsterdam, the regional organ of Amsterdam (ROA), the province of Noord-
Holland and the Dutch national government signed a contract in which they 
worked out the financial contributions, the (public) goals of the project and 
most notably the procedures that would be used to attract investors willing 
to buy shares in the South Axis enterprise (Zuidasonderneming). The corpora-
tion will be formed in 2008 when all the shares will have been sold. The City 
of Amsterdam will own 20% of the shares of the corporation, and the nation-
al government will also own 20%. Private parties (mostly banks and pension 
funds) will also own some shares. It is a unique case for Amsterdam that the 
public parties will only own a minority interest in the enterprise.
The national government will, therefore, have a say in the enterprise but 
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Figure 8.4 Amsterdam, AFC Sports Park in 2005
Source: Salet & Majoor, 2005, p. 56
all specific public regulations will be made by the City of Amsterdam.
One of the landowners in the South Axis area is the Amsterdam Football 
Club (AFC). On the existing playing fields, high-rise offices will appear over 
the next decade. However, the amateur club will not leave the area; the sports 
fields will be realized above the existing train tracks and highway, on the roof 
of the dock, occupying more than 40,000m2 of the most expensive land in 
the Netherlands. The dock will cost about €2 billion. Although the final deci-
sion about its construction has not yet been made, the actors involved do not 
doubt its future realization. The sports fields will form the central park of the 
South Axis (although football will be played on artificial and not real grass).
From an outsider’s viewpoint, it is difficult to understand how amateur 
football club members are able to occupy such expensive land. In the past, 
the municipality has had many problems when attempting to relocate sport 
clubs. From a political point of view, it is not desirable to begin such a process. 
Furthermore, famous sports figures like Ruud Gullit and Marco van Basten 
and some Dutch television personalities often play at AFC after their active 
football careers; the pressure to remain in the location is tremendous. The 
executive committee of the football club began communications with the City 
of Amsterdam after the South Axis development was decided upon. The com-
mittee proposed giving AFC a plot within this new development according to 
the principle of multiple and intensive use of space (Haan & Rengers, 2005). In 
this example, the sport fields will be reallocated in the development area; the 
original sports park will be used for offices and the revenues from this devel-
opment will finance the dock and the new sports fields on the dock.
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Figure 8.5 Amsterdam, AFC Sports Park in 2030 on top of the South Axis Dock
Source: Salet & Majoor, 2005, p. 56
Evaluation and debate8.7 
The most elaborate non-financial compensation initiative in the Netherlands 
is the Space for Space program. In addition, the GEM example is now seen as 
common practice. The other examples discussed above are still in their in-
fancy. The success of the Space for Space programs resulted in other ideas for 
pay-as-you-grow arrangements and increased attention for sustainable land-
scape development, such as in the Limburg initiative. In addition, the South 
Axis sports park reallocation is seen as an interesting experiment, although 
some argue that after seven years of debate, this reallocation has become a 
project in itself instead of a way to keep all of the involved participants satis-
fied (Majoor, in: Haan & Rengers, 2005).
In all the Dutch variants exchange is noticeable. However, none of the vari-
ants utilizes a classic TDR system. Recapturing windfalls, however, can be 
seen as a kind of compensation to society for granting building permits (see 
the Limburg example). All of these TDR-like options seem to have pitfalls. One 
major pitfall is that in all options the right to develop will be made dependent 
upon a non-spatial requirement. In doing this, major legal obstacles exist. 
Principally, planning requirements must have a causal relation with the de-
velopment. Recently, however, a system of cost recovery in a broad, regional 
sense has been introduced in the new Land Development Act (Grondexploitatie-
wet). On a voluntary basis, developers in a region can contribute to the spatial 
quality of the region. In the draft of the implementation of the law, develop-
ment of the countryside, for example, is mentioned; but the idea of demolish-
ing old development might also fall within the scope of the law. Exchanging 
developments seems to be more likely to take place under this new law. Fur-
thermore, this new law might be the first official step to legalizing non-spatial 
conditions for developments. The space for space system has been silently 
approved, after all (Janssen-Jansen & Van der Veen, 2006).
Pay-as-you-grow planning principles can be included as interesting addi-
tional instruments in Dutch planning. In this paper we have discussed the 
paradigm shift towards a more development-oriented planning. This para-
digm shift should mean that the complexity of urban society is better ad-
dressed. With developmental planning policies, the command-and-control 
role of government changes into a more active role creating sustainable de-
velopments. The steering role of the government in a developmental planning 
system is no less involved than in a more permissive planning system, in fact 
it is more involved. Market players, as long as they accept the public interest 
of sustainable development, will secure a more prominent position in a devel-
opment-oriented planning system, and that also puts emphasis on recouping 
surplus values for society by redistributing the profits of profitable land uses 
(offices, commercial housing) to loss-inducing projects (parks) on a regional 
scale. The intent is not that development-oriented planning as such will be 
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more profitable, but that this kind of planning will result in more initiatives 
and thus strengthen the creativity and innovative solutions – resulting in im-
proved sustainability. The focus is on transaction opportunities rather than 
transaction costs. Insights are needed about the positive and negative costs of 
this kind of (voluntary) cooperation. In addition, fiscal incentives can be used 
to encourage changes in the behavior of individuals and organizations.
In the Netherlands, redistribution between land uses is becoming more in-
stitutionalized. Red for green principles, sometimes with a TDR-like conver-
sion, are becoming more and more common. The successful Space for Space 
program in Noord-Brabant has been approved. Voluntary exchange is slowly 
penetrating the minds of developers; this increases the opportunities for non-
voluntary exchange. Public intervention in the land market has been quite 
common in the Netherlands, after all. Government is often seen as the actor 
that is responsible for the creation of public value, for example via the de-
velopment of new instruments. Conditional planning and setting standards 
for development are also common. Zoning can be seen as a collectively-held 
entitlement and thus as a collective property right. It would not be surprising 
if the approach to private property rights shifts slightly. The planning system 
will increasingly frame developments focusing on conditions to frame the 
collective action space. For now, Dutch planners seem to be moving toward a 
planning system where market players occupy a different position; if they co-
operate in realizing more sustainable development, by developing under the 
pre-set governmental conditions and reinvesting the ‘market money’ in the 
quality of the development as a whole, they will be able to contribute to their 
own goals as well as to the goals of society.
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Table 8.1 Summarizing the Dutch cases
Conservation Conversion Reallocation
Limburg experiment 
VORm
Brabant’s Space for 
Space program
GEM Vleuterweide 
(City of Utrecht)
Zuidas enterprise in 
South Axis (City of 
Amsterdam)
Period in which 
case was introduced
Still in set-up phase, 
first experiments since 
2006
2001 Contract signed in 
2000
Proposal was signed in 
2005 by partnership
General objective 
of proposed 
instrument
Reinvesting 
windfall profits of 
a few additional 
development sites in 
provincial countryside 
development program
Financing demolition 
of stables of intensive 
livestock industries 
(and thus reducing 
emissions) by using 
profits from additional 
housing sites
Comprehensive 
development of 
new housing area 
with 6000 houses 
via reallocation of 
developments rights
Relocation of landowner 
AFC within the project
Characteristic 
factors
Use of profits from 
urban land uses for 
provincial policy 
on countryside 
development
Embedding non-spatial 
policy aims in a spatial 
plan
Reallocation of plots in 
order to get the most 
optimal overall quality 
of the area
Relocation of sports 
fields of a powerful 
football club within a 
major internationally 
competing business 
district
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined 
the instrument
Decision of national 
government 
to economise 
on countryside 
development
Need to meet the 
EU objectives on the 
reduction of phosphate 
and nitrate emissions 
and thus need to 
create a financial 
fund to facilitate the 
demolition of stables 
of intensive livestock 
farms
VINEX goals to 
develop 30,000 houses 
in Leidsche Rijn (and 
6,000 in Vleuterweide) 
– divided ownership of 
land in the area
Powerful landowner 
with land to be 
redeveloped in the 
project which caused 
problems in the 
relocation of land within 
the project
Fit within planning 
and legal system: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Initiatives have to be 
laid down in the local 
land use plans
Doubts about legally 
sound elaboration: 
relation between 
demolition of stables 
and recouping of 
windfalls of a land use 
with no relation to the 
stables. Link has to be 
included in the local 
land use plan
Proposed development 
has been laid down in a 
local land use plan
Deal between original 
landowners and public-
private partnership 
participants. Ultimately 
inclusion of the 
relocation in land use 
plan
Conservation Conversion Reallocation
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
No Yes: the regulation 
on the ending of 
livestock branches and 
the Brakkestein Pact 
(2000)
No No
Spatial level at 
which case is 
tackled
Provincial level Provincial level Project and local level Project and local level, 
with also national 
interference
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
Province of Limburg 
(initiative and 
coordination) and local 
authorities(imple-
mentation of 
additional sites)
Province of Noord-
Brabant (initiative 
and coordination) 
and local authorities 
(implementation of 
additional sites)
Former City of  
Vleuten-De Meern 
(contracts have been 
adopted by the City of 
Utrecht)
Local authority of 
Amsterdam (public 
actor in public-prive 
partnership and 
responsible for land 
assembly)
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
Mainly a contract 
between province and 
local authority. Local 
authority passes on the 
recouping of profits of 
the additional site to 
private developers
Strong coordinating 
role of public sector 
(province and local 
authorities). Individual 
farmers ending 
their business and 
developers also benefit
Joint venture on 50-50 
basis (risks, influence 
etc.)
Hardly. Deal between 
landowner and public-
prive partnership about 
relocation of land use
Parties which 
financed the case
Ultimately the private 
developers (and thus 
the end users) pay 
for the countryside 
development
Revolving fund of 
Space for Space 
Development Company 
includes 5 private 
developers and 
financial institutions 
(each 16% share) and 
province (20% share)
Developers and 
municipality
Public private 
partnership responsible 
for the overall financing 
of the project (banks, 
national government 
etc.)
Possibility for public 
participation
Through the formal 
public participation 
in the local land 
use plan, as the 
linking of additional 
development site 
and countryside 
development has to be 
laid down in this plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan, 
but in the specific deal 
on relocation
Table 8.1 continued
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Table 8.1 Summarizing the Dutch cases
Conservation Conversion Reallocation
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Brabant’s Space for 
Space program
GEM Vleuterweide 
(City of Utrecht)
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South Axis (City of 
Amsterdam)
Period in which 
case was introduced
Still in set-up phase, 
first experiments since 
2006
2001 Contract signed in 
2000
Proposal was signed in 
2005 by partnership
General objective 
of proposed 
instrument
Reinvesting 
windfall profits of 
a few additional 
development sites in 
provincial countryside 
development program
Financing demolition 
of stables of intensive 
livestock industries 
(and thus reducing 
emissions) by using 
profits from additional 
housing sites
Comprehensive 
development of 
new housing area 
with 6000 houses 
via reallocation of 
developments rights
Relocation of landowner 
AFC within the project
Characteristic 
factors
Use of profits from 
urban land uses for 
provincial policy 
on countryside 
development
Embedding non-spatial 
policy aims in a spatial 
plan
Reallocation of plots in 
order to get the most 
optimal overall quality 
of the area
Relocation of sports 
fields of a powerful 
football club within a 
major internationally 
competing business 
district
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined 
the instrument
Decision of national 
government 
to economise 
on countryside 
development
Need to meet the 
EU objectives on the 
reduction of phosphate 
and nitrate emissions 
and thus need to 
create a financial 
fund to facilitate the 
demolition of stables 
of intensive livestock 
farms
VINEX goals to 
develop 30,000 houses 
in Leidsche Rijn (and 
6,000 in Vleuterweide) 
– divided ownership of 
land in the area
Powerful landowner 
with land to be 
redeveloped in the 
project which caused 
problems in the 
relocation of land within 
the project
Fit within planning 
and legal system: 
which relation with 
spatial plans?
Initiatives have to be 
laid down in the local 
land use plans
Doubts about legally 
sound elaboration: 
relation between 
demolition of stables 
and recouping of 
windfalls of a land use 
with no relation to the 
stables. Link has to be 
included in the local 
land use plan
Proposed development 
has been laid down in a 
local land use plan
Deal between original 
landowners and public-
private partnership 
participants. Ultimately 
inclusion of the 
relocation in land use 
plan
Conservation Conversion Reallocation
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
No Yes: the regulation 
on the ending of 
livestock branches and 
the Brakkestein Pact 
(2000)
No No
Spatial level at 
which case is 
tackled
Provincial level Provincial level Project and local level Project and local level, 
with also national 
interference
Relevant public 
actor(s) and role
Province of Limburg 
(initiative and 
coordination) and local 
authorities(imple-
mentation of 
additional sites)
Province of Noord-
Brabant (initiative 
and coordination) 
and local authorities 
(implementation of 
additional sites)
Former City of  
Vleuten-De Meern 
(contracts have been 
adopted by the City of 
Utrecht)
Local authority of 
Amsterdam (public 
actor in public-prive 
partnership and 
responsible for land 
assembly)
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
Mainly a contract 
between province and 
local authority. Local 
authority passes on the 
recouping of profits of 
the additional site to 
private developers
Strong coordinating 
role of public sector 
(province and local 
authorities). Individual 
farmers ending 
their business and 
developers also benefit
Joint venture on 50-50 
basis (risks, influence 
etc.)
Hardly. Deal between 
landowner and public-
prive partnership about 
relocation of land use
Parties which 
financed the case
Ultimately the private 
developers (and thus 
the end users) pay 
for the countryside 
development
Revolving fund of 
Space for Space 
Development Company 
includes 5 private 
developers and 
financial institutions 
(each 16% share) and 
province (20% share)
Developers and 
municipality
Public private 
partnership responsible 
for the overall financing 
of the project (banks, 
national government 
etc.)
Possibility for public 
participation
Through the formal 
public participation 
in the local land 
use plan, as the 
linking of additional 
development site 
and countryside 
development has to be 
laid down in this plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan
Through the formal 
public participation in 
the local land use plan, 
but in the specific deal 
on relocation
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Non-financial 9 
compensation from an 
economic perspective
Vincent Renard
Introduction9.1 
The use of planning instruments has, over a long period of time, raised le-
gal, political, and economic concerns due to inequities inherent in zoning and 
other regulations. The value of a parcel of land depends crucially on the regu-
lations that apply to it. This is especially true in urban and suburban areas 
where development rights assigned to a piece of land are a central element in 
price setting. Property law varies widely from one country to another, particu-
larly in the case of development law, the prime demand, and therefore, cost 
determinant for land.
In many countries, including those in Western Europe, planning and zon-
ing laws were traditionally applied without granting compensation to land-
owners whose land use was restricted. In some countries, however, such as 
the U.S., compensation has increasingly been demanded by property own-
ers whose property values have been affected by regulations under the Fifth 
Amendment’s ‘takings’ jurisprudence. Other countries have also progressively 
been including various devices to compensate, in one way or another, for the 
impact of restrictions on land values. A good overview of such cases is ana-
lyzed in Windfalls for Wipeouts by Hagman and Myszinski (1978).
Two points should be emphasized. First, the wide variety of tools required 
to take into account the legal-historical attitude towards property which is 
very different from one country to another. Even within Western Europe large 
discrepancies exist in the attitude and legal framework regarding property 
and compensation. A second point refers to the economic reasoning behind 
such mechanisms. The basic principle behind such mechanisms is a principle 
of distributive justice; if the value of an owner’s property has been reduced 
by some regulation, he must then be compensated. This statement is easy to 
understand because it is a basic principle of economic equity. But it also in-
cludes a series of difficult issues, mainly the issue regarding evaluation of the 
‘loss,’ which is in fact a potential loss on the one side, and the issues regard-
ing the sources of money used to compensate, such as public authorities or 
property owners who received some undue capital gains. There is no single 
answer, and the wide variety of solutions illustrates that there cannot be one 
single equitable and efficient solution to the questions that are being raised.
We are focusing here on non-financial compensation devices, especially 
market-oriented devices that are used to compensate for land use restrictions. 
The various chapters of the book display the wide variety of such non-finan-
cial devices, especially those using the notion of the market for development 
rights, or ‘Transferable Development Rights’ (TDRs), and we focus here on the 
economic interpretation that can be provided.
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Before going into the details of actual examples of tradable permits, the 
relationships between property law, urban development regulations and trad-
able permits will be examined, with particular attention to the differences 
between the legal systems found in North America and those common in 
Western Europe. Following this, a description will be given of how the non-
financial compensation systems – which may still be deemed experimental 
since the practice is not yet widespread even in the U.S. – operate in various 
countries, with special attention to the situation in France. After considering 
these experimental schemes, a number of conclusions will be drawn as to the 
value of the system, its economic effectiveness in reaching its goals and the 
conditions required for it to operate satisfactorily.
Non-financial compensation in 9.2 
planning and land use
The origin: market tools for the protection 9.2.1 
of the environment
Tradable rights have come to the fore as a topic in recent years, particularly in 
the general context of climate change, the greenhouse effect and air pollution. 
An important threshold was crossed in late 1997 with the Protocol adopted 
in December by the Kyoto Conference which envisaged trading in quotas or 
emission credits. A primary conceptual difference should first be noted be-
tween a tradable permit attached to land and a tradable emission quota.
With respect to pollution, the object of the trade is an entitlement to emit 
an ongoing level of a pollutant, measured, for example, in tons of nitrogen 
dioxide discharged into the air per year. A continuing processis involved so 
that the relevant quotas themselves may continue to be bought or sold ad in-
finitum. The idea behind tradable land rights is quite different since the right 
concerned is sold outright or for a very long period of time. Admittedly, it is 
only saleable in part, or may be bought back at a later date, but the purpose of 
the transaction is in no way to engage in an ongoing process. This obviously 
has a major impact on the way the instrument is employed with respect to 
allotting rights and the conditions for buying them back. The concept, there-
fore, concerns property law as applied to geographical space, and reveals a 
major difference between the legal systems originating in Roman law, based 
on the indivisibility and absolute nature of land ownership, and the different 
view of the main variants of Anglo-Saxon law, in particular North American 
law, which considers land ownership to consist of a ‘bundle of rights.’ Some 
components of this bundle can be separated, such as development rights, air 
rights or mineral rights.
These differences in legal structure and in case law go a long way to explain-
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ing the difficulty which countries of Western Europe or Japan have in under-
standing the concepts or techniques that are widespread in North America. It 
is particularly evident in the long-standing American practice of tradable envi-
ronmental rights (easements), a concept which appears nowhere in French law, 
for example, with its need to determine dominant tenement and servient tene-
ment (fonds dominant and fonds servant) in order to establish such a relation.
A distinction also exists between tradable rights and transferable rights, 
the latter being the right which is attached to a particular piece of land, and 
then transferred to another plot. The mechanism under scrutiny here con-
cerns transferable rights, but the transfer is not on a plot to plot basis but 
rather can be on a zone to zone basis. As such, any development right on the 
emitting zone can be transferred to any plot in the receiving area, possibly 
through the intermediation of an ad hoc body, a development rights bank 
which can take place via the municipality itself.
The rationale behind non-financial compensation: 9.2.2 
creating a market or compensating restricted 
landowners?
Central to the creation of a market in development rights is the issue of the 
financial and fiscal implications of land use regulations. In urban and peri-ur-
ban areas, the value of a parcel of land lies in the rights attached to it which 
is conditioned by zoning and other environmental regulations. Whenever reg-
ulations are introduced by public authorities, the price of land can be strongly 
affected. Since any change in the regulations moves the price of land up or 
down, this raises the issue as to what corrective measures ought to be taken 
by the public authorities.
As far as urban and peri-urban areas are concerned (the problem being 
most acute in the latter), the response differs from country to country. Rough-
ly speaking, most countries in Western Europe have adopted the principle that 
constraints on urban development are not subject to compensation. As ex-
pressed in the French Urban Code for example, this principle applies “to any 
constraint affecting the road system or prompted by health, aesthetic or any 
other considerations and concerned with such matters as land use, heights 
of buildings (…) or prohibition of development in given zones” (article 160-5 
of the Urban Development Code). A constraint on the right to make use of a 
given parcel of land is not considered grounds for compensation unless it in-
fringes a vested right such as withdrawal of a building permit already granted 
or a change in the previous status of the site resulting in direct, material and 
indisputable damage to property. The latter comes close to a ‘taking,’ and in 
fact rarely applies. Strict application of this principle, which makes landown-
ers subject to unequal treatment, has naturally met with considerable opposi-
tion and has led to the generation of de facto and de jure loopholes. In France 
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for example, the introduction in 1976 of procedures for the transfer of devel-
opment rights falls under this heading and was attacked as a breach of the 
principle of ‘no compensation.’
The underlying principle is different in the U.S. Although the constitu-
tional legality of zoning has been well established since Euclid in 1926 (Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365), the dividing line between admis-
sible constraints under police powers, which are ineligible for compensation, 
and excessive constraint subject to compensation (due to ‘takings’) includ-
ing compensation due to expropriation (eminent domain) is constantly shift-
ing. The term ‘taking’ which may be read as ‘seizure’ originates in the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “(…) nor shall private property be taken 
for public use without compensation”. So it must be understood that a severe 
restriction in land use resulting from zoning can be considered a form of ex-
propriation, at least in regards to compensation. As illustrated by a number 
of recent decisions of several courts and the rise of the movement of private 
property rights, attention is drawn to recent developments which have tend-
ed to restrict the implementation of regulations and constraints (in particular 
the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act) via systematically playing 
the compensation card, thereby inhibiting the regulator.
The manner in which case law in this matter has developed over time 
matches the gradual change that has taken place in property rights law in 
which a distinction is made between what is private property in the strict 
sense of the term (and thus may be placed on the market) and what is com-
mon property. With respect to this point, it appears TDRs in the U.S., where 
they have developed to some extent, appear as a tool to compensate restrict-
ed landowners in order to make zoning more acceptable rather than devel-
oping a market in development rights where buyers meet sellers and prices 
adjust to supply and demand. The same reasoning appears to some extent 
in the Space for Space experience in the Netherlands where landowners are 
compensated when they agree to stop their livestock activities.
Trading and transferring a right to develop9.2.3 
Postulating the existence of transferable rights assumes that there is some-
thing to trade, in other words, that one of the parties is ready to relinquish 
an attribute of his property (the right to build, for example) to another owner. 
Whatever the circumstances, no market will operate unless the exercise is 
worthwhile, or in other words, unless there is a demand for the rights. This 
raises the issue of the initial allotment of rights. The two concepts can be 
distinguished, depending on the methods used to value land and real estate 
which are themselves based on the way property is conceived.
Under one concept, which is fairly widespread in northern Europe, own-
ership of land does not include the right to the development value that re-
[ 200 ]
sults from urban growth in general and the provision of infrastructure. This 
is, for example, what happens (or rather happened) in Sweden or the Neth-
erlands, but by means of different mechanisms (long-term land reserves for 
Swedish towns and the key role of towns in the development process in the 
Netherlands). Most of the value added by urban development is collected by 
the community – the notion of ‘betterment recoupment’ that has been widely 
accepted but is now questioned.
The other concept which prevails, for example, in several countries in 
southern Europe (there is no pure case and it is therefore difficult to be more 
precise here) consists of allowing the original landowner to keep the capital 
gain subject to tax corrections – for example, value added tax. In such sys-
tems, the introduction of urban development regulations or their amendment 
is generally perceived as a constraint on previously held rights, the assump-
tion being that ownership was at the outset unconditional and included the 
development rights. Later, however, the reality was quite different. However, 
the argument which sets forth that zoning restrictions create a ‘loss’ for the 
landowner continues to be used.
Such is the context in which it is possible to conceive of trading a ‘right’ 
that is assumed to be in existence but the actual use of which has not been 
authorized. This point is essential to understanding the crucial importance of 
the original allotment of rights and the conventional nature of that allotment.
Other land rights’ markets exist. The market in shooting rights, for ex-
ample, which is still extant although of minor importance, or fishing rights if 
water is assimilated to land (legally not completely irrelevant). However, the 
heart of the problem and the major experiments in rights trading concern the 
market in rights to intensify land use which are essentially the rights to en-
gage in urban development or, more and more, redevelopment. This chapter 
focuses on these rights.
Origins and applications of a market for 9.3 
development rights as a non-financial 
compensation: the case of France
This section compares the current systems employing the transferable 
rights technique in France with elements used in other countries. The legal, 
economic and institutional backgrounds vary widely – as do their aims and 
sphere of application. As indicated in Section 9.2.2, French urban develop-
ment law – as in most European legal systems – is based on the principle of 
‘no compensation’ for urban development constraints or, in the American ter-
minology, ‘police powers’ trump the powers of ‘eminent domain’. This feature 
clearly creates inequities for landowners whose land is adversely affected by 
urban development schemes.
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In France, such inequities raised a particularly thorny problem in the ear-
ly 1970s with the launch of urban planning through the Land Use Act (Loi 
d’Orientation Foncière, December 31, 1967) which for the first time introduced 
zoning as a general principle (Plan d’Occupation des Sols) from which there was 
no exemption. After a number of abortive attempts and lengthy controversy, 
the Urban Development Reform Act (Loi sur la Réforme de l’Urbanisme, Decem-
ber 31, 1976) finally made it possible, in some zones, for development rights 
to be transferred from one subzone (transmitter site) to another (receiver site). 
This principle is embodied today in article L 123-2 of the Urban Development 
Code, “In zones to be conserved because of the quality of the landscape (…)
land-use plans may determine the conditions under which the development 
potential determined by the land-use coefficient set for the zone as a whole 
may, subject to authorization of the administrative authorities, be transferred 
in order to promote concentration of development on other lots in one or 
more sectors of the same zone.” This wording is somewhat ambiguous in its 
reference to zones “to be conserved because of the quality of the landscape.” 
There is no case law as yet regarding the intent to exclude productive agricul-
tural areas, or zones available for development or whether a distinction can 
be made between them.
The provision generated a great deal of debate before, during and after its 
adoption. Considerable criticism has been targeted to three points: the tie to 
zoning, incompatibility with the principle of no compensation for zoning re-
strictions, and distributive justice.
With regard to the first point, the difficulty resides in using the term ‘qual-
ity of landscape’ which seems to be equated with a conservancy area in the 
local plan in which all development is prohibited. The issue of how produc-
tive agricultural areas can be excluded since these are often areas in which 
the landscape is of outstanding quality is still controversial.
With respect to the second point, what is being questioned is the very prin-
ciple of the transfer of a development right. It implies compensation for con-
straints since it applies solely to land to be “conserved because of the quality 
of the landscape,” in opposition to a basic principle of land use law in France. 
From the point of view of distributive justice, it can be said that the equity 
of the procedure is basically conditioned by the original distribution of land 
holdings. Were land distributed in a fairly equitable way among all the inhab-
itants, the procedure would be neutral in terms of distributive justice. How-
ever, the situation is generally very different to this, at least in France. The 
technique then represents a transfer from the community as a whole, the le-
gitimate beneficiaries of any value added by urban development, to the sub-
group represented by the landowners in the zone concerned. Such a notion of 
equity can be discussed.
Although the law allowing the transfer of development rights has now 
been in place for nearly 30 years, applications remain few, disparate and dif-
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ficult to summarize. Not all of them are completely convincing. The examples 
are confined to a limited number of geographical areas, mostly coastal and 
mountain areas where the pressure of tourist development generates impor-
tant increases in land prices. This ‘windfall’ to be shared is usually an impor-
tant facilitating condition for the implementation of TDRs. Moreover, it has 
mostly been used where a powerful mayor was in a position to firmly imple-
ment his land use plan. Thus, it was more a compensating device designed to 
help the implementation of a plan than the actual market mechanism it was 
supposed to be.
Land readjustment as a non-financial 9.4 
device for compensation
Another interesting non-financial compensation device, exemplified in sever-
al preceding chapters is land readjustment. The land readjustment technique 
in France has long been extensively used in agricultural areas using a well 
known and straightforward mandatory device led by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. It includes subsidies distributed to affected landowners to reorganize 
their farming activities.
 This device has been extensively applied to improve the land own-
ership pattern of agricultural areas in order to reach better agricultural eco-
nomic efficiency. However, as a compensation device it has only in a very lim-
ited form been extended to urban and suburban areas. In contrast to Germany 
(Umlegung) or Japan (Kukaku Seiri), for example, land readjustment has been 
used as a compensation device under the name of remembrement-aménagement 
(readjustment and development) in only a very limited and non-significant 
number of cases. The legal process is complicated, and political acceptability 
is limited – factors that explain this failure.
Some criteria for an economic evaluation 9.5 
of markets for development rights119
As a whole, trials which include the use of non-compensation devices have 
not yet reached critical mass levels that would allow statistically reliable con-
clusions to be drawn. Even though there is a fairly large number of examples 
in the U.S., they are in different geographical areas, have different aims, use 
different operating methods and, naturally, show different results. Many ex-
amples of the practice – generally on an informal level – occur among very 
119  Some of these elements have been developed in Renard (2007).
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small groups of owners and operate by consensus without any formal legal or 
institutional framework being involved. Such examples, generally occurring 
in built-up areas, have a long history in the form of TDRs in the U.S. and pri-
vate law constraints in France. On the other hand, use of the method in a vast 
geographical area by means of a universally applicable mechanism formally 
established in advance is still fairly limited, and the various experiences that 
are described in the preceding chapters display both a profusion of experi-
ences but also the lack of a systematic and general legal and economic frame-
work. Most examples have specific features, making it difficult to reach gen-
eral conclusions.
The examples presented and the information available on other schemes 
nevertheless enable some assessment of the practice of attaching tradable 
rights to land and using them as a compensation device, be it TDR or some-
thing else. After an examination of the real nature of the rights being traded, 
a look will be taken at the key link between tradable rights and zoning. In ad-
dition, a consideration of the way these trading rights markets operate and 
the prices/market prices they generate will illustrate the distributive effects 
of the system.
The goals attributed to most schemes are generally environmental or ar-
chitectural. The most frequent is nature conservancy. Many examples, often 
smaller in size, focus on architectural merit and the preservation of listed 
structures. Nevertheless, the most frequently cited case remains nature con-
servancy, preservation of sites of outstanding natural beauty and protec-
tion of agricultural land in the vicinity of built-up areas. Indeed, it is often in 
terms of the ‘surface area preserved for conservation in perpetuity’ that the 
success of a program is measured. An area ‘conserved in perpetuity’ is taken 
to mean one that has transferred all its development rights and is thus closed 
to development. However, this particular aim is frequently merely the back-
drop to the prime objective of the technique which is distribution, namely to 
provide compensation for the constraints which society places on the use of 
property, or in other words, to render acceptable the inequalities created by 
zoning laws which by their nature cause development rights to be distributed 
inequitably.
The goal of nature conservancy, or of the preservation of structures of ar-
chitectural merit, is the prime objective of the regulatory procedure. The TDRs 
technique is, therefore, to be regarded more as an intermediate instrument to 
facilitate implementation of a plan. The concept of equity promoted by TDRs 
schemes will be discussed later.
The technique may also serve as a legal safety net for the planner. Even 
if the scheme is not in operation, the mere fact that it is in place will enable 
disputes over compensation for constraints to be avoided. This is an impor-
tant aim in North America in view of the widespread litigation prompted by 
potential ‘takings.’
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The legal nature of transferable 9.5.1 
development rights
In all countries that have made use of TDRs of one sort or another, the legal 
status of those rights has been a point of contention, and of litigation. It has 
been questioned whether they are an integral part of a property (even when 
destined to be used at another site) or whether they are merely a financial 
instrument to provide compensation for value lost as a result of a constraint. 
This is an important point, both because of its impact on the legal viewpoint 
on the issue (in France and Germany, for example, it is unlawful for planning 
restrictions to be subject to compensation except in very special circumstanc-
es) but also because of the way it is applied and in the way compensation is 
assessed.
As explained earlier, in the U.S., the case law on zoning (‘takings’) has 
played a key part in determining the way urban development operates and 
development rights are managed by providing compensation for an owner 
when a regulation considered extremely restrictive is viewed as ‘taking.’ With 
the sword of Damocles – represented by the threat of litigation under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution – hanging constantly over the planner, he 
may find TDRs an acceptable means of mitigating the threat. It was in fact as 
a consequence of proceedings of this sort (the decision in Penn Central Trans-
portation Company v. City of New York (1978), referred to in Chapter 7 about the 
U.S.) that the practice was described in detail. Case law, however, while it may 
have assimilated the principle that the title to one plot of land might include, 
even if only implicitly, a right to make use of another plot, has set limits to 
the practice, which have not yet been finalized.
The concept of property rights itself has never been ultimately defined. 
Many commentators turn to the idea of a ‘bundle of rights’ whereby owner-
ship of land consists of a series of autonomous, separable rights – rights to 
use, to access, to develop, to fly over, and to cross, for example. However, this 
idea does not settle the question of transferable rights in legal terms, name-
ly which of the rights attached to land are by their nature part of ownership 
(such as the right to farm the land) and which are rights whose attributes 
may be determined by the social function of the property (such as the right to 
build).
The Penn Central decision, which had a major impact on case law on ‘tak-
ings’ in the U.S., expressly took the stand that TDRs were a useful instrument 
to secure compensation for some of the effects which regulation had on land 
and housing values. In Justice Brennan’s own words while explaining the ma-
jority view, “[w]hile these rights may not have constituted ‘just compensation’ 
if a ‘taking’ had occurred, these rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that 
reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation.” 
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Whether or not a ‘taking’ had occurred, the procedure was an additional in-
strument that could help landowners to accept stringent zoning regulations.
The Suitum decision of 1997 provides a good illustration of current trends 
in the relevant case law which has taken a clear stand on the point. Under the 
Lake Tahoe transferable developments rights scheme, the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that the right to build was an inalienable part of property rights, 
was as such usable in situ and was not transferable to another site. This was 
the first time such reasoning had been taken all the way to the Federal Su-
preme Court. The Suitum decision was thus of major importance because it 
questioned whether it was lawful for the procedure to set limits on the finan-
cial implications of land use regulations.
Such a decision is clearly at odds with several experiences described in 
this book, where development rights are used essentially as currency.
In a quite different context, a similar debate has been going on in France, 
although from a different starting point since the basic premise is that con-
straints are not subject to compensation. When the Act was drafted, voices 
were heard denouncing the risks involved in introducing rights that could be 
considered as ‘imaginary’ (Lenôtre-Villecoin, 1975). Like the Suitum decision 
in the U.S., this amounts to an attack on the very principle behind the cre-
ation of the legal entity of ‘transferable rights.’ According to J. Lenôtre-Ville-
coin, “the capacity to transfer an imaginary development right establishes a 
jus abutendi, or a right of disposal, in a case in which the public interest, in 
the form of regulation of urban development, is against existence of the right 
to build at all.” Perhaps it is time to deal finally with the inseparable trio (usus, 
fructus and abusus) which ‘abuse’ opinion in Latin countries.
The relationship between zoning and the 9.5.2 
use of non-financial compensation
There is a clear link between zoning and the use of non-financial compen-
sation. Non-financial compensation, be it TDR or another device, is in itself 
a zoning instrument since it implies a division into emission and reception 
zones. Greater precision may well be introduced by stipulating that the zones 
must be of precisely specified dimensions; otherwise the whole scheme will 
be invalidated. If the scheme is to operate properly, owners in both emission 
and reception zones need to be given appropriate incentives, which should 
help to balance supply against demand with respect to development rights.
In the case of reception zones, where conventional planning regulations 
operate as usual, the purpose of zoning is to ensure a high standard of ur-
ban development. The quality of urban development is thus the criterion to 
be taken into account. As the process proceeds, however, it becomes difficult 
to provide adequate incentives. Many TDR programs, such as the Pinelands in 
the U.S., or Space for Space in the Netherlands, use a system of ‘bonus zon-
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ing,’ in other words, the density authorized increases if transferable rights are 
purchased. This makes it very tempting for the planner to reduce the ordinary 
density (where no rights have been purchased) and increase the bonus densi-
ty. However, such a policy is likely to fall foul of the principle of vested rights 
and to lead to litigation. Incentive zoning is thus a difficult process to handle.
Another sensitive issue is the eligibility of a zone to be designated an emis-
sion zone which opens the way to granting transferable rights. The subject is 
one of endless debate with no clear way of settling it on a systematic basis. 
First of all, it involves agricultural land and the issues of whether such land 
should be allocated TDRs and if so, on whose behalf. Generally speaking, the 
price of agricultural land could be considered to reflect its productivity, the 
current net value of its future yield. It is paradoxical to allot ‘development 
rights’ to land on which farming is expected to continue even if the rights are 
not to be used on that land. Arguments are often based – this is generally the 
case in France and in most of the American examples – on the natural beauty 
and biological diversity of the site. However, this takes no account of the ex-
isting usage and places owners with quite different relationships with their 
land on the same footing.
Although no general conclusion can be reached on the linkage between 
zoning and transferable rights, note should be taken of the risk of distort-
ing zone demarcations and urban planning regulations in order to propel the 
rights market to function. It is important to maintain a proper perspective; 
the transferable rights procedure is no more than an aid to good urban plan-
ning and not an end in itself.
Technical and institutional feasibility9.5.3 
The examples described above and the comments make it clear that sensitive 
management is needed to make the technique work.
The landmark examples described and analyzed all rely on an ad hoc insti-
tutional base – such as the Pinelands Commission – which assumes respon-
sibility for the whole area concerned, without any right of oversight by com-
mon law institutions, counties or districts. This structure takes care of both 
zoning and the management of development rights, possibly creating a bank 
of development rights. On the other hand, when an elected council is respon-
sible for operating the system, an election often succeeds in undoing a previ-
ous body’s achievements.
Another difficult matter, in addition to zone demarcation as mentioned 
above, is management over time. The initial allotment of rights in transmitter 
and receiver zones has to correspond to some point of equilibrium at some 
given time in order to enable the market to operate and give sellers an in-
centive to sell and buyers an incentive to buy. The question arises as to what 
long-term dynamics of the system should be expected. From the standpoint 
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of the seller, a plot of land that has been stripped of its development rights is 
closed to development in perpetuity. Then as time passes, and if demand re-
mains at a given level or increases, pressures will build and the price of rights 
will soar. Should more rights then be allotted to land that has been stripped 
of them, and under what circumstances? Can the initial allocation of devel-
opment rights be considered immutable even if this is likely to lead to a price 
boom? What should be done with regard to owners in the emission zone who 
hold on to rights, speculating on a rising market? Should their development 
rights be expropriated?
Few of the examples discussed have yet had to face this problem. Either 
the mass of rights has been very large, or demand has been overestimated, or 
incentives were not strong enough, or the scheme was too new, or the prob-
lem has not yet taken an acute turn. Its advent is inevitable, and the reallot-
ment of rights will require very careful handling. In any event, schemes need 
at the outset to determine what the medium-term prospects are and to de-
fine the reallotment procedure to be used: such is the core of the difficulty 
in applying long term strategic planning in a world of flexibility and market 
volatility.
Another technical question to be resolved is the manner in which rights 
are to be managed. In order to allow the market to operate, there has to be a 
body with the power to buy, stock and sell rights at any given time. In view of 
the special nature of such a market and the likelihood of discontinuities, it is 
a mistake to think that it will be able to operate on a decentralized basis from 
the beginning. Here again, the examples that are working well are doing so 
with the help of a development rights bank which operates in close associa-
tion with the general aims of the system.
One last need is to educate owners, both emitters and receivers. Trading in 
TDRs is an activity that is not self-evident and needs extensive explanation 
and demonstration in order to work properly.
Price of rights: a ‘market price’?9.5.4 
It would be great to be able to answer this question, taking market price to 
mean the price that would balance supply against demand under conditions 
of atomicity, transparency, and so forth. Even in the most successful cases, 
the number of transactions involved (low) and the time the scheme has been 
in operation (short) does not allow statistically significant conclusions to be 
drawn. The only firm conclusion, reached in settings as different as Auckland 
in New Zealand, Torino in Italy, Montgomery County in Maryland or the com-
mune of Taninges in the French Alps is that prices rise sharply when the pro-
cedure is beginning to settle down and then level off or even decline.
To be more specific on this important point, there has to be a way to make 
detailed analyses of local markets in order to set the ‘market price’ of a devel-
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opment right on a residual basis (from the market price of the end product, 
the building, less the costs of the operation, deduction is made the highest 
level of land tax likely and thus, the value of the development rights to be 
purchased). The actual price will then probably be seen to be nowhere near 
this ‘market price’ unless the purchase of tradable rights is mandatory and 
there is no alternative nearby (e.g. a development zone not subject to the 
transfer system). This comes back to the paradox mentioned earlier, that this 
system of tradable rights will only work properly in a context where land use 
is subject to strict planning regulations. And this non-financial compensation 
is then the result of a negotiation among public authorities, developers and 
the landowners.
Equity and efficiency9.5.5 
The concept of equity has to be considered from the point of view of landown-
ers and from the point of view of the inhabitants of a zone as a whole. In the 
first case, tradable rights fulfill an essential function in the absence of a fiscal 
system capable of removing added value. The price of land is very dependent 
on the development rights allowed by the zoning regulations. Tradable rights 
make it possible to correct the inequities introduced by zoning. If the concept 
of equity is extended to all inhabitants, assessment of the method becomes 
more difficult and depends on the way property rights are conceived and the 
tax system which allows them to be put into operation.
There are two contrasting situations. In some countries, such as in North 
America and south western Europe, there is no universally applicable mecha-
nism for recovering capital gains from urban development and/or payments 
for development rights. The practice of transferring development rights or 
granting development rights somewhere else is thus equivalent in such cases 
to distributing the overall capital gain by urban development among land-
owners only, whereas it might well be expected to return to the community as 
a whole, in particular when the public amenities that give rise to that added 
value are funded by the taxpayer. Introducing rights transfers is thus, roughly 
speaking, a means of formalizing a transfer from those acquiring houses to 
landowners. This is a limited view of equity, which may admittedly be of help 
in particular cases, at the cost of a broader notion of equity. This applies un-
less land is divided up in a very comprehensive and equal way among the 
inhabitants, which is unusual.
The second type of situation, which is found mainly in northern Europe, 
is founded on the principle that the capital gain due to urban development 
should return – at least in very large part – to the community. Such is the very 
principle of betterment recoupment. Using various methods discussed above, 
the initial procedure that increases the value of land essentially benefits the 
community rather than the landowner. This leads again to the very definition 
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of the right of property – on land and its contents. Stating that non-financial 
compensation is a compensation for the loss of a right relies on the assump-
tion that the development right was the property of the landowner. This is a 
strong assumption, especially in countries with a flexible planning system.
Conclusion: towards a redefinition 9.6 
of the right of property on land
We are thus brought back once more to the definition and content of property 
law, the key to the problem. The mechanism of non-financial compensation 
basically relies on the assumption of an extensive definition of the right of 
property, including the right of ‘capital gain’ on land, even if this gain is the 
result of the general evolution, of urban growth, or of the construction of in-
frastructure by public authorities without any input by the landowner.
As noted by Donald Krueckeberg (Krueckeberg, 1995): “Property is not just 
the object of possession or capital in isolation, but a set of relationships be-
tween the owner of a thing and everyone else’s claim to the same thing. This 
understanding of property highlights considerations of distributive justice 
that are particularly important in light of the issues in the contemporary de-
bate about property rights. Rights to personal use of property are fundamen-
tal to individual and social well-being: rights to profit from property, in con-
trast, have always been subject to reasonable constraints for the benefits of 
the entire community and society. Attempts to establish a contrary case by 
appealing to natural rights, market necessity, liberty, social utility, or just des-
ert all fail to withstand scrutiny. (…) These concepts of use rights and profit 
rights in property are at the heart of the planning question”.
The limited success of the method in the U.S. is due to the specific legal 
content of its property law and above all to its case law on added and lost val-
ue. The radical differences in practice with West European countries, in par-
ticular, may partially explain the difficulties of transferring the system.
The last word may be left to Ann Louise Strong, an expert in the field, who 
showed great interest in and enthusiasm for these schemes at the outset. 
She now has a more reserved outlook: “Although there has been some suc-
cess with TDRs, we are skeptical of the technique in general. It has generated 
far more discussion than actual land preservation. There are serious practical 
and legal obstacles to implementing it. (…) The author believes that the lim-
ited success stories, such as the one in Montgomery County, Maryland, result 
from regulation, with TDRs as only one small part of the programme” (Strong 
et al., 1996).
The final conclusion about this set of mechanisms which are now spread-
ing all around the world – first in the U.S. and in Western Europe, then in 
South America and now in China – may appear pessimistic. Our comment is 
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not questioning the very principle of creating rights and organizing markets 
for the exchange of rights. Such mechanisms are innovative and promising. 
The mechanism with carbon markets, greenhouse gas emissions, which is 
now being developed around the world, is probably a good way to limit such 
emissions in an efficient way, connected with other instruments. We would 
like here to insist on the specificity of the mechanism as applied to land and 
land betterment, where the practical and theoretical issues are different and 
require a deeper analysis and economic practice.
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Property, law and non-10 
financial compensation
Philip Booth
Introduction10.1 
The idea that owners of land might be compensated as a result of restrictions 
imposed on the way in which that land is occupied and used implies a par-
ticular understanding of the nature of property and its legal formulation. It re-
lies on the premise that there is such a thing as a right to future development 
of land that can be separately identified and given legal existence, and that, 
because it is a right, it requires compensation if it is removed. What is striking 
from the earlier chapters in this book is that such an understanding appears 
to be widely shared. In particular, the phrase that is used frequently in rela-
tion to property is that of the ‘bundle of rights’ which owners are said to enjoy. 
This in turn suggests that rights may be selectively restricted or disposed of 
without ownership as a whole being affected, and that owners might reason-
ably expect to be compensated if some of the bundle is removed from their 
control. A right to future development (if it actually exists) would form part of 
the bundle. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to explore the origins of 
the ‘bundle of rights’ thesis and locate the question of non-financial compen-
sation within the legal traditions of Europe and America.
Concepts of property: the common law 10.2 
and Roman law traditions
What is clear from legal history is the energy which legal systems have de-
voted to understanding, shaping and limiting concepts of property. Property 
in land is of course only one element of property law, but one which poses 
particularly intractable problems. There is an important point to make at the 
outset. In common English parlance property often signifies the tangible ob-
ject (land or buildings). But in its origins, property is in fact an abstract con-
cept which designates the attributes of ownership. Referring to property as a 
bundle of rights is helpful in restoring the meaning of the word. What, law-
yers have inquired, does it mean to possess land? If someone occupies land 
and uses it, what status is thereby conferred? Answers to such questions have 
given rise to alternative versions of what property in land is, and these alter-
native versions are, we may argue, in conflict. The ‘bundle of rights’ conceptu-
alization, enormously important though it is, is potentially at odds with views 
of property as absolute dominium. We need to start, therefore, by exploring 
the concept of property as a bundle of rights.
Though he did not himself use the phrase, the ‘bundle of rights’ approach 
to understanding property derives from the great American legal theorist, 
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Hohfeld (1913; 1917). At pains to try and determine the nature of legal rights 
in land, he began with the idea that ownership is primarily a relational con-
cept: your rights in property are about the obligations that you owe to oth-
ers and others owe to you as a result of your owning property. It follows that 
the rights and obligations consequent upon ownership are multiple and sep-
arable. Hohfeld distinguished between rights in personam and rights in rem, 
which refer respectively to rights against a particular individual and against 
the generality of people. To that basic distinction, Hohfeld then adds further 
categorizations, to include rights, privileges, powers, immunities and duties, 
each of which may be either against individuals or people in general. Hohfeld 
continues to be a point of reference for the development of legal theories of 
property, even if there has been much argument about the categories that 
he identified. But it is worth noting that the phrase ‘bundle of rights’ coars-
ens the fine distinctions he was making: he himself refers to “an aggregate of 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers and immunities” (Hohfeld, 1917: 746). In 
this formulation, Hohfeld identifies, by implication, future development not 
as a right, but as a privilege of ownership.
Hohfeld’s work is located within a specific legal tradition, that of common 
law as it developed in both England and America. There are two distinct as-
pects to that tradition that have a bearing on the legal conceptualization of 
property in land. One is the process of law and of the forms of legal reasoning 
to which it gave rise. The other is the system of property developed under the 
feudal regime in the England of the Middle Ages. Both set English property 
law concepts apart from those of continental Europe and require explanation.
Common law itself is described as being largely a product of the adminis-
trative reforms of Henry II, designed to establish central control in the face 
of baronial opposition. Common law was in effect a system of courts put 
in place to ensure justice that was common to the country as a whole. The 
courts were focused on finding remedies for alleged injustice which in turn 
led to an emphasis upon case law to provide the framework within which 
later judgments would be made. From this emphasis came the tendency to 
derive fundamental principles from facts of particular cases which could 
then be applied to subsequent cases. At its beginnings, the system of justice 
represented by common law was little different from that which obtained in 
continental Europe, with one important distinction: common law applied to 
the kingdom as a whole, whereas in continental Europe, legal systems were 
fragmented. This meant that while legal practice shaped doctrine in this 
country and the Inns of Court offered apprenticeship to would-be lawyers, in 
continental Europe law became an academic discipline. Legal theory turned 
increasingly to Roman law in the search for abstract concepts which would 
underpin legal systems. In time, this was to lead to the development of the 
civil code tradition in which codified legal rules were based upon abstract 
principles. Though some theorists in England did study Roman law, the prag-
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matism of the case law tradition was maintained, and English and continen-
tal law gradually diverged (Van Caenegem, 1988; Booth, 2007).
As important, however, was the development of attitudes toward property. 
Feudal systems of property had evolved in continental Europe and were to be 
found everywhere. But nowhere was the feudal system applied more single-
mindedly than in England after the Norman Conquest. The right to occupy 
and use land was, as West (1975) and Gray and Symes (1981) have explained, 
the consequence of entering into a relationship with a feudal superior: ten-
ure was the reward for service, be it military, agricultural, domestic or even 
religious. It meant that there was only one absolute owner of land in Eng-
land, and that was the monarch; everyone else had tenure by virtue of a grant 
from someone above them in the hierarchy of status, and anyone with tenure 
might grant others certain kinds of right as the result of service. It was nec-
essary to envisage land as being the locus of a whole series of overlapping 
rights, duties and privileges. There was a further complication in that these 
rights might exist in the future, so that time became a fourth dimension in 
the concept of property (see also Booth, 2002).
There is some doubt as to whether the feudal system ever really existed in 
England in its pure form. Certainly by the later Middle Ages property relations 
had evolved well beyond the basic concept of property as a consequence of 
service. Service was transmuted into money payments and it became increas-
ingly possible to exchange land on the payment of a fee. Lawyers struggled 
to find ways of expressing what exactly an individual with tenure actually 
had and how, in the event of conflict, one could establish who had the great-
er right to occupation or use. From this came the doctrine of estates which 
was a way of giving concrete expression to an essentially abstract concept of 
tenure and to the understanding that there could be competing interests in a 
single piece of land. Although this is far from Hohfeld’s conceptualization of 
property as a series of rights and privileges accruing to one owner, the feudal 
system of property does establish a way of thinking about property and own-
ership that is multi-dimensional.
The contrast with the tradition of Roman law is clear, at least in principle. 
The Romans, in using the concept of dominium, assumed that all powers over 
land were in the hands of the owner-occupier: the owner had the right to en-
joy land both in its current state and in the future and that right extended 
from the heavens to the depths of the earth (Parisi, 2002). The Romans con-
trasted the power of the owners over their land, subsumed in the term do-
minium, with the over-arching authority of the state, expressed in the term 
imperium (Gaudemet, 1995). The owner had absolute control over land unless 
reasons of state required interference. Although Roman property law formed 
the base of all European legal systems, in practice it underwent a radical 
transformation as a result of feudalism (Parisi, 2002). It was revived, to become 
the basis of the civil law tradition, one may deduce, under a dual impetus.
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On the one hand is the fact that legal theory in continental Europe was 
developed, not on the basis of practice as in England but in the rarefied atmo-
sphere of the universities, where the search for ideal models of law was en-
couraged. Roman law, we can argue, offered a way out of the muddle of con-
temporary legal practice. Rather more potent, however, was the revolt against 
feudalism that occurred throughout Europe between the 16th and 19th cen-
turies, and the development of philosophies which proposed an entire set of 
property relations. Locke argued that the right to property in land was natu-
ral and preceded states and governments, and was won by honest labor. The 
Lockean ideal was taken up by Rousseau in the 18th century and the idea that 
the right to property was an essential part of the liberties of mankind became 
a tenet of the French Revolution. For the French, property became un droit in-
violable et sacré (an inviolable and sacred right), which could in fact be violated 
if reasons of state provided an overwhelming reason to intervene. But in prin-
ciple the sovereign state was set entirely apart from the process of landown-
ing (Halpérin, 1995).
The U.S. inherited the English system of common law. But the Lockean 
principle of the natural right to property became deeply embedded in the 
American revolutionary psyche, and property was directly related to free-
dom (Gordon, 1996). But if Americans believed ownership rights to be abso-
lute, American law could also conceptualize the incidents of ownership in the 
same way English law did. What was lacking was any vestigial remnant of 
feudalism such as remained in England where the sovereign is still in theory 
the only person who has absolute title to the land. Indeed, Americans devel-
oped a mistrust of government interference of all kinds and particularly in 
relation to property rights. The courts developed the doctrine of ‘taking’ and 
have been at pains to protect individual property owners from the arbitrary 
exercise of power. Planning powers have always been particularly suspect 
in this regard (Cullingworth, 1993), even if zoning ordinances were ruled to 
be constitutional as in the celebrated case of Amber Realty v. Village of Euclid 
in 1926. Hohfeld’s analysis of property rights must, therefore, be seen in the 
light of this American ideal. Property for Hohfeld remains multi-textured, but 
whereas traditionally the textures were created by overlapping interests vest-
ed in several individuals, for Hohfeld it was the multi-layered range of rights 
and privileges vested in a single – possibly absolute – owner that was at issue.
Parisi (2002) argues that absolute ownership offers a more flexible and ef-
ficient system of property than does the common law tradition. Neale, on the 
other hand, argues that the concept of property as a series of separate inter-
ests offered exceptional flexibility and was a major factor in the creation of 
the urban environment in England in the 18th and 19th centuries. Neverthe-
less, it also true that successive attempts have been made to simplify prop-
erty law since the Middle Ages, culminating in the Law of Property Acts of 
1920-1925. Already at the end of 13th century, the ability to create new feu-
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dal tenures was removed, and the round of major reform in the 1920s was 
designed to restrict forms of tenure to two only: freehold, and leasehold for 
a term of years. Yet even that division came to seem problematic as lease-
holders viewed themselves as being in absolute possession of their land and 
buildings. The most recent reforms in Britain have aimed to give increased 
possibilities for leaseholders to acquire the freehold of the buildings in which 
they have leases.
This tension between two visions of ownership and the nature of property 
goes beyond the scope of this chapter. What we can begin to discern, howev-
er, is a distinction between the nature of ownership and the character of the 
owner. The late medieval common law rationalization of feudal tenure was 
able to conceive of multiple and possibly competing interests in a single par-
cel of land. The Roman law tradition as it came to be formulated in the 18th 
century postulated property vested in a single owner without the hierarchical 
constraints implicit in the feudal system. As for the nature of ownership, Ro-
man law viewed the rights, privileges and obligations of possessing land as a 
single indivisible entity, in stark contrast to the Hohfeldian vision of the bun-
dle of rights. It is this distinction that allows Hohfeld to perpetuate a feudal 
understanding of the multi-textured nature of property, while working within 
the American tradition that prized the independence of the absolute owner of 
land.
The right to future development10.3 
Within these competing concepts of property and the nature of landowner-
ship, we can begin to explore the question of future development. Is it indeed 
a right, as is implied by all the examples given in the preceding chapters? Cer-
tainly it is widely held to be so. Within the Roman law tradition, all aspects of 
ownership were considered indivisible. This meant that potential for future 
use and development was as much part of what the landowner acquired on 
taking possession of land as the benefits that it yielded in its current state. Of 
course, we have already noted that the concept of absolute ownership written 
into the French constitution after the Revolution was a fiction insofar as the 
state reserved the right to intervene if necessary for reasons of state. In time, 
therefore, in the countries of the civil code tradition, the absolute right to 
ownership was set about with constraints, in particular on the way in which 
owners might develop their land. Codified regulations were the means by 
which the over-arching needs of the state were expressed. And in continen-
tal Europe, although not in America, the state reserved considerable rights to 
expropriate land if necessary to pursue a national goal. None of this removed 
the idea that future development was an indissoluble part of what it meant to 
be an owner of property in land. In the civil code countries there was a right 
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to develop, but within the constraints imposed by the code.
The common law tradition had a rather different outlook on the right to 
develop. Not everyone with an interest in a parcel of land would have the 
right to benefit from its potential for development. It would depend entire-
ly on the nature of the interest. Some forms of tenure allowed the person in 
possession only to benefit from land in its current state. Anyone with an in-
terest in reversion, in other words, at a point when someone else had ceased 
to occupy a particular parcel, had no right to current enjoyment of the land. 
In leasehold tenure, where someone would be granted the right to use land 
for a fixed term of years, the lessee would indeed have a right to future devel-
opment, but only for the period of the lease, after which the land, now possi-
bly improved in value, reverted to the freeholder. The original use of this form 
of tenure in England was apparently to control the conversion of arable land 
to (profitable) sheep-grazing but from the early modern period onwards, it be-
came a potent means of controlling future urban development (Holdsworth, 
1927). A lessee would be given a right, by contract, to put up buildings from 
which the lessee might extract a short-term gain. But in the long term, once 
the lease was up, the land and the buildings would revert to the ground land-
lord and the final lessee would acquire no capital advantage from the prop-
erty. By the late 19th century this had come to seem nothing short of scandal-
ous, that the final lessee might have invested in improvements which then 
accrued to the benefit of the freeholder not the lessee. Even more scandalous 
was the fact that to renew the lease, the lessee would be required to pay a 
premium to the freeholder (Acland, 1914).
Yet within this English common law tradition, freeholders clearly did come 
to see themselves as having a right to the future development of land. We 
can argue that this right was more fiercely defended because, in the case of 
aristocratic landholdings, the right to dispose of property might be very seri-
ously curtailed by the terms of inheritance. An inheritor of an estate might be 
limited to benefiting from it during his lifetime only, with reversion already 
settled on his offspring; he would not under those conditions be free to sell 
outright. This made the necessity of raising an income by developing the land 
ever more pressing. Thus, if not all those with an interest in land had a right 
to develop, the idea that the freeholder at least had such a right was also 
deeply ingrained within the English system of property.
If conceptions of property include, in one form or another, an understand-
ing of future development as a right, the notion of compensation follows 
swiftly in its train. Interestingly, this notion of compensation for the with-
drawal of a right to future development seems to have been better articulated 
earlier in the English system than in the countries with the civil code tradi-
tion. If ownership is expressed as dominium, with the owner in absolute con-
trol of the parcel which he or she occupies, but the law recognizes the right 
of the state to exercise its imperium for the greater good of the nation, the 
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question of compensation for the loss of development rights as a separate 
category might not arise (even if the loss of property as a whole would indeed 
merit compensation). If, on the other hand, future development is seen as a 
separable part of what is entailed in landownership, then it becomes much 
easier to argue that when that right is removed for whatever reason, the loss 
should be compensated. This was precisely the debate that took place in Brit-
ain in the first half of the 20th century when statutory townplanning was first 
introduced. It is, therefore, to the British case that we must now turn.
Compensation and betterment: 10.4 
the English dilemma
In the range of countries represented in this book, Britain is conspicuous by 
its absence. This is because, in the narrow sense of Transferable Development 
Rights (TDRs), non-financial compensation is almost entirely absent in Britain. 
The fact of its absence sheds interesting light on the nature of property rights 
and the right to future development in particular, and on the problem of how 
landowners might be compensated for their loss.
The introduction of legislation for townplanning in 1909 was a conten-
tious affair. There had, of course, been a strong lobby arguing for the end of 
a development free-for-all that appeared to have nefarious consequences for 
the quality of life. But it was scarcely surprising, given the extent to which 
landowning was still the definer of status in Britain at the beginning of the 
20th century, that there should have been considerable opposition to any con-
trol even of the relatively limited kind proposed by the 1909 Housing, Town-
planning etc. Act. In the end, opposition was overcome and the legislation 
was granted royal assent, but opponents managed to ensure that the law in-
cluded a right to compensation for owners who were not allowed to build on 
their land as a result of the provisions of a townplanning scheme120 (Booth, 
2003; Cox, 1984).
The argument that landowners should be compensated for the loss of a 
right to future development engendered a counter argument. If some land-
owners could lose from state intervention of this kind, it could also be argued 
that others might acquire a significant benefit from that intervention, by vir-
tue of their land being identified as suitable for development. In that case, 
was it not appropriate that the benefit should accrue to the state and not to 
the individual landowner? So it was that the early townplanning legislation 
not only included a right to compensation but also allowed for the collection 
of betterment – the increase in value as a result of land being declared devel-
120  Townplanning schemes were a form of zoning plan introduced by the 1909 Act.
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opable – by the state as represented by the municipal authorities that created 
the townplanning scheme.
The theory is simple enough, but the practice proved quite otherwise. In 
particular, the proportion of betterment that the state might collect was much 
contested, and the mechanics of collecting the betterment largely defeated 
local authorities. Very little money, it seems, came to the state as the result of 
the provisions of the 1909 Act or its successors until 1947. But there were two 
inherent problems with compensation and betterment. One was that not all 
land could be said to have the same development value. Close to an existing 
urban area, a parcel might very well have considerable development potential. 
Further away, however, land might have little or no value for development. Yet 
the entitlement to compensation was equal. The result was that local authori-
ties regularly allocated far more land for future development and in so do-
ing partially negated the benefits of having a townplanning system. Collect-
ing betterment was ultimately even more problematic, even if the problems 
were only to emerge after World War II when for the first time compensation 
was collected in a rigorous fashion. The problem was that if the betterment 
tax was set at too high a level, the incentive for landowners to develop might 
be removed and in so doing also defeat the purposes of townplanning (Booth, 
2003; Cox, 1984).
By the 1940s when the question of what shape the townplanning system 
should take in Britain after peace was declared, the question of how to re-
solve the twin problems of compensation and betterment became inescap-
able. The task was given to Lord Chief Justice Uthwatt whose reports (Uthwatt, 
1941; 1942) remain an unequalled exploration of the difficulties sketched out 
above. His solution to the twin problems was to extinguish the right to future 
development and, ultimately, for the state to nationalize all land needed for 
development. Until that ultimate nationalization was achieved, however, the 
state would collect all the betterment accruing on development, and do so 
nationally, not locally.
Uthwatt was the first person to articulate the dilemma with compensation, 
that at any given moment in time only some land was actually attractive to 
potential developers and thereby had development value. His proposal to ex-
tinguish the right to develop was to offer compensation only to those who 
could claim that, but for the outbreak of war, their land was ‘dead-ripe’ for 
development. There would then be no further claim for compensation, and 
anyone wishing to develop land would require permission from the state to 
do so.
Uthwatt’s proposals were not carried forward in their entirety into the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1947 introduced by the reforming Labour gov-
ernment of 1945. The move to nationalize development land was abandoned. 
The collection of betterment was introduced, but rapidly became mired in 
controversy, and that part of the Town and Country Planning Act was repealed 
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by a Conservative government in 1952. On the other hand, extinguishing de-
velopment rights did endure as a central part of the legislation. The payment 
of compensation to those who had legitimate claims was also problematic but 
was ultimately a short-lived problem in that the number of landowners who 
could claim that their land was dead-ripe for development in 1939 was lim-
ited. But the central principle, that no one was entitled to develop their land 
without permission granted by the state, was not subsequently modified and 
remains the cornerstone of the British system of townplanning. The state had 
thereby nationalized the future development rights of all land – a term that 
had been deliberately used in the run-up to the legislation. It had deliberately 
insinuated itself into a structure which conceived of ownership as a multi-
plicity of interests and a range of different rights. The state was not over and 
beyond private property as the imperium/dominium model implied, it held 
an interest in land that was cognate with any other.
If the right to compensation was extinguished, and the state recognized no 
rights to development except those which it itself had granted, it follows that 
transferring development rights and non-financial compensation hardly exist 
as concepts in the British townplanning lexicon. There is a right to financial 
compensation where a landowner can claim that the activities of the local 
planning authority have led to an effective blighting of land as a result of the 
particular land use allocation that has been made. There has also been anoth-
er problem that arises because of the fact that between 1947 and 1962, once a 
planning permission had been granted it could not be repealed except upon 
payment of compensation. As the pressure for development began to escalate 
once war-time and post-war restrictions on building were lifted at the end of 
the 1950s, this rapidly came to be seen as a major obstacle to rational town-
planning. An amendment to the law restricted the validity of permissions to 
five years, a period which was reduced in 2004 to three years. Normally in the 
rare cases when a local authority has wanted to extinguish a planning per-
mission, the chosen route has been by financial compensation, not by trans-
ferring rights. A recent exception to that rule was the case of a quarry owner 
in a national park who was persuaded to forego permission to extend a quar-
ry that predated 1962 by the grant of an extension to another quarry outside 
the park. But this is very much an exceptional case.
Contractual agreements and the 10.5 
transfer of rights
If in the British case compensating for the loss of rights by mechanisms such 
as the Dutch Space for Space program is largely absent, there is another way 
in which non-financial compensation does in fact take place in British town-
planning. It is, however, a case of the developer compensating the state rather 
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than the other way round.
From the earliest townplanning legislation, local authorities have always 
had the power to enter into contracts with private sector developers in or-
der to ensure that townplanning objectives could be met. Since 1968, that 
power has been used specifically in conjunction with the granting of plan-
ning permissions for development and, in one interpretation at least, become 
the means by which the state could recover betterment in kind rather than 
in cash. Termed ‘variously planning agreements,’ ‘planning obligations’ and, 
most recently, ‘planning contributions,’ the underlying principle has remained 
the same. The developer enters into an agreement with the local authority 
that, should planning permission be granted for development, the developer 
will undertake to provide some kind of extra benefit for the good of the area 
as a whole. This benefit is described in the official literature as ‘planning gain.’
The question of planning gain and the use of agreements to achieve it 
has been the subject of extensive and often agonized debate in planning lit-
erature and cannot concern us in any more than outline here (but see Healey, 
1995; Campbell et al, 2000). What is relevant to the current discussion is that 
the nature of the gains achieved is highly diverse. A planning agreement or 
obligation may be a way of securing improvements to infrastructure, in whole 
or part necessary to sustain the development proposed. It has also been used 
as the means of securing additional facilities for an area in the form, say, of 
a new library or an extension to a school, the need for which may be only 
slightly related to the development. Or again, a developer may agree to dedi-
cate part of the land for public use as open space. What is particularly striking 
about this mechanism is the way in which what started as an entirely private 
transaction between a local authority and a developer has become increas-
ingly integrated into a national policy for development.
This recruitment of private contractual agreements into a national policy 
has come about for several reasons. In the first instance, the Conservative 
government of the 1980s was concerned that local authorities were abus-
ing the freedom granted by the law and exacting gains from developers in 
an unwarranted fashion. Later, however, the government was to realize that 
contractual agreements could have their benefits and in something of an 
about-turn, from 1988 onwards it became national policy that local authori-
ties should use agreements of this kind to secure affordable housing in any 
proposal for residential development. That policy, introduced by a Conserva-
tive government, has continued under the Labour administrations since 1997. 
The Labour government has also proposed a new reform that would see a 
prescribed tariff for planning gain to ensure that the gains were proportional 
to the development for which permission was being sought. This reform, in-
troduced in the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, has yet to be 
brought into effect and may not be so, because of a new proposal to capture 
betterment value through the payment of what is called the Planning Gain 
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Supplement. This money payment would not, however, entirely exclude the 
use of agreements for minor forms of planning gain.
Non-financial compensation in the U.S.10.6 
Given that the U.S. inherited the English common law tradition and with it an 
understanding of property which was essentially of the same order as that 
in England, it is appropriate to enquire why non-financial compensation in 
the form of TDRs should have surfaced as a practice there when it did not in 
Britain. English law sought to articulate the nature of property as a series of 
interests which it then saw as its duty to protect. But the articulation of prop-
erty was done in the context of a hierarchy of status which was intimately 
connected with the possession of land. The American Founding Fathers had 
settled America in order to escape this hierarchy and the injustices it brought 
with it. The right to the unfettered ownership of land was, therefore, an inte-
gral part of the freedoms won by settling in the American continent. Absolute 
ownership without interference from anyone was central to the American 
dream.
The major concern of lawyers in the American system was to ensure that 
government interference, whether at federal or state level, was kept to a min-
imum. In particular the doctrine of ‘taking’ developed as a way of giving ex-
pression to unwarranted intrusion by public authorities in the legitimate con-
cerns of landowners, and this made any control of land in the public interest 
difficult (Cullingworth, 1993).
In this context, as we have seen, the understanding of property as multiple 
interests vested in many people gave way to the concept of multiple rights 
vested in one owner. For government to interfere with any one of the multiple 
rights was to run the risk of an unconstitutional taking and this was clearly 
true of an identifiably separate right to future development. And if the right to 
future development was separately identifiable, it could clearly also be traded 
separately. The use of non-financial compensation in the American context 
is therefore the natural extension of a legal formulation that married a post-
feudal common-law approach to property and a philosophy of natural rights 
in land and their relationship to the freedom of the citizen.
Non-financial compensation in the 10.7 
Civil Code tradition
Given that the Civil Code tradition did not recognize multiple, separable, 
rights in property in the same way as the common law, it is perhaps surpris-
ing that Hohfeld’s view of property as a bundle of rights appears, from the ev-
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idence of earlier chapters alone, also to be taking root in continental Europe. 
Perhaps the explanation for this shift is to be found in the inherent tension 
we noted above between dominium and imperium. If the landowner had a con-
stitutional right to property but that constitutional right was in fact subordi-
nated to overriding reasons of state, a landowner might paradoxically have 
even less right of redress against the state than in the common-law tradition, 
where property rights were only ever contingent and partial. The ‘bundle of 
rights’ conceptualization allows a potential injustice to be put right but in a 
way that is less costly than compensating for complete expropriation. And of 
course Hohfeld’s extension of common-law doctrine was being applied in a 
context in which the ideal of absolute ownership was not only aimed for but 
achieved. There is less strain in translating a common-law doctrine into the 
civil code tradition than might at first appear.
There are, however, other ways of exploring the problem. Just as in the 
American tradition, landownership is strongly identified with personal liberty 
in the countries represented in this book. Systems of inheritance were de-
signed to ensure that owners could not readily accumulate land and by so do-
ing, replicate the old inequalities of feudalism. It is very much from this civil 
code tradition that the European Convention on Human Rights has identified, 
as a right for a natural or legal person, the “peaceful enjoyment of his pos-
sessions,” (Art. 1 First Protocol) although the same article recognizes the right 
of governments to control property in the general interest. This does not, of 
itself, imply that if deprived of their rights in the general interest, landowners 
may expect to be compensated, but it is clearly only a small step to adopting 
such a position.
In practice, the civil code tradition of spatial planning has been at pains to 
identify the specific rights that a landowner does enjoy in a system of abso-
lute ownership. Systems of zones and regulations that apply in all the coun-
tries covered in this book correspond very well to this concern by spelling 
out in detail what a landowner might or might not do with the land in his 
or her possession. The absolute right to property of the French constitution 
became a right to act in accordance with the townplanning code and its spa-
tialized representation, the zoning plan. The single right to property in effect 
becomes a multiple right, to a certain way of using the land, to a particular 
form and quantity of building, both now and in the future. This is not exactly 
the Hohfeldian vision of rights in property, although it is broadly analogous, 
and it allows the individual rights to be separately enumerated. Once articu-
lated in this way, the right to compensation if any of those rights are removed 
becomes inescapable.
In this context, transferring those rights in order to achieve a particular 
goal in the general interest of citizens becomes both possible in a legal sense 
and attractive. Financially, transferring rights rather than offering financial 
compensation for removing them is likely to be the attractive option for pub-
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lic authorities. But the argument goes further than financial considerations 
alone. It is clear that in some countries at least, notably in Japan and the U.S., 
there is considerable reluctance to use compulsory purchase or eminent do-
main powers, precisely because to do so would infringe deeply held convic-
tions about civil liberties. In these circumstances it is far better to negotiate 
for the transfer of rights than to expropriate and then to offer financial com-
pensation.
There is another impact of the civil code tradition on property which is 
relevant to this discussion. Fragmentation of landownership seems to be 
a consequence of the insistence on the right to absolute dominium and the 
measures that are taken to ensure that land is not concentrated in particu-
lar hands. That this makes the achievement of objectives in the public inter-
est difficult to achieve is clear from the accounts of Spain and Japan in this 
book, and transferring development rights becomes part of a bigger program 
to amalgamate landholdings and in this way organize space in the public in-
terest.
Conclusion10.8 
The account of the way in which the two contrasting systems of law have 
dealt with the right to future development might suggest a convergence. Cer-
tainly, the fact that future development is being treated as a separable en-
tity within the countries represented in this book suggests that implicitly a 
common-law approach to property is gaining ground. On the other hand, the 
move everywhere towards affirming absolute ownership even within coun-
tries of the common-law tradition suggests that the Roman law conception of 
dominium is also gaining ground. The convergence is indeed real enough with-
in the narrow confines of the topic of this book. In a larger sense, the older 
distinctions still obtain, even if they are undergoing substantial change.
Convergence is, however, less important than a deeper issue. Non-financial 
compensation assumes that there is indeed a right that is concerned with the 
future utilization of land. Deeply ingrained though this understanding may 
be, there is no inherent reason why it should be a right. The European Con-
vention on Human Rights refers to ‘peaceful enjoyment’ of property, but not 
specifically to the right to develop land. If future development of land was re-
cast in terms of privilege and not a right, the whole question of compensation 
would be very different, indeed might disappear.
However, this is to accord a larger instrumental role to law than it in fact 
has. The law is the articulation of societal values and not the other way round. 
Property ownership retains a powerful hold in the collective psyche of the de-
veloped world, and different legal systems have striven to give the concept 
of property expression, but the concept itself precedes law. Non-financial 
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compensation and the various mechanisms described in this book are about 
finding legal ways of offsetting private interest against general interest and 
ensuring that public policy objectives for the spatial distribution of activities 
and development are met.
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Comparing the cases 11 
and planning for the 
future of non-financial 
compensation
Menno van der Veen, Marjolein Spaans, Bianca Putters and Leonie Janssen-Jansen
Introduction11.1 
In this chapter we analyze the international experiments and practices of 
non-financial compensation in planning as described in this book. As men-
tioned in Chapter 2, the country chapters on experiences with non-financial 
compensation in Japan, Korea, Spain, Italy, the U.S. and the Netherlands can 
be read as sequential presentations of descriptive data, but in accordance 
with a common framework to ease comparison between the different cases. 
This study does not aim to explain causal relations, but to mirror different 
approaches to an abstract problem in order to be inspired by, learn from or 
even transplant other experiences. By showing different planning innovations 
and solutions to comparable problems we hope to give assistance to planners 
who face similar problems in their countries. For each abstract problem we 
start by comparing the information in the summarizing tables for each of the 
six countries. In the first part of this chapter, after discussing differences and 
similarities in the cases (Section 11.2), we provide an overview of the abstract 
cases that we asked the writers to discuss. The three sections each include a 
table that provides an overview of the conservation (Section 11.3), conversion 
(Section 11.4) and re-allocation cases (Section 11.5).
In the second part of this chapter we draw conclusions on the methodolog-
ical challenges we encountered in writing this book and the general conclu-
sions of the cases. We also provide suggestions for further research. Despite 
the general formulations in abstract cases, the question remains whether the 
problems were really comparable or whether we forced the cases to fit our ab-
stract case categories. A further refinement might be needed in the future. In 
the conservation case for example, we initially focused on preserving an open 
area that is now being used for extensive farming. For this category it seems 
wise to include an urban category as well, for example when it concerns con-
servation of landmarks like in the Penn Central case. An interesting addition 
to the conversion category can be found in necessities from outside such as 
disaster prevention in Japan or reducing emission in the Dutch case. Also am-
bitions from the inside such as the political decision to redevelop the Hud-
son Yards and the Japanese Katsuragi example offer interesting contributions. 
In our re-allocation case we focused on compensation for non-development, 
for example via restructuring incentives, to include owners of these plots as 
well in redevelopment processes in order to improve the overall quality of the 
area. Instruments on land readjustment belong to this category as well. These 
cases also address a variant of the non-financial compensation per se, which 
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is non-financial incentives. In future research these seem worthwhile addi-
tions to broaden up the abstract case categories. In our initial research set-up, 
some categories had a somewhat limited definition. But some authors inter-
preted these categories more broadly. This is why – where appropriate – we 
have included this in our comparison of the conservation, conversion and re-
allocation cases.
Differences and similarities between 11.2 
the cases
In all countries, except for the Netherlands with its more regional perspective, 
the focus was on the local level. We also saw other purposes of the instru-
ments used. In Chapter 2 we briefly introduced a variation on non-financial 
compensation per se: the non-financial incentive. It turned out some of the 
authors approached non-financial incentives as an integral part of the con-
cept of non-financial compensation, which resulted in refinement of the con-
cept with demarcation between non-financial compensation and incentives 
during the workshops held to discuss the submitted draft papers. In Section 
11.6 we further elaborate on both compensation per se and incentives.
To summarize, in Korea, Italy and the Netherlands the focus was general-
ly on non-financial incentives, probably because the property rights systems 
have little experience with the idea of takings. These countries do not seem to 
have development rights as such at their disposal that could be compensated. 
Another explanation for this difference might be the divergent views of the 
concept of non-financial compensation between planners and legal experts. 
The planners among the authors approached the idea of non-financial com-
pensation more from the context of the case as a whole, whereas the lawyers 
regard the specific instrument within the context of compensation (i.e. loss of 
property rights). This distinction can also be explained as the perspective of 
the regulating government versus the perspective of the individual property 
owner. The first is predominant in Korea, Italy and the Netherlands, the sec-
ond in Japan, Spain and the U.S. In these latter countries the focus is primarily 
on non-financial compensation, although in Japan and Spain some incentive-
like uses of the instruments can also be identified. In Japan we saw a transfer 
of Floor Area Ratio (FAR) between areas in order to increase densities in specif-
ic areas and to conserve monuments or historical districts. In Spain the con-
cept is used as a way of developing new housing areas. The U.S. focus is pre-
dominantly on the compensation side. There are many more incentive zoning 
examples to be found in the U.S. that have not been included in this book. In 
the U.S. the number of potential cases was enormous, though not all examples 
can be seen as ‘best practices’. In Korea only cases of re-allocation could be 
found, and all with a focus on non-financial incentives via density bonuses.
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The extent to which solutions are reached in each of the countries is per-
haps also dependent on the adoption of the non-financial compensation tech-
niques developed by each nation. In the Netherlands, the red for green instru-
ments have yet to be implemented, and in the U.S. examples are in existence, 
but widespread or even consistent use is far from reality. Japanese planning 
practice has developed and puts its ‘conservation’ instruments into use as en-
visioned, and the same can perhaps be said about Italian planning practice. 
Nevertheless, it may be premature to divide the instruments into successes or 
failures based on their current implementation. It remains to be seen if a shift 
in economies or a modification of current provisions would affect the use and 
perceived value of these instruments.
The conservation problem11.3 
We started our research project by providing the authors of the country chap-
ters with three abstract cases and asked them to report on how these prob-
lems were dealt with in their countries. The problem of conservation was de-
scribed as follows: one or more local government would like to preserve an 
open area that is now being used for extensive farming. A residential neigh-
borhood will be created nearby. The preservation and maintenance of the 
green area is too expensive for the farmer. The local government does not 
have any funding available for maintaining the green area and would there-
fore like the developers of the residential neighborhood to contribute to the 
green area, which could even be upgraded into a green recreational and wild-
life area. Do the local governments utilize an instrument to force the develop-
ers to do that? In this conservation category, protection – and even upgrade – 
of the existing land use is important as well as whether the existing land use 
is ‘open space’ or contains monuments. The conservation problem of each 
case is systematically described in Table 11.1.
A review of the conservation cases presented in this text reveals the exis-
tence or application of different instruments, all geared to resolving concerns 
within the unique set of legal, social, physical and philosophical circumstanc-
es and tendencies inherent in each country: Japan, Italy, Spain, the U.S. and 
the Netherlands. As such, the instruments in use or as proposed appear to be 
well-tailored to each country’s set of current problems or concerns. Two types 
of conservation are dealt with: conserving historic districts and buildings, and 
the protection of green (or blue) areas.
In Japan, for example, non-financial compensation in the Marunouchi Dis-
trict is being used in a conservation mode to provide fill-in in a land with very 
limited acreage and with a history of low density development. An increase in 
FAR was made possible through the developer’s investments in public ameni-
ties such as open space, cultural facilities and the construction of a passage-
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Table 11.1 The conservation problem
Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Name of the case Compensation for the non-
development of Tokyo Station
- Almería General Plan Schio Malibu, California Limburg experiment VORm 
Period in which the case was 
introduced
Bubble economy period (1986-
1991)
- 1984-1988. Our case study 
finished in 1988 but the 
experience that started in 1984 
lasted several more years
From 1960 2005 Still in set-up phase, first 
experiments started in 2006
General objectives of the 
proposed instrument
Special FAR applied district: 
efficient utilization of lands in 
commercial districts
- General objective was to boost 
restoration of historic buildings 
in derelict condition and to reuse 
them as public equipment to 
assist the cultural and social 
needs of the city center of Almería
Actuating management of the 
municipality General Town Plan 
(GTP) choice
No increase in development in 
environmentally- sensitive areas
Reinvesting windfall profits of a 
few additional development sites 
in provincial nature development 
program
Characteristic factors Preservation and restoration  -
of the old station building
Area in front of station con- -
verted into a plaza (west side)
A large promenade deck  -
planned with a high-rise 
building at each end (east 
side)
- All the techniques involved 
were applied on a willing basis 
between private and public actors
Little urban vision -
Public/private negotiation is  -
very informal
Sending area is the Santa  -
Monica Mountains Area 
coastal zone
Receiving areas are only two  -
districts in the City of Malibu 
– MF (Multiple Family) 
and MFBF (Multi-Family 
Beachfront)
Use of profits in urban land uses 
for provincial policy on nature 
development
Particular economic and social 
circumstances that have 
determined the instrument
A decade of low growth of 
the economy (1991-2001) 
resulted in several deregulation 
measures that were supposed 
to recover the economy
- Public reaction against a  -
previous historic process of 
development which neglected 
the preservation of heritage
Financial difficulties for the  -
public sector
Need for public control of the 
expansion of large urban areas
The California Coastal  -
Commission was afraid that 
development from LA would 
spread to Malibu
Large number of undeveloped  -
parcels with limited 
infrastructure
Decision of national government 
to economize on nature 
development
Fit with the planning and legal 
system: What relation with 
spatial plans?
Project carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
- Regulatory framework  -
established by ordinance 
contained in the General Plan 
(Master Planning instrument) 
of the municipality
Special physical provisions  -
drafted in the planning
This instrument is used in a 
few parts of the municipality 
General Regulation Plan
Special coastal regulation: but 
basically TDCs are within the 
city Zoning Code that conforms 
to the city Land Use Plan 
Initiatives have to be laid down in 
the local land use plans
Were specific laws and 
regulations drawn up?
Amendment of the City 
Planning Law and Building 
Standards Law in 2001
- Only at the local level General national and regional 
legislation
Not for this particular case No
Spatial level at which the case 
is tackled
- Local (municipality) Only in the areas for the 
actuating plans
Because of sending area being 
outside of the City of Malibu, 
this is regional-like
Provincial level
Relevant public actors and role National government:  -
provider of subsidisation 
for the renovation of Tokyo 
Station
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
applied district
- City council of Almería estab- -
lished the policy and the rules 
and controls its enforcement
Developers and building own- -
ers are the economic actors 
by means of free agreements 
amongst them
146 TDRs achieved -
Municipality The City of Malibu approves the 
transfer of TDCs
Province of Limburg (initiative 
and coordination) and local 
authorities (implementation of 
additional sites)

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between private and public actors
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Monica Mountains Area 
coastal zone
Receiving areas are only two  -
districts in the City of Malibu 
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Beachfront)
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The California Coastal  -
Commission was afraid that 
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system: What relation with 
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Project carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
- Regulatory framework  -
established by ordinance 
contained in the General Plan 
(Master Planning instrument) 
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Special physical provisions  -
drafted in the planning
This instrument is used in a 
few parts of the municipality 
General Regulation Plan
Special coastal regulation: but 
basically TDCs are within the 
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to the city Land Use Plan 
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Were specific laws and 
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- Only at the local level General national and regional 
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Not for this particular case No
Spatial level at which the case 
is tackled
- Local (municipality) Only in the areas for the 
actuating plans
Because of sending area being 
outside of the City of Malibu, 
this is regional-like
Provincial level
Relevant public actors and role National government:  -
provider of subsidisation 
for the renovation of Tokyo 
Station
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
applied district
- City council of Almería estab- -
lished the policy and the rules 
and controls its enforcement
Developers and building own- -
ers are the economic actors 
by means of free agreements 
amongst them
146 TDRs achieved -
Municipality The City of Malibu approves the 
transfer of TDCs
Province of Limburg (initiative 
and coordination) and local 
authorities (implementation of 
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
way (the Marunouchi Building); it was made possible through the transfer of 
FAR from one building to another (the Industry Club of Japan Building); and, it 
was made possible through the ‘use substitution instrument’ which allowed 
an exchange of uses between different buildings in the district (the Tokyo 
Building). This last example allowed, in effect, a relaxation of the use substi-
tutions in Marunouchi.
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) are used in Spain even though the 
laws do not include them per se. They are viewed as a form of the land read-
justment technique. With the newly elected democracy came the ambition to 
conserve its special historic resources and thus to halt the common practice 
of demolishing historic buildings.
In Italy, non-financial compensation instruments have been applied to 
preserve green areas and historic districts where eminent domain costs are 
prohibitive for a city, and disputes and the lack of political consensus further 
complicates and impedes necessary development. The transfer of develop-
ment rights from areas designated as suitable for public use to areas desig-
nated as appropriate for additional development makes it possible for the city 
to acquire the land it needs and simultaneously provides developers with op-
portunities not previously available.
The use of transferable development credits (TDCs) in Malibu has helped 
to protect an environmentally-sensitive section of the area while allowing a 
landowner to subdivide his parcel of land within city limits. This TDC pro-
gram is an example of collaboration between a municipality and a broader 
region that can be viewed as a winning measure for the overall region in that 
it limits development to an area with closer ties to infrastructure and allows 
more remote areas to remain undeveloped. However, at the time of publica-
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Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Balance between private and 
public exchange
The redevelopment project is 
an outcome of negotiations 
between private and public 
parties, and not so much a 
result of regulations set up by 
the government in advance
- Building owners or developers  -
not interested in its restoration 
battled with the municipality 
in exchange for development 
rights allocable in other areas.
Properties of the historc build- -
ings transferred to the muni-
cipality which restored and 
reused them as public facilities
More public interest than 
private
Negotiations take place  -
between owners of sending 
lots and owners of receiving 
lots
The Planning Director  -
calculates TDCs and 
maintains the records of 
transfer
Mainly a contract between 
province and local authority. 
Local authority then passes 
on the recouping of profits of 
the additional site to private 
developers
Parties which financed the 
case
National government, JR East 
and some other private parties
- Properties are contributed by  -
the private sector
Public sector finances the resto- -
ration works
Private The landowner who subdivided 
the two lots paid for the TDCs
Ultimately the private developers 
(and thus the end users) pay for 
the nature development
Possibility for public 
participation
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by the 
involved parties
- Each one of the deals which 
performs a TDR is subject to a 
period of public participation to 
allow possible representations 
and suggestions of third private 
parties
Low Public notice and review took 
place
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land use 
plan, as the linking of additional 
development site and nature 
development has to be laid down 
in this plan

Table 11.1 continued
tion, widespread application of the program had not materialized.
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Limburg VORm experiment (tradable de-
velopment rights) as exemplified, in part, in the red for green policy, takes the 
profits resulting from favorable zoning laws and reinvests them in projects 
that benefit the public.
The Dutch non-financial compensation models exemplify the very close 
relationship that exists between all the models and their respective country’s 
general attitudes and philosophies toward property, its ownership, its use and 
the laws promulgated to regulate it. In the Netherlands, the idea of the public 
recapture of added value resulting from favorable zoning amendments fits in 
neatly with the society’s long-standing outlook on public justice and equal-
ity. In Japan, the ingrained sacredness of land ownership affects the ability 
to develop efficiently, yet this long-standing respect is not tampered with. As 
such, the non-financial compensation tools developed there include unpar-
alleled flexibility. The U.S. example of the City of Malibu’s TDCs likewise fol-
lows a pattern of a very appropriate adaptation of the city’s residents’ expec-
tations: the expensive parcels can ultimately be subdivided and the residents’ 
protective attitude towards the natural landscape prevails when acres of land 
are dedicated to conservation status. The Italian examples are adapted to the 
country’s particular situation which consisted of an impasse to the develop-
ment of public necessities such as green areas and the preservation of his-
toric resources and which provided the funds necessary to expand the large 
urban areas.
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
The conversion problem11.4 
The conversion problem was described as follows: a local government would 
like to demolish existing high-rise buildings in a certain area and replace 
them with one and two-story (low-rise) buildings. It does not have the finan-
cial resources available to compensate the real estate owners for the lower 
income they will receive as a result of the conversion. Is there an instrument 
available that the local government could use to fulfill its goals? In this con-
version category, the improvement of the current land use is important. The 
conversion problem of each case is systematically described in Table 11.2.
In contrast to the use of non-financial compensation instruments for con-
servation problems, the use of these instruments for conversion purposes ap-
pears to be more common practice, particularly in the cases of Italy and Japan 
where a series of applications is discussed. Examples in the U.S. and the Neth-
erlands appear to be more limited in scope – that is, tied to the respective 
projects discussed. In Japan, for example, as of 2002, a minimum of 385,000 
hectares of land had been developed using the Land Readjustment Method 
and 860 hectares had been developed using the Urban Redevelopment Meth-
od both within Tokyo and in the urban fringes.
In Italy, the Intervention Integrated Plans (IIPs) have been in use since 1995, 
and the Park Ex Feltrinelli IIP in Cremona is only one case of many in Lom-
bardy. The IIPs provide contracts between a municipality and the other par-
ties involved. In this unique set of instruments, private parties can contract 
to manage public services including public gardens and sports facilities. The 
public entity has been granted the power to negotiate with the private sec-
tor and can therefore grant public services as well as development rights. The 
flexibility of this instrument resolves the previous level of conflict which oth-
erwise caused legal disputes in the urban planning of towns. As such, IIPs are 
an appropriate adaptation which more than adequately resolves the problems 
previously encountered.
The Japanese instruments, Integrated Land Readjustment and Urban Re-
development are well adapted to promote more efficient land use and resolve 
certain land use problems with long-standing origins. At the core of these so-
lutions is the idea that the landowners accept a smaller plot of land or prop-
erty after the instruments are applied in order to benefit the greater good. As 
such, these solutions are viable in this society which incorporates the philos-
ophy of the greater good in many aspects of its structure. These unique solu-
tions may not be viable in a country with a different perspective on the gen-
eral well-being.
The successful redevelopment of the Francia Avenue Sector in Valencia 
(Spain) took an area of the city that was formerly industrial and converted it 
into thriving commercial and much-needed residential space. Land readjust-
ment made it possible to assign 80% of the area to public uses and even in-
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spired regional legal reform in Spain. The focus in this case was on the extent 
and quality of the renewal rather than the typical emphasis on an increase 
in density. Once again, this Spanish example of non-financial compensation 
is an exceptional case study of adaptation to a country’s circumstances and 
resolution of a problem.
In the Netherlands, the vacant buildings that resulted from the steps taken 
to meet EU standards for the reduction of phosphate and nitrate emissions 
were seen as a problem. The non-financial compensation instrument Space 
for Space incorporated a solution to funding which was not previously avail-
able and resulted in a benefit perceived by society as beneficial for the gen-
eral population (the countryside cleared of abandoned stables) and a benefit 
to a few individual landowners who after re-zoning were allowed to build 
more expansive and expensive housing. The instruments work to resolve the 
unique situation and particular goals of this tightly-knit country with limited 
land area.
TDRs in use for the Hudson Yards project in New York City will assist in de-
veloping the last area of underdeveloped land in Manhattan. A gritty industri-
al area will be converted into much needed housing and appropriate support 
facilities, and in turn spare additional sprawl which was otherwise inevitable. 
The complex arrangements to finance this large project – the building of a 
deck over the Eastern rail yards – is well adapted to the magnitude of plans 
for residential buildings, a convention center, parks and related infrastructure 
over the rail yards. It appears that the long-term planning of the financing 
of this project should provide some measure of the guarantee of its success, 
although as it is still in the initial stages it remains to be seen how all the in-
struments, including TDRs, will contribute to its success.
The re-allocation problem11.5 
The problem of re-allocation was described as follows: a new commercial 
business area will be created and as a result the landowners will enjoy a con-
siderable increase in the value of their land. Within the area, however, some of 
the plots have been zoned as green areas. Consequently the owners of these 
parcels will suffer a decrease in the value of their land, and as a result they do 
not cooperate. Expropriation of these owners is not an option since the local 
government does not have the financial resources to compensate the owners. 
Is there another way to compensate the owners of the green areas and thus 
convince them to include their land in the project? In this re-allocation cat-
egory, the compensation for non-development is important. The re-allocation 
problem of each case is systematically described in Table 11.3.
As discussed in the two previous categories above, the non-financial com-
pensation instruments applied to the re-allocation problem show a close ad-
[ 237 ]
[ 238 ]
Table 11.2 The conversion problem
Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Name of the case Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
- Francia Avenue Program (Valencia) Cremona Hudson Yards Project Brabant’s Space-for-Space 
programme
Period in which the case was 
introduced
Bubble economy period (1986- -
1991)
1998 (three years after the big  -
earthquake in Kobe)
- First public decision (official  -
announcement of a public contest) 
in 1991
Public works of urbanization  -
finished in 1986
Building process finished in 2006 -
From 1995 2003 2001
General objectives of the 
proposed instrument
Integrated land readjustment:  -
Coordinated development of 
railways and their surrounding 
areas
Urban redevelopment:  -
Disaster prevention 
Provision of public facilities 
Efficient utilisation of land
- Redevelopment of a very large 
industrial area between the city 
center of Valencia and its seafront
Actuating management of the 
modification requirements-
integration of the GTP by the 
privates(?)
To make use of an  -
underutilized section of 
the City (part of Manhattan 
borough) where land is scarce 
and valuable
To provide office space -
To defer sprawl -
Financing the demolition of 
stables of intensive livestock 
industries (and thus reducing 
emissions) by using additional 
profits by additional housing sites
Characteristic factors After land readjustment: Public  -
land: 26%, Private land: 74% 
(of which 35% is commercial 
land and 34% residential)
After the urban redevelopment:  -
On 60% of the 0.64 ha project 
area two high-rise buildings 
have been constructed. The 
remaining land is public.
- Relevant public infrastructure  -
works developed or afforded by the 
private sector
Global impact in the life of a major  -
city
Pioneer experience of public  -
contest to choose a developer in 
charge of an area that exceeds its 
own property
Urban vision is requested -
Public/private negotiation is  -
public
Sending areas are: Eastern  -
Rail Yard (ERY) and Phase II 
Hudson Blvd & Park
Receiving areas for ERY is  -
located to the north of ERY 
For Phase II districts C2-8, 
C6-2, C6-4, and M1-5
Embedding non-spatial policy 
aims in a spatial plan
Particular economic and 
social circumstances 
that have determined the 
instrument
a+b) High growth of the economy 
led to a large influx of people into 
the urban areas (1950s onward)
b) Great fires in urban areas 
(1960s)
- Financial requirements that exceed 
the possibilities of the public budget. 
Large number of landowners affected 
(170) with passive attitudes and 
the need to find leading actors to 
promote the private involvement in 
the public targets
Creating flexibility of the 
public instrument to face the 
requirements of the private 
landowners
TDRs help finance the deck  -
over the Eastern Rail Yards
TDRs allow the density levels  -
appropriate and necessary 
for NYC
Need to meet the EU objectives 
on reduction of phosphate and 
nitrate emissions and thus need 
to create a financial fund to 
facilitate the demolition of stables 
on intensive livestock farms
Fit with the planning and 
legal system: What relation 
with spatial plans?
a+b) District plan - Private project selected in public 
contest inside the guidelines prior 
established in the General (Master) 
Plan drafted by the municipality
This instrument is used with 
a strategic vision document 
related to the municipal General 
Regulation Plan
TDR provisions are in municipal 
zoning resolution
Doubts about legally sound 
elaboration: relation between 
demolition of stables and 
recouping of windfalls of land use 
with no relation to the stables. 
Link has to be included in the 
local land use plan
Were specific laws and 
regulations drawn up?
a) Special law on the housing 
land and railroad system 
development (1989)
b) Urban Redevelopment Law 
(1969)
- No, only at the regulatory local level. 
Procedure legally foreseen but never 
before applied. Relevant practical 
discovery (possibility of a third actor 
between landownership and public 
administrations). The experience 
inspired major legal changes at the 
regional and national levels
Specific national and regional 
legislation
Hudson Yards area was rezoned 
in 2005
Yes: the Regulation on ending 
of livestock branches and the 
Brakkestein Pact (2000)

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Table 11.2 The conversion problem
Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Name of the case Towards a safer and more 
efficient land use
a) Katsuragi
b) Asahi Machi
- Francia Avenue Program (Valencia) Cremona Hudson Yards Project Brabant’s Space-for-Space 
programme
Period in which the case was 
introduced
Bubble economy period (1986- -
1991)
1998 (three years after the big  -
earthquake in Kobe)
- First public decision (official  -
announcement of a public contest) 
in 1991
Public works of urbanization  -
finished in 1986
Building process finished in 2006 -
From 1995 2003 2001
General objectives of the 
proposed instrument
Integrated land readjustment:  -
Coordinated development of 
railways and their surrounding 
areas
Urban redevelopment:  -
Disaster prevention 
Provision of public facilities 
Efficient utilisation of land
- Redevelopment of a very large 
industrial area between the city 
center of Valencia and its seafront
Actuating management of the 
modification requirements-
integration of the GTP by the 
privates(?)
To make use of an  -
underutilized section of 
the City (part of Manhattan 
borough) where land is scarce 
and valuable
To provide office space -
To defer sprawl -
Financing the demolition of 
stables of intensive livestock 
industries (and thus reducing 
emissions) by using additional 
profits by additional housing sites
Characteristic factors After land readjustment: Public  -
land: 26%, Private land: 74% 
(of which 35% is commercial 
land and 34% residential)
After the urban redevelopment:  -
On 60% of the 0.64 ha project 
area two high-rise buildings 
have been constructed. The 
remaining land is public.
- Relevant public infrastructure  -
works developed or afforded by the 
private sector
Global impact in the life of a major  -
city
Pioneer experience of public  -
contest to choose a developer in 
charge of an area that exceeds its 
own property
Urban vision is requested -
Public/private negotiation is  -
public
Sending areas are: Eastern  -
Rail Yard (ERY) and Phase II 
Hudson Blvd & Park
Receiving areas for ERY is  -
located to the north of ERY 
For Phase II districts C2-8, 
C6-2, C6-4, and M1-5
Embedding non-spatial policy 
aims in a spatial plan
Particular economic and 
social circumstances 
that have determined the 
instrument
a+b) High growth of the economy 
led to a large influx of people into 
the urban areas (1950s onward)
b) Great fires in urban areas 
(1960s)
- Financial requirements that exceed 
the possibilities of the public budget. 
Large number of landowners affected 
(170) with passive attitudes and 
the need to find leading actors to 
promote the private involvement in 
the public targets
Creating flexibility of the 
public instrument to face the 
requirements of the private 
landowners
TDRs help finance the deck  -
over the Eastern Rail Yards
TDRs allow the density levels  -
appropriate and necessary 
for NYC
Need to meet the EU objectives 
on reduction of phosphate and 
nitrate emissions and thus need 
to create a financial fund to 
facilitate the demolition of stables 
on intensive livestock farms
Fit with the planning and 
legal system: What relation 
with spatial plans?
a+b) District plan - Private project selected in public 
contest inside the guidelines prior 
established in the General (Master) 
Plan drafted by the municipality
This instrument is used with 
a strategic vision document 
related to the municipal General 
Regulation Plan
TDR provisions are in municipal 
zoning resolution
Doubts about legally sound 
elaboration: relation between 
demolition of stables and 
recouping of windfalls of land use 
with no relation to the stables. 
Link has to be included in the 
local land use plan
Were specific laws and 
regulations drawn up?
a) Special law on the housing 
land and railroad system 
development (1989)
b) Urban Redevelopment Law 
(1969)
- No, only at the regulatory local level. 
Procedure legally foreseen but never 
before applied. Relevant practical 
discovery (possibility of a third actor 
between landownership and public 
administrations). The experience 
inspired major legal changes at the 
regional and national levels
Specific national and regional 
legislation
Hudson Yards area was rezoned 
in 2005
Yes: the Regulation on ending 
of livestock branches and the 
Brakkestein Pact (2000)

aptation to their individual country’s set of circumstances. For example, in 
Japan, where ‘negotiation-led planning’ is the norm, the Special FAR ‘applied 
district’ was used to successfully redevelop the Tokyo Station Building. Pro-
ceeds from the sale of FAR were used for the redevelopment, and FAR was 
made available to increase density in the surrounding vicinity. The non-finan-
cial compensation tools employed matched the Japanese method of focusing 
on the economy and providing flexibility.
Likewise, the non-financial compensation program used in Rome, which 
transfers land to the municipality in exchange for development rights, re-
solves the problem of the scarcity of public resources to expropriate and en-
sures equitable treatment of the landowners.
In environmentally-conscious Portland, Oregon, where TDRs appear in sev-
eral provisions of the zoning code, their focus is the protection of environ-
mentally-sensitive areas and the development of low-income housing. A TDR 
bank may be necessary to promote their use since examples of their applica-
tion are not plentiful. However, successful projects have resulted where TDR 
projects have been implemented.
In the Netherlands, an extension of long-standing land re-adjustment is 
being employed in Vleuterweide and in the Amsterdam Zuidas where sport 
fields will be re-allocated and realized above existing tracks and highway on a 
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Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Spatial level at which the 
case is tackled
- Local (municipality) In new areas not provided for by 
the actuating plans
Municipal Provincial level
Relevant public actors and 
role
a+b) National government and 
local government providers of 
subsidization
- City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 170 property owners 
contributed in different ways to 
the development. Professional 
developers managed and financed 
the process
Municipality New York City -
Metropolitan Transportation  -
Authority
Two corporations formed  -
to manage the finance and 
construction (HYIC and HYDC)
Province of Noord-Brabant 
(initiative and coordination) and 
local authorities (implementation 
of additional sites)
Balance between private 
and public exchange
a) The plan was developed by the 
government after consulting 
the landowners involved
b) The plan was developed by the 
private landowners themselves 
with the help of an outsider 
(private developer)
- Public targets performed by the 
private sector. The city gains a 
new neighbourhood located at 
an industrial area in an obsolete 
position as it also obtains many 
properties and major infrastructures. 
No cost for the public sector. 
Profitable results for the numerous 
private actors affected
Good balance Control of financing and  -
management is in public 
hands
Private developers will pay for  -
density bonuses and TDRs
Tax exemptions will be  -
available to private parties
Strong coordinating role of  -
public sector (province and 
local authorities)
Individual farmers ending their  -
business and developers also 
benefit
Parties which financed the 
case
a) Urban Renaissance Agency 
and Ibaraki prefecture
b) Urban renewal association and 
Sumitomo Fudosan (a private 
developer)
- Private developers -
Landowners contribute with  -
properties
Private and Public New York City (general fund)  -
and private developers
Sale of long-term bonds to be  -
financed by revenues from the 
improvements
Revolving fund of Space for Space 
development company includes 5 
private developers and financial 
institutions (each 16% share) and 
province (20% share)
Possibility for public 
participation
a+b) Yes, both cases have to 
undergo the city planning 
procedure
- Through formal public participation 
in the local land use plan
Medium Public notice and review 
took place; public forums in 
November 2002 and February 
2003 
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan

Table 11.2 continued
dock that is part of the new project. The current playing fields will be home to 
high-rise offices whose revenues will be used to finance the dock and sports 
fields. Non-financial compensation principles are helping to convert Dutch 
planning from a government-centered activity providing the common good 
to a more market-centered activity which includes developers contributing to 
the same goal.
In Korea, non-financial compensation-like District Unit Planning applica-
tions in Jeonong-dong and Sinseol-dong are illustrations of market-driven 
devices in a historically top-down planning regime. These examples include 
density transfer in a limited fashion – the transfer is within a single develop-
ment track. Therefore, the technique is limited and does not function for the 
preservation of environmentally-sensitive areas or historic resources. The ap-
plications are in their very early stages and it is therefore premature to evalu-
ate their success. Recent legislative changes have been made, however, which 
may expand their effectiveness and provide for inter-district transfers. Their 
promotion in this way may be due to the realization that they provide a solu-
tion to the shortage of public funds to provide for public spaces.
Finally, in Spain, land readjustment in the Orriols Sector of Valencia, which 
employs value coefficients to determine FAR development rights, was used to 
re-allocate future urban development. In conjunction, transferable develop-
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Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands
Spatial level at which the 
case is tackled
- Local (municipality) In new areas not provided for by 
the actuating plans
Municipal Provincial level
Relevant public actors and 
role
a+b) National government and 
local government providers of 
subsidization
- City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 170 property owners 
contributed in different ways to 
the development. Professional 
developers managed and financed 
the process
Municipality New York City -
Metropolitan Transportation  -
Authority
Two corporations formed  -
to manage the finance and 
construction (HYIC and HYDC)
Province of Noord-Brabant 
(initiative and coordination) and 
local authorities (implementation 
of additional sites)
Balance between private 
and public exchange
a) The plan was developed by the 
government after consulting 
the landowners involved
b) The plan was developed by the 
private landowners themselves 
with the help of an outsider 
(private developer)
- Public targets performed by the 
private sector. The city gains a 
new neighbourhood located at 
an industrial area in an obsolete 
position as it also obtains many 
properties and major infrastructures. 
No cost for the public sector. 
Profitable results for the numerous 
private actors affected
Good balance Control of financing and  -
management is in public 
hands
Private developers will pay for  -
density bonuses and TDRs
Tax exemptions will be  -
available to private parties
Strong coordinating role of  -
public sector (province and 
local authorities)
Individual farmers ending their  -
business and developers also 
benefit
Parties which financed the 
case
a) Urban Renaissance Agency 
and Ibaraki prefecture
b) Urban renewal association and 
Sumitomo Fudosan (a private 
developer)
- Private developers -
Landowners contribute with  -
properties
Private and Public New York City (general fund)  -
and private developers
Sale of long-term bonds to be  -
financed by revenues from the 
improvements
Revolving fund of Space for Space 
development company includes 5 
private developers and financial 
institutions (each 16% share) and 
province (20% share)
Possibility for public 
participation
a+b) Yes, both cases have to 
undergo the city planning 
procedure
- Through formal public participation 
in the local land use plan
Medium Public notice and review 
took place; public forums in 
November 2002 and February 
2003 
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan

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Table 11.3 The re-allocation problem
Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2)
Name of the case Redevelopment of the 
Marunouchi District (Tokyo)
Jeonong-dong, 
Sinseol-dong and Isoo 
development tract (Seoul)
Land readjustment Orriols (Valencia) Rome Portland, The Sally 
McCracken Building
GEM Vleuterweide (City of 
Utrecht)
Zuidas enterprise in South 
Axis (City of Amsterdam)
Period in which the 
case was introduced
Bubble economy period (1986-
1991)
Since 2003 The bases were established in the 
General Plan of Valencia in 1988. 
Orriols operation started in 1995 
(public contest) and finished in 2001 
(completion of the public facilities 
and land readjustment)
2005 Early 1990s Contract signed in 2000 Proposal was signed in 2005 
by partnership
General objectives 
of the proposed 
instrument
FAR bonus instruments:
Ensure balance between  -
public infrastructure and 
buildings
Achieve a pleasant urban  -
environment
Re-allocation (provision of 
public amenities without 
public finance)
Development of a new neighborhood 
in green land. Land readjustment 
among 300 properties connected 
with 12 other land readjustments 
around different parts of the city
Introduction upon 
drawing up the GTP of the 
management and transfer 
rules of the building rights
To encourage development 
of new low-income housing, 
specifically SROs (single-
room occupancy buildings)
Comprehensive development 
of new housing area with 
6,000 houses via re-
allocation of development 
rights
Relocation of landowner AFC 
within the project
Characteristic factors Introduction of non-office 
usages such as retail, 
conference, restaurants to 
an office dominated Central 
Business District
Implemented on the basis 
of a single developer
The case combines the techniques 
of land readjustment with TDRs, and 
public contest to select the developer 
in charge. The number of landowners 
affected was unusually large
Urban vision is necessary -
Public/private negotiation  -
is planned and organized
Owners of qualifying sites can 
transfer unused floor area to 
any location in the Central 
City Plan District
Re-allocation of plots in order 
to get optimal overall quality 
of the area
Relocation of sports fields 
of a powerful football club 
within a major internationally 
competing business district
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined the 
instrument
Rapid growth of the economy 
resulted in high development 
pressures on the Central 
Business District
Shortage of public  -
finance to meet the 
demanding public spaces
The burgeoning trend  -
of market-oriented 
approaches to planning
Typical development in Valencia 
region during the mid- 1990s. 
The premise was that all the 
landowners of green land affected 
by development around the city had 
to have equal development rights 
gauged in terms of financial value 
Lack of public resources to 
expropriate and equity of 
treatment of owners in a 
preventive way and not in 
retrospect
Loss of low income housing 
due to gentrification
VINEX goals to develop 
30,000 houses in Leidsche 
Rijn (and 6,000 in 
Vleuterweide) – divided 
ownership of land in the area
Powerful landowner with 
land to be redeveloped in the 
project who caused problems 
in the relocation of land within 
the project
Fit with the planning 
and legal system: 
What relation with 
spatial plans?
Projects carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
Compatibility with the 
relevant urban planning 
required
Spatial planning of 1988 established 
all the relevant physical and 
social parameters which rule the 
development 
The instrument is an 
important part of the new 
municipality GRP.
TDR provisions for this case 
appear within one of the plan 
districts (Central City Plan 
District). Areas that have 
unique characteristics or 
resources can form a District.
Proposed development has 
been laid down in a local land 
use plan
Deal of original landowners 
with public private 
partnership. Ultimately 
inclusion of the relocation in 
land use plan
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
Tokyo Building made use  -
of the Special FAR applied 
district regulation (2001)
Marunouchi Building and  -
Industry Club of Japan 
Building made use of existing 
FAR regulations (1961)
Yes
PUNTA at the national  -
level
City ordinance for  -
specific regulation
No. Only the details of the land use 
regulation were drawn up for the 
case, but it was based on previously 
established parameters. It was also 
necessary to establish the economic 
details related to the landowners’ 
participation, but they were strictly 
fixed, applying the general legal rules 
and also the result of bids offered 
during the public contest
Regional legislation Not for this particular case No No
Spatial level at which 
the case is tackled
National and local levels 
combined
Local (municipality) Both in the actuating plan 
and all over the municipality 
territory 
District level Project and local level Project and local level, with 
also national interference

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Table 11.3 The re-allocation problem
Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2)
Name of the case Redevelopment of the 
Marunouchi District (Tokyo)
Jeonong-dong, 
Sinseol-dong and Isoo 
development tract (Seoul)
Land readjustment Orriols (Valencia) Rome Portland, The Sally 
McCracken Building
GEM Vleuterweide (City of 
Utrecht)
Zuidas enterprise in South 
Axis (City of Amsterdam)
Period in which the 
case was introduced
Bubble economy period (1986-
1991)
Since 2003 The bases were established in the 
General Plan of Valencia in 1988. 
Orriols operation started in 1995 
(public contest) and finished in 2001 
(completion of the public facilities 
and land readjustment)
2005 Early 1990s Contract signed in 2000 Proposal was signed in 2005 
by partnership
General objectives 
of the proposed 
instrument
FAR bonus instruments:
Ensure balance between  -
public infrastructure and 
buildings
Achieve a pleasant urban  -
environment
Re-allocation (provision of 
public amenities without 
public finance)
Development of a new neighborhood 
in green land. Land readjustment 
among 300 properties connected 
with 12 other land readjustments 
around different parts of the city
Introduction upon 
drawing up the GTP of the 
management and transfer 
rules of the building rights
To encourage development 
of new low-income housing, 
specifically SROs (single-
room occupancy buildings)
Comprehensive development 
of new housing area with 
6,000 houses via re-
allocation of development 
rights
Relocation of landowner AFC 
within the project
Characteristic factors Introduction of non-office 
usages such as retail, 
conference, restaurants to 
an office dominated Central 
Business District
Implemented on the basis 
of a single developer
The case combines the techniques 
of land readjustment with TDRs, and 
public contest to select the developer 
in charge. The number of landowners 
affected was unusually large
Urban vision is necessary -
Public/private negotiation  -
is planned and organized
Owners of qualifying sites can 
transfer unused floor area to 
any location in the Central 
City Plan District
Re-allocation of plots in order 
to get optimal overall quality 
of the area
Relocation of sports fields 
of a powerful football club 
within a major internationally 
competing business district
Particular economic 
and social 
circumstances that 
have determined the 
instrument
Rapid growth of the economy 
resulted in high development 
pressures on the Central 
Business District
Shortage of public  -
finance to meet the 
demanding public spaces
The burgeoning trend  -
of market-oriented 
approaches to planning
Typical development in Valencia 
region during the mid- 1990s. 
The premise was that all the 
landowners of green land affected 
by development around the city had 
to have equal development rights 
gauged in terms of financial value 
Lack of public resources to 
expropriate and equity of 
treatment of owners in a 
preventive way and not in 
retrospect
Loss of low income housing 
due to gentrification
VINEX goals to develop 
30,000 houses in Leidsche 
Rijn (and 6,000 in 
Vleuterweide) – divided 
ownership of land in the area
Powerful landowner with 
land to be redeveloped in the 
project who caused problems 
in the relocation of land within 
the project
Fit with the planning 
and legal system: 
What relation with 
spatial plans?
Projects carried out in 
accordance with the city 
planning vision established for 
the Marunouchi District
Compatibility with the 
relevant urban planning 
required
Spatial planning of 1988 established 
all the relevant physical and 
social parameters which rule the 
development 
The instrument is an 
important part of the new 
municipality GRP.
TDR provisions for this case 
appear within one of the plan 
districts (Central City Plan 
District). Areas that have 
unique characteristics or 
resources can form a District.
Proposed development has 
been laid down in a local land 
use plan
Deal of original landowners 
with public private 
partnership. Ultimately 
inclusion of the relocation in 
land use plan
Were specific laws 
and regulations 
drawn up?
Tokyo Building made use  -
of the Special FAR applied 
district regulation (2001)
Marunouchi Building and  -
Industry Club of Japan 
Building made use of existing 
FAR regulations (1961)
Yes
PUNTA at the national  -
level
City ordinance for  -
specific regulation
No. Only the details of the land use 
regulation were drawn up for the 
case, but it was based on previously 
established parameters. It was also 
necessary to establish the economic 
details related to the landowners’ 
participation, but they were strictly 
fixed, applying the general legal rules 
and also the result of bids offered 
during the public contest
Regional legislation Not for this particular case No No
Spatial level at which 
the case is tackled
National and local levels 
combined
Local (municipality) Both in the actuating plan 
and all over the municipality 
territory 
District level Project and local level Project and local level, with 
also national interference

ment rights were used to transfer development rights from land set aside for 
public use to the areas in the outskirts referred to as sectors. The technique 
worked to develop a new neighborhood in green land and involved 300 prop-
erties connected with twelve other land readjustments around different parts 
of the city. The project began in 1995, and the public facilities and land re-
adjustment were completed in 2001. Therefore, the technique was not in any 
way experimental, and it resolved the needs of the many private landowners 
involved and the municipality, and thus proved to be an excellent adaptation 
to the citizens’ circumstances.
The concept of non-financial 11.6 
compensation revisited
This book introduces a new concept in spatial planning: the concept of non-
financial compensation. Now it is time to draw conclusions. Does this new 
concept, together with the case studies, provide new and innovative results 
for spatial planning?
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Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2)
Relevant public 
actors and role
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
incentives
Chiyoda Ward: involved in  -
the planning of the minor 
public facilities (local road, 
local parks)
Local government (The  -
City of Seoul)
The role of formulating  -
the DUP plans and 
issuing the development 
permit on negotiation
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 300 property owners 
contributed in different ways to 
the development. Professional 
developers managed and financed 
the process
Municipality City of Portland approved the 
transfer
Former City of Vleuten-De 
Meern (contracts have 
been adopted by the City of 
Utrecht)
Local authority of Amsterdam 
(public actor in public private 
partnership and responsible 
for land assembly)
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
The several redevelopment 
projects are the outcomes of 
negotiations between private 
and public parties, and not so 
much a result of regulations 
set up by the government in 
advance
Resolved by rounds of 
negotiation between the 
city and the developer 
(in the third example, 
between city and property 
owners, mediated by the 
development company)
Development rights equally 
redistributed among landowners 
proportional to their respective 
original area. Participation of 
external properties assigned for 
public uses in order to compensate 
the greater development possibilities 
in the area
Equalization between private 
interests
Private companies owned 
sending and receiving 
properties
Joint venture on 50-50 basis 
(risks, influence etc.)
Hardly. Deal between 
landowner and public private 
partnership about relocation 
of land use
Parties which 
financed the case
Mitsubishi Corporation Example 1+2: Individual  -
property owner 
(developer)
Example 3: the develop- -
ment company and the 
future residents to be 
housed in the developed 
property
Developers and landowners. Private Sending area was building 
owned by a non profit 
organization; owners of 
adjacent receiving lots were 
owned by another company
Developers and municipality Public private partnership 
responsible for the overall 
financing of the project 
(banks, national government, 
etc.)
Possibility for public 
participation
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by the 
involved parties
Not legally required Through the formal public 
participation in the local land use 
plan. The experience proved that 
public contest stimulates public 
participation.
High Public notice and review took 
place
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan, but in the specific 
deal on relocation

Table 11.3 continued
In Chapter 2 we showed that there are two main reasons why governments 
use the concept of non-financial compensation in spatial planning. The first 
one is compensation per se; the second aims more toward compensation as 
an incentive. In the first category a government compensates a person or com-
pany with an interest in land for the loss of one or more of his property rights 
therein by creating a new property right that he can either use or sell. The in-
centive category is used by a government to ensure that landowners and de-
velopers realize certain planning goals on either their land or on someone 
else’s land, respectively. By creating an incentive, the government does not di-
rectly subsidize that realization but creates a property right that landowners 
and developers can use or sell, respectively, when they have realized the goals.
In this book three abstract cases were provided which lead the reader to 
‘real live’ cases in the six countries which are discussed in this book. These 
cases cover conservation, conversion and re-allocation problems. To avoid the 
risk of losing ourselves in an enumeration of facts, we decided to discuss the 
innovative planning instruments in a structured way. Moreover, the method 
of using three abstract cases, dealing with very concrete planning issues and 
problems, made it easier to compare the cases.
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Japan Korea Spain Italy U.S. Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2)
Relevant public 
actors and role
Tokyo Metropolitan  -
Government: provides the 
conditions for the FAR 
incentives
Chiyoda Ward: involved in  -
the planning of the minor 
public facilities (local road, 
local parks)
Local government (The  -
City of Seoul)
The role of formulating  -
the DUP plans and 
issuing the development 
permit on negotiation
City council of Valencia directed 
the process. 300 property owners 
contributed in different ways to 
the development. Professional 
developers managed and financed 
the process
Municipality City of Portland approved the 
transfer
Former City of Vleuten-De 
Meern (contracts have 
been adopted by the City of 
Utrecht)
Local authority of Amsterdam 
(public actor in public private 
partnership and responsible 
for land assembly)
Balance between 
private and public 
exchange
The several redevelopment 
projects are the outcomes of 
negotiations between private 
and public parties, and not so 
much a result of regulations 
set up by the government in 
advance
Resolved by rounds of 
negotiation between the 
city and the developer 
(in the third example, 
between city and property 
owners, mediated by the 
development company)
Development rights equally 
redistributed among landowners 
proportional to their respective 
original area. Participation of 
external properties assigned for 
public uses in order to compensate 
the greater development possibilities 
in the area
Equalization between private 
interests
Private companies owned 
sending and receiving 
properties
Joint venture on 50-50 basis 
(risks, influence etc.)
Hardly. Deal between 
landowner and public private 
partnership about relocation 
of land use
Parties which 
financed the case
Mitsubishi Corporation Example 1+2: Individual  -
property owner 
(developer)
Example 3: the develop- -
ment company and the 
future residents to be 
housed in the developed 
property
Developers and landowners. Private Sending area was building 
owned by a non profit 
organization; owners of 
adjacent receiving lots were 
owned by another company
Developers and municipality Public private partnership 
responsible for the overall 
financing of the project 
(banks, national government, 
etc.)
Possibility for public 
participation
No, only a master plan was 
made which is seen as a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ by the 
involved parties
Not legally required Through the formal public 
participation in the local land use 
plan. The experience proved that 
public contest stimulates public 
participation.
High Public notice and review took 
place
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan
Through the formal public 
participation in the local land 
use plan, but in the specific 
deal on relocation

The six country chapters are followed by a number of concluding chapters. 
Vincent Renard (Chapter 9) looks at the concept of non-financial compensa-
tion from an economic perspective, whereas Philip Booth (Chapter 10) focuses 
on the legal perspective and origins. They both criticize non-financial com-
pensation practices. Renard does not question the very principle of creating 
rights and organizing markets for the exchange of rights, as he thinks such 
mechanisms are innovative and promising. However, he stresses the specific-
ity of the mechanism as applied to land and land betterment, where the prac-
tical and theoretical issues are different and require a deeper analysis and 
economic practice. Booth concludes that non-financial compensation and the 
various mechanisms described in this book are about finding legal ways of 
offsetting private interest against general interest and ensuring that public 
policy objectives for the spatial distribution of activities and development are 
met.
A noteworthy example in the cases is the density bonus in Korea, which 
is an example of a non-financial incentive. It can be seen as an alternative 
source of capital financing for new facilities needed to realize public pur-
poses. Local governments usually lack financial resources, and, therefore, the 
general tax revenues are inadequate to finance the public services and infra-
structure needed. This is a variation within the concept of non-financial com-
pensation, in which density bonuses can be achieved for doing something in 
return. Density bonus ordinances permit, for example, developers to increase 
the number of units allowed on a piece of property if they agree to restrict the 
rents or sales prices on some of the units. The New York example shows that 
it is possible to obtain density bonuses in return for incorporating plazas, ar-
cades and other on-site amenities into new developments. Planning via den-
sity bonuses or non-financial incentives is a variant of incentive zoning (Mur-
phy & Stinson, 1996). Incentive zoning is intended to provide a reward-based 
system to encourage development that meets established urban development 
goals. Typically, a base level of prescriptive limitations on development will 
be established, and an extensive list of incentive criteria will be established 
for developers to adopt or not at their discretion. A reward scale connected 
to the incentive criteria provides an enticement for developers to incorporate 
the desired development criteria into their projects. Common examples in-
clude FAR bonuses for affordable housing provided on-site, like in our Japa-
nese case, and height limit bonuses for the inclusion of public amenities 
on-site. Incentive zoning is an attractive tool for communities seeking to en-
courage compact development. An interesting illustration of incentive zoning 
can be found in Seattle. The Washington Mutual Tower gained twenty-eight 
of its fifty-five stories as a result of amenities, in particular affordable hous-
ing, offered by the developer (see Figure 11.1). This developer incentive seems 
to work, in addition to the levy for affordable housing and tax exemptions in 
other neighborhoods (Metcalf, 2007).
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In our definition of non-financial compensation we did not include instru-
ments of non-financial incentives. However, we did distinguish multi-purpose 
from single purpose non-financial compensation. Examples of multi-purpose 
non-financial compensation are Hudson Yards and the Highline in New York. 
In the latter case, TDRs were used not only to compensate landowners for 
their loss of development rights, but also to promote the construction of high-
rise buildings outside the area itself. This can be seen as an incentive. Tokyo 
Station is a good example of a single-purpose non-financial compensation 
scheme. The two motives for the project were conservation of the Tokyo sta-
tion and promotion of the construction of high-density buildings in the areas 
that could receive the TDRs. It resembles the Penn Central example in New 
York (see Chapter 7 on the U.S.).
The borders between non-financial compensation and incentives are 
vague. Not only the Hudson Yard case shows this, but also the Dutch example 
of Space for Space where farmers were compensated for demolishing empty 
stables. The project itself was initially introduced as an incentive to encour-
age farmers to reduce their stock farming, which resulted in empty stables. 
The Korean cases strike us as a typical example of density bonuses. In multi-
purpose non-financial compensation a non-financial incentive is quite often 
included, as the example of Space for Space shows. As a result of feedback on 
the draft papers during the workshops we organized between the contribu-
tors, we distinguished between non-financial compensation and incentive. 
Further research into planning with non-financial incentives might be an in-
teresting addition to this study of non-financial compensation. Together they 
more or less cover all the non-financial planning practices and are broader 
and have a more neutral concept than the better known and often misused 
concept of TDRs.
Comparing the planning context 11.7 
of the six countries
As explained in Chapter 1, there is hardly any relevant literature on the meth-
odological approach to international comparative research by discussing dif-
ferent schools and the aims of comparative research. Since the 1990s there 
has been a growing interest in investigations into different aspects of spatial 
and urban policy. A number of generally descriptive international compara-
tive studies have been done on spatial and urban policy in West European 
countries (e.g. Newman & Thornley, 1996; Schmidt-Eichstadt, 1996; CEC, 1997; 
Spaans, 2002; Booth et al., 2007). A number of these studies consist of collec-
tions of separate chapters dealing with individual countries written by local 
experts, including adequate introductions and conclusions. Others are limited 
to comparisons between cities and regions. Much of this comparative research 
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in planning is done to increase knowledge and to develop ideas for new poli-
cies and instruments to improve or change individual systems. In this study 
we distinguished three levels of increasing intensity in the transfer of plan-
ning instruments and practice: inspiration, learning and transplantation (Sec-
tion 1.3).
We ended Section 1.3 with De Jong’s (2004) conclusion that planners who 
want to adopt transplants from countries varying greatly in terms of admin-
istrative culture and structure should reckon on considerable institutional 
complications, caused by the different cultural, political, administrative, legal, 
social and economic circumstances. We also concluded that it is commonly 
assumed that transplanting planning institutions from countries with similar 
political, legal and cultural characteristics is easier.
In this section we will try to compare the planning context of the six coun-
tries. There have been wide-ranging theoretical discussions with respect to 
the comparison of welfare states. A large number of West-European countries 
laid the foundations of their welfare state in the early years after World War 
II. The discussion of the welfare state has been dominated by the distinction 
between convergence and divergence. Those who adhere to the convergence 
thesis assume that under the influence of similar political, economic, demo-
graphic, and technological developments, the national welfare arrangements 
will become increasingly similar. The divergence perspective, on the other 
hand, is based on the assumption that the national welfare states will show 
very different reactions to similar internal societal trends and external inter-
national developments (Spaans, 2002; Engbersen et al., 1994).
When categorizing countries – be it in welfare state regimes, planning, 
legal or other types of families – the focus is often on European countries, 
sometimes complemented by countries such as the U.S., Australia and Can-
ada, but rarely with Asian, Latin American and African countries. Esping-An-
dersen (1990) elaborated a classification of countries into a number of clusters 
of different types of welfare states. Some researchers have applied this classi-
fication to other fields, such as housing. Starting from the three classes of re-
gimes, they expand on the dichotomy of divergence and convergence (Smidt, 
1989; Oxley, 1991; Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992; Doling, 1997).
When distinguishing between planning families, the categorization very 
much depends on the approach used. Spatial planning systems are influenced 
by three main contextual factors, which include constitutional law, govern-
ment structure and responsibilities for spatial planning, and the legal frame-
work (CEC, 1997). As a consequence, the planning context in individual coun-
tries is shaped by their history. Sorensen (2005) demonstrates the example of 
Japan in which institutional specifics very strongly determine the planning 
systems. The Japanese planning is shaped by a distinct state-society relation-
ship characterized by a persistent notion of individual and collective sacrifice 
for the sake of national interests. The distinctly centralized style of Japanese 
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planning draws on this culture of sacrifice; and in this top-down approach, 
the Japanese planning bureaucracy is supported by both political parties and 
business elites, forming a mutually supportive triangular relationship.
The roots of the modern Korean planning system can be traced back to the 
period of Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945. While the Japanese 
City Planning Laws have taken a holistic and authoritative stance towards the 
planning process, the Korean framework focuses on master planning, con-
cerned with broad visions rather than detail. The planning system is one of 
broad zoning and subsequent technical control, all administered at the city 
government level (Gallent & Kim, 2001).
As described in Chapter 7, land use controls have a long history in the U.S. 
In the early days few problems existed with the taking of land for public pur-
poses due to the abundance of land. Now when zoning is used as a land use 
device which superimposes a grid on land, dividing the different zones into 
categories generally including types of use, area requirements, we see a very 
protected property rights regime. According to U.S. property law, the owner 
of land is entitled to a certain ‘bundle of rights’ which includes components 
such as the right to develop land, air rights and mineral rights. Development 
is often ‘as-of-right’, implying that the owner is entitled to certain benefits as 
long as his plan fits the existing regulations. This right cannot be taken from 
a property owner for public use without compensation, making zoning a dif-
ficult undertaking in the U.S. Planning and land use regulations in the U.S. are 
for the most part accomplished at the municipal level of government and the 
forces in favor of zoning differ between states.
From the legal perspective, countries can be categorized according to their 
legal system. The essential characteristics of spatial planning are often estab-
lished by the countries’ constitution. What is essential is the extent to which 
the countries’ constitution defines individual or government rights and re-
sponsibilities and what structure of government establishes the constitution 
and allocates responsibilities in relation to spatial planning functions. When 
specifically looking at legal systems, a distinction is often made between com-
mon law and civil law countries. Booth (2005) for example demonstrates that 
even though the planning systems in both France and Britain were inspired 
by German townplanning in the nineteenth century, they evolved in very dif-
ferent ways, due to differences in their legal systems: common law in Britain 
and civil law in France.
Planning in the Netherlands is shaped by a set of circumstances created 
not only by its geography but also by its Protestant tradition, its corporatist 
structure of decision making, and a culture with a soft spot for planning (Fa-
ludi, 2005). Planning contexts vary not only amongst different nations in the 
world, but also within nations, particularly those with federal governance 
structures. In Italy, planning is caught in the duality between city-state tra-
dition and central-state government. Somewhere in between there are the 
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regions. Comprehensive spatial planning in Italy is narrowed by the con-
struction activities of local organizations on the one hand and by project im-
plementation of central-state planning authorities on the other (Keller et al., 
1996).
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC, 1997) 
proposes four major traditions of spatial planning:
The regional economic planning approach, in which spatial planning has  ■
a very broad meaning relating to the pursuit of wide social and economic 
objectives.
The comprehensive integrated approach, in which spatial planning is con- ■
ducted through a very systematic and formal hierarchy of plans from the 
national to the local level, which coordinate public sector activity across 
different sectors but focuses more specifically on spatial coordination than 
economic development. The Netherlands is one example.
The land use management approach, where planning is more closely as- ■
sociated with the narrower task of controlling the change of use of land at 
the strategic and local levels.
The ‘urbanism’ tradition, which has a strong architectural flavor and con- ■
cern with urban design, townscape and building control. Regulation has 
been undertaken through rigid zoning and codes. Spain and Italy are ex-
amples of this category.
Countries may move from one approach to another over time. Britain, for ex-
ample, is currently moving from the land use management approach towards 
the comprehensive integrated approach. These traditions are based on the 
European context, but may be extended to countries worldwide. If we put the 
other three countries into these European based traditions, we would include 
Japan in the first tradition and Korea and the U.S. in the third category.
This leaves four aspects that are relevant to understanding the position of 
a non-financial compensation scheme in a country (see Table 11.4). First it is 
necessary to determine into which family the planning system can be situ-
ated and, since non-financial compensation schemes rely on private parties 
for their success, how strong the gap between public and private parties is 
in that country. In the Netherlands, for example, the government relatively 
often plays the role of ‘land developer’ both to generate revenues and to steer 
or control development, and this is accepted by private parties, whereas in 
the U.S. it is very hard for public parties to interfere in development. The sec-
ond aspect includes the level of government that enables the existence of the 
scheme (local, regional or national) and the scale of the scheme itself (local or 
regional). Then the question would be whether the non-financial compensa-
tion scheme is an accepted or an experimental approach. Finally, the question 
is whether such a scheme exists as an as-of-right scheme or as part of a nego-
tiation process. As-of-right means that compensation is automatically grant-
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ed to a landowner or developer if he fulfils the (paper) requirements whereas 
negotiation schemes involve negotiations on the amount of compensation. 
An in-between variant existed, where the initial developers were involved in 
a compensation scheme (at the level of a specific project), after which it be-
came general practice.
Concluding remarks: 11.8 
planning for the future
Research approach and comparability among cases
We used an abstract case-approach for the analysis of the actual cases in the 
countries. The objective of this analysis was to find out which non-financial 
compensation instruments solve the conservation, conversion and re-alloca-
tion problems in the countries considered. In taking this approach, we neces-
sarily paid less attention to the differences between the various planning sys-
tems of the countries. The surplus value of this approach, aimed to provide 
better comparability between the various countries.
At the end of this book, the question remains as to whether this approach 
proves useful beyond the context of this book and actually results in compa-
rable answers and solutions. Starting with the latter, the answer is complex. 
Planning operates within a real life context that involves a wide variety of is-
sues such as culture, history and politics. Non-financial compensation instru-
ments are no exception to this rule and the real-life cases in this book cannot 
be fully understood without some knowledge of the background of the plan-
ning systems. However, from a more abstract point of view, the various instru-
ments show some striking similarities both in their aims and in their legal de-
signs. The Marunouchi case in Japan is very similar to the Penn Central case 
in New York, the innovative District Unit Planning-system in Korea turned out 
to be a density bonus-system that will certainly strike readers from the U.S. 
as familiar.
What certainly worked was the ‘zooming in approach’. Normally, practices 
such as non-financial compensation practices are presented as part of a wider 
planning case. It is then just one of the issues presented, and the reader is not 
presented with a full description of the non-financial compensation scheme. 
By zooming into one practice and starting from an abstract case, the authors 
were asked to work the other way around – to start with the non-financial 
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Table 11.4 Typology of the six countries
Level
Embeddedness in 
national system Planning approach
As-of-right/
negotiation
Japan Local General practice Regional economic planning approach As-of-right
Korea Local Experimental Land use management approach As-of-right
Spain Local General practice Urbanism tradition Mixture
Italy Local General practice Urbanism tradition As-of-right
U.S. Local and regional General practice Land use management approach As-of-right
Netherlands Local and regional Experimental Comprehensive integrated approach Mixture
compensation practice and then explain the context. We claim that this ap-
proach is helpful for planning practitioners. Planning in the 21st century is 
complex and in daily practice can only be done by a team of specialists. Spe-
cialists presented with the problems in this book will find this book useful. 
The case studies may not provide them with all the details they need to solve 
their cases, but it may tell them which approaches they need to look into and 
which to avoid.
This brings us to whether this approach is also useful beyond the context 
of this book. We believe it is. Although one has to be aware of the various is-
sues that come with any real-life case (see Chapter 1), the abstract case-ap-
proach is useful for both academics and planners who want to exchange ex-
periences. The chosen approach thus encourages cross-country learning. In 
our book we show that planners face similar problems in planning practice 
across countries. Although the planning systems in these countries vary con-
siderably, planners looked for inspiration beyond their borders. This results 
in innovative instruments which are adapted to the specific circumstances of 
the national planning system. We have observed a search for new planning 
tools to address similar problems across countries.
Further research and conclusion
As is often the case after finalizing a project such as this book, one ends up 
with more questions than one started with. Earlier on in this chapter we 
intro duced one direction for further research: exploring in more depth the 
concept of non-financial incentives. The second direction for further research 
remains closer to the issue addressed in this book: taking a broader geograph-
ical perspective of the concept of non-financial compensation than the Japa-
nese, Korean, Italian, Spanish, American and Dutch perspectives. The idea of 
non-financial compensation and incentives will be dealt with in other coun-
tries as well, probably under different names.
Market-oriented planning instruments have recently received a lot of at-
tention in many countries. They reflect a strong awareness of the need for a 
more balanced and sustainable spatial development with excess space for 
future development. It is increasingly assumed that it is the market and not 
the state that should resolve planning problems either without or with mini-
mal (financial) public intervention. This issue is also linked to the global trend 
from government to governance, in which government takes a step back from 
planning and leaves more and more development to the private sector. In this 
view, government creates the preconditions and sets out the policy objectives. 
Citizens and private parties enjoy greater freedom in this setting, as public 
authorities are less preoccupied with whether the objectives will be attained 
in one way or another. The idea of recouping value and ‘pay-as-you-grow’ sys-
tems are gaining in popularity, but also the idea of planning via compensa-
tion.
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We have discussed the concept of non-financial compensation in this book. 
Though the idea of this exchange is not completely new and is already known 
under different labels as TDRs, the Valencia model, District Unit Planning and 
Space for Space, this book contributes to planning theory and science by elab-
orating this concept and defining it more clearly.
Even though there appear to be many pitfalls to the implementation of the 
concept of non-financial compensation and the fact that it will always require 
active government interference, it seems to offer an interesting new perspec-
tive to planning. Even though new instruments will always result in some 
new failures, the failures of non-financial compensation might be less harm-
ful to society as they foster creativity.
The steering role of government in a planning system which includes non-
financial compensation schemes is not weaker than in a more permissive 
planning system, rather it is stronger. Private actors will get – as long as they 
carry public interest in sustainable development with them – a more promi-
nent role in a planning system. The aim is not necessarily that non-financial 
compensation planning as such will be more profitable, but that this kind of 
planning will result in a greater number of initiatives that will strengthen the 
creativity and innovative solutions and will ultimately result in improved sus-
tainability. The answer, after reading this book, is that this result is indeed 
possible.
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Transferable Development Rights, a market-oriented planning instrument developed 
in the U.S., has received a lot of attention in many other countries. It has been a 
source of inspiration for planning systems, resulting in instruments concerning  
the transfer of development opportunities between areas. These instruments often 
have a much broader scope than just the transfer of development rights and also 
relate to compensation, not financially, but in a non-financial perspective:  
governments compensating landowners non-monetarily for opportunity losses  
or loss of endeavors. It can also be used as an incentive structure to realize  
planning goals via the market. Therefore they can help realizing creative and  
flexible solutions.
This book is valuable for all concerned with market-oriented planning. It offers  
an elaboration on the concept of non-financial compensation and a systematic 
comparison of the use of several instruments of this type in six countries around 
the world.
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